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Abstract 
This thesis is a contribution to cross-national studies of professional officer education and 
training. It describes and evaluates a junior officer preparation programme at King Khaled 
Military Academy (KKMA), Saudi Arabia, in a comprehensive way. Both positive and negative 
aspects of the programme are included in this study, along with an extensive literature survey 
highlighting common features of programme effectiveness and potential barriers to success. 
The research develops an innovative five-point "star model" for the evaluation of junior officer 
preparation programmes, deemed appropriate for the investigation of five programme 
components: recruitment and selection, indoctrination, vocational preparation, liberal education, 
and physical fitness. 
To obtain multiple viewpoints in evaluating KKMA's junior officer programme, the study 
adopts a multiple method design integrating the use of questionnaires, interviews, and 
documentary evidence, in order to permit triangulation. It is also guided by three questions: 
"How is it done? "; "How well is it done? "; and "How can it be improvedT. In total, one hundred 
graduating cadets, forty seven teaching staff members, and three high-ranking military officers 
took part in this study. 
The study is organised as follows. Chapter one introduces the research, chapter two explores 
issues surrounding the professional education and training of the modem military officer, 
chapter three surveys the relevant literature, chapter four explains the study's methodology, 
chapters five to nine present the results and chapter ten discusses the main findings and draws 
conclusions. 
The major findings of this research are as follows: based mainly on the perceptions of the 
research participants, (1) KKMA's recruitment and selection system was judged to be 
unsystematic and ineffective despite the huge efforts and resources invested in it annually; (2) 
the evidence pointed to a mixed verdict with regard to KKMA's indoctrination programme, 
recognising that it was strong in terms of military culture, but weak because it emphasised 
soldiering over leadership training; (3) the Academy's vocational programme was overall rated 
as moderately effective and balanced, although improvements were needed in the provision of 
technical, technological, and leadership skills; (4) the liberal education programme was also 
judged to be on balance moderately effective despite imperfections, particularly in terms of 
relevance to military needs; finally (5) KKMA's physical fitness programme equally emerged as 
moderately effective despite weaknesses and barriers impeding its success, its greatest 
deficiency being that it did not teach cadets how to coach others. 
Practical implications include the need to review and update every aspect of KKMA's junior 
officer preparation programme, if it is to continue to enjoy high esteem for excellence and 
integrity, and if its graduates are to merit the status of professionals. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This research is an attempt to evaluate empirically the effectiveness of King Khaled 
Military Academy's junior officer preparation programme. This chapter provides an 
overview of the research from its inception to its completion. It begins with the 
background of the study and justifies the need for it. The research problem is then 
stated. Next, the major aim of this research and the research questions are addressed. 
Following that, the scope and limitations, the benefits, and an outline of the thesis are 
given. 
1.2 Background of the Study 
The Saudi National Guard (SANG) was founded in 1960. It represents a significant 
part of the Saudi military strength, and its key roles are the defence of Islam, the King 
and the homeland and its citizens, in conjunction with other armed and security forces 
of the country (Dahy 1988: 93). It is headed by Crown Prince Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz, 
its commander, who is also Deputy Prime Minister in the Saudi Government. 
Since its creation, SANG has benefited from the experience and expertise of various 
countries in developing an adequate military training and education system for its 
members, particularly its officer corps. However, for over two decades, SANG's 
officer corps remained heavily dependent upon the military schools of friendly nations, 
namely those of Jordan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in preparing the 
bulk of its members. In 1983, King Khaled Military Academy (KKMA) was 
established. Its purpose was to train and educate professional SANG officers. KKMA 
is structured in the mould of most modem military academies in the world and shares 
many of their characteristics and goals. It produces between 300-400 officer cadets per 
year, and is staffed by over 100 senior military officers and 30 full-time post-graduate 
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civilian teachers and trainers. 
As is the case with most modem military academies in the world, KKMA is keen to 
produce professional military leaders who are capable of performing their multiple 
functions in times of both peace and war. Emphasis is heavily laid on preparation for 
battle because a soldier's first task is to fight and win wars. However, considerable 
attention is also paid to preparing future officers to be responsible and well-adjusted 
citizens, who are comfortable as members of the military community, as well as 
members of the wider society which they are committed to protect, at the cost of their 
own lives should that be necessary. This dual function, professional and societal, 
emphasized by notable military writers (Janowitz 1960, Huntington 1957, Jordan 
1971, Moskos and Wood 1988 etc) has been the basis upon which many officer 
preparation programmes have been designed in the military establishments of the 
Western World and other countries that have emulated them. Each country, however, 
including Saudi Arabia, has attempted to tailor its officer preparation programmes to 
suit its particular circumstances and needs. 
As national security has become a matter of great concern because of the 
unprecedented complexity and ambiguity of the twenty-first century operational 
environment, increasing attention is paid to how best to educate and train military 
leaders. This is all the more important at a time of new regional and international 
groupings and alliances, and common security goals. Hence, there is a pressing need to 
update and harmonise military preparation programmes. Inevitably, military research 
efforts are aiming in this direction. It is against this background that the present 
research was conducted. A main motivation behind it is to provide empirical evidence 
of the state of KKMA's junior officer preparation programme at the dawn of the new 
century. 
1.3 The Need for this Study 
The preparation of SANG's officer corps is a vital part of Saudi military defence 
strategy. The quality of its members largely depends on their initial academy 
preparation. For this reason, it is important to ensure that the education and training 
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officer cadets go through is adequate. Currently, this means that they should be 
equipped with the necessary knowledge and skills they need to perform their duties as 
military leaders, without neglecting their growth and development as well-adjusted 
citizens of the wider society to which they belong. Twenty years after its birth, KKMA 
has not as yet conducted a single comprehensive evaluation of its junior officer 
preparation programme. According to Converse (1998), some form of evaluation of 
officer education and training is conducted at least once a year in Western military 
academies, particularly in the USA. This implies that it is high time to attempt to at 
least evaluate KKMA's junior officer preparation programme in the light of practices 
in other academies with long traditions of military professionalism and academic 
excellence, such as Sandhurst (UK) and West Point (US) and others, as well as of 
recent military theory. 
1.4 Statement of the Problem 
In a paper entitled "Why Arabs lose wars", Atkine (2000: 19) contends that leadership 
preparation may be the greatest weakness of Arab training systems. Without regular 
and systematic evaluations of its officer preparation programmes, KKMA's objective 
of producing capable and effective leaders is left to chance. In the USA, the military 
academies of West Point and Annapolis see their mission as to produce 'the best 
leaders in the world' and their programmes are geared to achieve just that (Thomas 
2000: 14). How does KKMA know what kind of leaders it is producing? How does it 
know whether or not the various components of its officer preparation programme are 
based on sound theoretical foundations, and how does it know the extent to which it is 
being effective in the delivery of its programme? Is the cadets' learning environment 
conducive to effective learning? Is its military culture adequate, and are its 
indoctrination methods appropriate in the modem world? These are only a few of the 
questions for which there are no answers yet. One would expect a highly regarded 
military academy such as KKMA to have such knowledge available periodically if it is 
to attain high levels of performance and maintain its reputation for excellence. 
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1.5 Aims of the Study 
The main aim of this investigation is to arrive at an empirically based assessment of 
the effectiveness of KKMA's junior officer preparation programme. It is suggested in 
this work that all education and training activities that cadets undergo could be 
grouped and studied under five components which form the basis of the theoretical 
framework. These are: (i) Recruitment and Selection; (ii) Indoctrination; (111) 
General/Liberal Education; (iv) Vocational Education and Training; and (v) Physical 
Fitness Training. 
One objective of this study is to gather a wealth of knowledge from theory and best 
practice in military literature that is relevant to each of the five components of junior 
officer preparation. It seeks to identify as many contributing factors to success as 
possible and use them as a basis for the evaluation of KKMA's performance in the 
design and delivery of its programmes. It also attempts to uncover the various barriers 
that reduce effectiveness and explores ways to improve the Academ's programmes. 
Since the present researcher was unable to find a single study specifically related to the 
topic of this thesis, whether in Saudi Arabia or in any other Arab country, a fact also 
noticed by Converse (1998: 294), another aim of this study is to fill that void with a 
first research attempt which, it is hoped, will stimulate future work. A further aim 
stemming from the discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of KKMA's junior 
officer preparation programme, and other insights, is that it is hoped that the relevant 
authorities will reflect on the findings of this study and begin a process of appropriate 
remedial action to enhance effectiveness. 
1.6 Scope and Limitations 
This research is limited to the evaluation of KKMA's regular-track junior officer 
preparation programme (see Fig. 5.1). It is assessed mainly through the attitudes and 
perceptions of a scientifically selected representative sample of cadets and their 
teachers and trainers, as well as through the views and attitudes of three senior military 
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commanders responsible for education and training. The programme is also assessed 
through the analysis of documentary evidence and on the basis of relevant military 
literature. This work, therefore, makes no claim that its findings are irrefutable, nor 
immune from possible perceptual or attitudinal bias. It is in no way comparable wi 
an objective government report. 
1.7 Research Questions 
In the light of the aims and scope of this investigation, the following research 
questions have been developed: 
RQI How effective are current recruitment and selection practices in KKMA? 
RQ2 How effective is KKMA's indoctrination programme? 
RQf How effective is KKMA's vocational programme? 
RQ4 How effective is KKMA's liberal education programme? 
RQ5 How effective is KKMA's physical fitness progamme? 
RQ6 What problems and obstacles impede the effectiveness of KKMA's junior 
officer preparation programme? 
1.8 Overview of Methodology Used 
The methodological approach used to achieve the research objectives and answer the 
research questions integrates the use of three instruments: questionnaire, interview, and 
documentary research. It could be described as "a multi-method evaluation design" 
(Robson 2000: 8 1). It is an approach that pen-nits triangulation and provides a check on 
bias. The investigation begins with a survey of the literature on the professional 
education and training of military officers. The aim is to gather knowledge of and 
insights into the experiences of other countries in the field and to identify current 
trends and the rationales behind them, in order to provide a basis for the evaluation of 
current practices in KKMA. 
Once the literature review is completed and the research design is finalized, 
preparations for a pilot study will begin. This will involve the design and construction 
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of a structured questionnaire, the main instrument for this study, which is to be 
completed by graduating third year-cadets (Class 1999) and members of the teaching 
staff. The second data collection instrument for this study consists of interviews with 
three military commanders who will be asked a fixed set of pre-determined questions 
on junior officer programme effectiveness. They will also be asked questions on how 
the programme could be improved. The third collection tool to be used in this study is 
documentary research. This consists of examining and analysing printed documents, 
such as syllabus details, manuals etc. The intention here is to obtain as full a picture of 
the programme as possible, and allow comments to be made on its nature and delivery 
in the light of the respondents' reactions. 
The main field study will need to draw a representative sample of respondents from 
KKMA. For the survey, two independent sub samples are needed: cadets and teaching 
staff members. Random sampling will be used. Interviews with commanders need to 
be arranged, and data collection will make use of a tape recorder and/or note taking as 
a technique. Gathering documentary evidence will continue until the end of the field 
study. The whole data collecting process is expected to face no major problems, as the 
present researcher is himself a graduate of KKMA and a member of SANG. 
Once all the relevant data are gathered, the survey results will be analysed 
quantitatively with the help of a computer, using frequency distribution and other 
relevant statistical techniques. The interview data will be processed qualitatively, as 
will the documentary evidence. Comparisons of results between cadets, teaching staff, 
and commanders' reactions will be made throughout the analysis. As a whole, the merit 
of the methodology used for this research is that it provides evidence from more than 
one perspective (cadets, teaching staff, commanders), and uses more than one 
investigatory technique (triangulation). 
1.9 Outline of the Study 
This research consists of ten chapters, as outlined below: 
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Chapter I introduces the study, its background, the need for conducting it, the 
research problem, the study's aims and objectives, its scope and limitations, and 
specifications of the research questions and the methodological approach and 
techniques to be used in order to achieve the desired goals. 
Chapter 2 explores issues surrounding the professional education and training of the 
modem military officer and surveys relevant military literature. It also gives a general 
picture of the nature of officer preparation in military academies, as the present 
investigation is conducted in King Khaled Military Academy in Saudi Arabia. 
Arguments to justify the choice of a theoretical framework for this research are also 
offered here. 
Chapter 3 continues the survey of military literature. It presents and discusses key 
features of effective junior officer preparation programmes in relation to each of the 
five components of officer preparation: Selection, Indoctrination, Vocational 
Education and Training, Liberal Education, and Physical Fitness. Obstacles to 
effectiveness are also addressed. 
Chapter 4 explains and justifies the choice of research design and instruments for this 
study. It describes how the survey questionnaire was constructed and pilot tested, as 
well as how the other instruments are to be used. It also covers the issues of target 
population and sampling, the data analysis methods used, validity and reliability, and 
the ethical dimension of conducting this research. 
Chapters 5-9 present the statistical results of this study together with their analyses. A 
separate chapter is devoted to the results of each of the five programme components. 
Chapter 10 sums up and discusses the main findings and their implications, and draws 
conclusions for this study. It answers the research questions, specifies the 
limitations, 
states the contributions made, and ends with suggestions 
for future research. 
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Chapter Two 
Professional Education and Training of Military Officers 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at a number of issues surrounding the professional education and 
training of the modem military officer. The notions of profession and 
professionalisation in general and in relation to the military are first discussed. Next, 
the distinctive aspects of military officer professionalism are highlighted. The chapter 
then gives an account of some contemporary trends affecting military professionalism 
and discusses their implications for officer preparation. It continues with a clarification 
of the purposes that training and education are designed to fulfil. The need for officer 
preparation to be broad-based, balanced, and of a high quality, together with the 
necessity for it to be continuous throughout the officer's career are explained next. 
This is followed by a general picture of the nature of officer preparation in military 
academies, because the present investigation is to be carried out in King Khaled 
Military Academy in Saudi Arabia. Finally, arguments are offered to justify the choice 
of a theoretical framework for this research. 
2.2 The Concept of Profession 
According to Dowens (1983: 1), much of our understanding of the notion of "military 
profession" and "military professionalism" derives from, or is based upon the stock of 
knowledge accumulated in the study of the general concepts of "profession" and 
"professionalism". This is not surprising since the military profession shares many of 
its features with the core characteristics of other long-establi shed professions. 
However, like most other specialised occupations, the military profession can be 
separated from other activities by its own distinctive traits and functions. 
Becker (1962: 30) sees profession as a "scientific concept" that can be defined through 
a precise list of features, in other words , it is possible to isolate a particular occupation 
and subject it to detailed analysis in order to 
identify its constituents. 
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2.3 Components of Profession 
Millerson (1964: 15) proposed a list of six main basic features that contribute to the 
definition of what he referred to as a "true profession": a) skills, b) training, c) 
competence, d) recognised form of organisation, e) code of conduct, f) service to the 
community. Goode (1957: 126) also described profession in ternis of basic traits. He 
viewed a profession as "a community within a community", which implies a certain 
degree of independence of such an organisation from the larger community which it 
serves. With this focus on the group or "community" in mind, Goode outlined the main 
characteristics that typified any occupation that claimed to be a profession. He 
remarked that its members were bound by a strong sense of common identity. Once in 
it, members acquired a lifelong status and became tied by a commitment to serve it 
indefinitely. Members of a profession shared common values and its roles were clear 
and binding. It often possessed a common language, which was only partially 
understood by others. A profession was answerable to the community that it served. Its 
goals were reasonably clear. Finally, its members were recruited through selection, 
followed by a process of training and adult socialisation. 
Criteria taken from several definitions of "true professions" can be condensed as 
follows. A profession possesses a degree of monopoly and control over a specific body 
of theoretical and practical knowledge. New recruits to the profession must undergo 
intensive, lengthy, forinal education and training, at the end of which their knowledge 
and skills are formally assessed by qualified practitioners, and appropriately rewarded 
by the award of a professionally and socially recognised qualification. The activities of 
the profession must serve a vital need of the wider community and the role of the 
practitioner is in essence that of a servant to the community. A profession retains a 
significant level of autonomy in the way it runs its affairs, and over matters of 
recruitment, training, discipline, and the maintenance of professional standards. 
Further, it sees itself as, and is often organised into a distinctive group or community 
with an occupational consciousness, or mission. It has a distinctive culture that 
transmits its values, norms, and symbols. The profession is taken as a full-time, long- 
term or permanent career. Finally, a society approves of, endorses, and supports its 
activities as morally praiseworthy. It also grants it a status of high esteem, respect, 
confidence, prestige, and often privilege, too. ( Dowens 1983: 5, Sarkesian 1981: 
6) 
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2.4 Professionalisation 
Most professions rely heavily on higher education institutions for the development of a 
large part of the skills and knowledge required to sustain them. However, there are 
many exceptions. Some professions, such as the Military prefer to run their own 
general and specialist courses, although their institutions often emulate many of the 
characteristics of mainstream higher education systems. Such establishments, first and 
foremost aim for the preparation of recruits for membership of the profession. The 
increasingly complex nature of most professions and the tasks expected of them by 
society today make it essential for their recruits to undertake a lengthy, intensive, 
formal and practical programme of education and training. 
The preparation process consists of three broad aspects: (a) a general and, according to 
Goode (1957: 196) liberal education; (b) a specialised training in the specific theory 
and skills of the profession; and (c) the instilling of certain attitudes and patterns of 
behaviour designed to mould the initiates into the mentality and beliefs of the 
community of the profession they are about to join. Of the three main aspects of 
professional education and training, there is hardly any controversy over the 
importance of the third element, that of instilling standard patterns of behaviour and 
attitudes into students of the profession. However, it is unclear where the preparation 
of professionals ought to place greater emphasis, that is whether it should be on the 
first, the general, liberal education, or on the second, specific training. 
Huntington (1979: 13) emphasises the necessity of both general, liberal and specialist 
education. He takes this view for at least one very good reason, the fact that 
professional expertise is 4(a segment of the total cultural tradition of society". He points 
out that a professional person can only apply his skill effectively if, and only if, he is 
fully aware of the broader culture and traditions of which he is part. Professional 
expertise must therefore be seen as an integral part of the total body of knowledge of 
the particular society in which it is practised, not as a separate body of knowledge that 
is unrelated to it. 
The professionalisation of most occupations rests upon six fundamental elements, as 
Jenkins (1970: 53-107) noted: structural, contextual, activity, ideological, educational, 
and behavioural (Figure 2.1). Below is a brief description of each, highlighting the 
importance of fundamental elements in the 11 11 ion. ight of professionalisat' 
Figure 2-1 Elements of professionalisation 
Structure 
The extent to which an occupation demonstrates evidence of centralisation, 
standardisation, and specialisation largely reflects its degree of professionalisation. As 
far as the Military are concerned, centralisation and standardisation of their activities 
have long been associated with the appropriate government department or ministry, 
which has authority and control over them. Military activities are usually strictly 
conducted by prerogative, that is by permission, for example, of the head of state. A 
system of hierarchy and strict disciplinary rules and procedures covering both 
occupational and non-occupational conduct confirm the status of the Military as an 
authentic profession. 
Context 
Variations in space and time are of special significance for professions. Historical 
considerations demonstrate that professionalisation is a dynamic process. Viable 
criteria and the nature of the professional group may change over time and across 
countries. For these reasons, the task of establishing universal criteria for 
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professionalisation is not an easy one. Indeed, some of them may only have a limited 
applicability. 
Activity 
Practitioners belonging to professional groups and organisations often claim that the 
tasks they perform require specialist skills and knowledge that only they possess. As a 
result, many people tend to equate "specialisation" with "professionalism" and 
associate "professional" with a highly skilled, qualified and competent specialist. 
Education 
It could be said that the true difference between a highly professional group and other 
less professional groups is in their levels of education and expertise. Indeed, the high 
levels of knowledge and techniques expected from a professional group demand that 
substantial attention be paid to the acquisition of the relevant body of knowledge that 
would qualify them as professionals. High standards are crucial here to live up to 
expectations and to maintain the reputation and prestige of the group. 
Ideology 
Belief and pride in the professional status, goals, and ethics of the group by its 
members is a critical measure of its degree of professionalisation. A sense of common 
identity, involvement, shared values, the acceptance of an element of risk in some 
cases, and altruism all contribute towards a culture of high professionalism. 
Behaviour 
The behavioural element is naturally linked with the ideological element. However, 
while the ideological element refers to the beliefs of an occupational group, the 
behavioural element reflects the standards of performance of its members. This also 
includes their conduct twards their peers and other internal and external contacts. 
Groups with sophisticated codes of conduct, like the Military, can legitimately claim a 
higher level of professionalism than those who do not possess one. 
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2.5 The Military Profession 
From the social sciences viewpoint, the military profession is a fascinating subject of 
study. Yet, remarkably some of the most insightful studies on the military profession 
and the education and training of officers dates back to the post-Second World War 
years, four decades ago or so. The ground-breaking works of Masland and Radway 
(1957), Janowitz (1960), and Huntington (1957) in particular stand out prominently in 
the literature on military professionalism. More recent valuable contributions are those 
of Sarkesian (198 1), Dyer (1985), and Eitelberg et al. (1992). 
In view of the global advances in science and technology, and the social changes that 
have occurred over the past decades, it stands to reason to expect the military 
profession to make all possible efforts to keep up with those changes in order to 
maintain its high standards and remain responsive to the needs of the contemporary 
world and the community it is destined to serve (Arnold 1993: 33). This is an issue of 
vital concern in the evaluation of current training and education programmes of 
military officers. But before delving into it in any detail, it is useful to cast an eye on 
some basic facts related to the military profession. 
2.6 Legitimacy of the "Professional" Attribute 
Arnold (1993: 2), Dyer (1985: 23-147), and Sarkesian (1981: 5) stress that "profession" 
is the correct attribute for the career officer today. The term applies to the Military in 
much the same way as it applies to other professions such as medicine and the law. 
The officer corps is mostly a self-regulating body employing members with expert 
knowledge and skills. Like most other disciplines, it has a monopoly over the exercise 
of its functions, as well as the exclusive right to select and train its aspiring members. 
Society at large is its ultimate employer and client (through the mediation of the state). 
In compensation for its services and loyalty, it is granted special privileges. 
2.7 Hallmarks of Military Officer Professionalism 
Huntington (1957: 11) identified three main features of military officer 
professionalism: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. 
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Expertise refers to the professional military officer's skills in the management of 
battles, including the care of personnel and logistics. Such skills are acquired through a 
long process of education and training. Much of this body of knowledge, Huntington 
points out, is universal, that is it is common to most military forces in the world. Thus, 
the military officers functions include organising, equipping, training, planning, and 
leading in both combat and peace time. Huntington also distinguishes between the 
military officer's management of 'violence' in combat, and the application of it, which 
is mostly the preserve of enlisted personnel. Officers, he concludes, are more 
concerned with the knowledge and perception needed to lead operations than with the 
down-to-earth skills of firing a rifle (ibid: 12). Military officers therefore need to be 
acquainted with the theory of war as well as its practice. 
Responsibility, the second feature of military professionalism, is what distinguishes the 
professional officer from other experts. If the management of violence is the primary 
skill that an officer must master, this cannot be conducted without a sense of 
responsibility and accountability to its main client, society. Mastery of this skill, the 
management of violence, carries risks, therefore it requires the acceptance of the 
responsibility that comes with it. In practice, responsibility for officers' actions is kept 
in check through codes of conduct, which delineate and limit the powers and actions of 
officers. 
Corporateness, the third and final feature of the military profession identified by 
Huntington has to do with identity. Professional military officers perceive themselves 
as a unique group, distinct from laymen and lower-rank troops. They see themselves as 
skilled, qualified professionals with clear duties and responsibilities. In this sense they 
are no different in terms of professionalism from doctors, lawyers, or teachers. The 
bureaucratic machine of the Military is a further feature of its corporate nature. In 
addition to Huntington's three main features of the military profession, a fourth 
cardinal feature could be added, that of total commitment to serve the state and the 
communi 
Earlier, it was stated that the primary orientation of any professional is altruism rather 
than self-interest, and to be a servant to the community. It is contended that this 
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characteristic is even more true of military professionalism than of any other 
profession. Indeed, as Moskos (1988: 30) points out5 the military profession is "more 
than just a job"; it is, as Allen (1995: 26) stresses, "a calling" and "a fine and 
honourable profession to serve in defence of one's country" as well as a duty. 
Dedication and commitment to the military profession goes beyond the duty of 
protecting the lives of civilians. It involves putting one's life on the line for others, and 
if necessary sacrificing it for their sake. This feature is unique to the military 
profession. 
2.8 Contemporary Trends in Military Professionalism 
The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a tremendous number of 
innovations in the fields of science and technology, as well as in the social sciences 
and the humanities. The Military have not remained impervious to these changes. 
Quite the reverse: military weaponry became even more sophisticated, more complex, 
and more destructive than ever before, often radically changing the nature of battles 
and with it the preparation of the troops and the way they are deployed. 
Janowitz (1960: 16) signalled five main trends that could be observed in the evolution 
of the military profession. The first concerns a shift in the nature and use of authority 
by officers; the second relates to the narrowing of the skill differential between 
military and civilian elites; the third is the change in officer recruitment; the fourth is 
linked with changes in career patterns; and finally there is the place of politics in 
officer training, or political indoctrination. He observed that the Military no longer 
relied on extremely rigid and at times intolerant rules of authority and discipline to 
prepare their personnel. And, although standards of discipline must remain high, 
modem military officers are increasingly relying less and less on the principle of 
domination alone; that is, on issuing orders without giving reasons. Blind obedience, in 
other words, cannot always be expected, nor is it always appropriate. The Military, of 
course, continue to be concerned with combat readiness, but such readiness, it is 
believed, is enhanced by the humane treatment of subordinates and through instilling 
in them a sense of purpose and esprit de corps. Simply barking orders is no longer 
perceived as an effective method of bringing about unit cohesion and success. 
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Like their civilian counterparts, military officers are having to keep up with modem 
technology and science. The armed services nowadays include in their ranks qualified 
teachers, doctors, engineers, personnel administrators, technicians, and many other 
specialists in most fields of knowledge. Military officers need and make use of almost 
all the skills that are needed in the civilian sector of society. 
Shifts in recruitment patterns are evident in the broader base and less discriminatory 
attitude to membership of the officer corps. In many countries, efforts are made to 
encourage candidates from all sections of society to join the ranks of officers, provided 
that they fulfil the necessary criteria. This democratic orientation carries its possible 
risks, but on the whole it is believed to have the potential to improve the profession, 
particularly in terms of its perception by the public at large. 
As to the place of politics in the lives of military officers, Janowitz (1960: 16) 
contends that although the accepted wisdom is that the Military should not meddle in 
politics, this is no reason for them to be ignorant of it. Modem military officers are 
increasingly unlikely to view themselves as mere technicians. Internal as well as 
external politics impinge upon national security. The Military are expected to cope 
with the implications of political and military manoeuvres within and outside their 
state. Very often, as Jesse (1972: 135) pointed out, they are called upon to make 
recommendations to their government in response to a potential threat or opportunity. 
2.9 Civilianisation 
Closer links and cooperation between the Military and the civilian world have 
prompted many observers to refer to this phenomenon as a process of civilianisation. 
The trend is singled out here for discussion in a separate section because of its 
importance and potential implications. Unlike other social researchers, Janowitz (1960: 
424) does not see the so-called civilianisation of the Military as a threat to their 
corporate effectiveness, or to their combat performance. He showed that the fact that 
the contemporary Military are more and more a reflection of the society to which they 
belong does not mean that they are civilianised, or that they are the weaker for it. Quite 
the reverse in fact. 
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On the other hand, Huntington (1957: 72), less enthusiastic for the civilianisatlon of the 
Military, advocates that the Military ought to stick to their traditional principles of 
military professionalism and remain somewhat aloof from the civilian world. They 
should steer clear of fashion and intellectual currents, and have no business with 
politics. In his view, the civilianisation of the Military is not the only way to ensure 
civilian, or what he calls 'objective' control of the Military. Military professionalism 
and commitment to serve the wider community will ensure this. In Huntington's (ibid: 
72) view, the duty of the Military is to offer the best advice and comply with the lawful 
civilian leadership's decisions. Their primary responsibility ought to be confined to the 
defence of the state, rather than attempting to mirror it or become involved in politics. 
The political involvement of the Military, he concludes, can be lethal. 
2.10 Implications of Modern Trends for Officer Preparation 
Many of the fears related to the civilianisation of the Military are either exaggerated or 
unfounded. Change is painful, but it is occurring in all spheres of life. Many service 
academies of the developed world are liberalising their military training programmes 
to include more study in the social sciences and humanities. Masland and Radway 
called for these changes in 1957. Already, the heavy emphasis on military-specific 
training seems to be a thing of the past in the West. 
As noted earlier, to meet the challenges of the modem world, military officers are 
nowadays developing many of the skills and capabilities traditionally associated with 
civilian professions and occupations. This entails a redressing of the balance between 
the teaching of military- specific knowledge and skills and the social sciences in the 
preparation of military officers. In other words, a more rounded education and training 
of officers is aimed for. 
Over forty years ago, Janowitz (1960: 137) already noted the eagerness of military 
service academies to increase the proportion of graduate recruits within the ranks of 
the Military, in the belief that a better-educated military force is a more effective one. 
He also observed that the Military were placing an increasingly strong emphasis on 
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academic education as a criterion for promotion to elite positions. Masland and 
Radway (1957: 502) also noted that US armed forces were using advanced education 
to prepare officers for senior roles. 
More recently, in a large-scale study on the recruitment and career prospects of 
military officers in the United States, Eitelberg et al. (1992: 80) discovered, among 
many other things, that there was a correlation between officer candidate aptitudes, 
both at the recruitment stage and at the end of their preparation, in education and 
training programmes and retention, morale promotion, and future perforinance. 
Clearly the Military have moved on from the outdated images of officers whose only 
concern is to manage discipline and battle, to one of an ideally well-rounded 
professional, an intellectual, and a gentleman. Strength of character and bravery are 
still desirable qualities, but they are no longer sufficient. To perform competently in 
their chosen occupations in our fast-changing, technologically sophisticated world, 
modem officers must go through a lengthy preparation programme consisting of 
formal education and practical training, as well as a socialisation process. They must 
become competent and informed, as well as educated professionals if they are to cope 
with the duties and responsibilities they will be expected to assume, not to mention 
enhancing their career prospects. 
2.11 Purposes of Education and Training 
The philosophy of the military training and education of officers-to-be in any country 
is generally rooted in the functions for which new entrants to the profession are 
prepared and the roles they will be called upon to perform in their future military 
careers (Jordan 1971: 211). It will be remembered that the primary domain of expertise 
of military officers is the "management of violence". However, as previously 
indicated, the contemporary definition of military expertise stretches beyond the 
battlefield roles that are traditionally associated with it. Indeed, according to Jordan 
(1971: 212), the modem military officer is nowadays expected to fulfil a wide range of 
roles during his career, including: (a) applying scientific and technological knowledge 
to military problems; (b) training and complying with orders for the deployment and 
19 
use of military force for purposes of national security; and (c) helping to define the 
nature of the security tasks of the nation in the light of its political and strategic goals. 
On the other hand, Masland and Radway (1957: 30-46) suggested that all military 
officers should be trained for three categories of qualification: (i) professional military 
qualification, which covers combat and leadership skills, and knowledge of the 
problems of enlisted personnel; (ii) general executive qualification, which includes the 
efficient management of people, information, and logistics, both in peacetime and in 
combat; and (iii) military executive qualification, which consists in obeying civilian 
superiors, contributing to the fon-nulation of national security strategies, and bringing 
the most expert military judgement to bear on civilian policy decisions. The 
proceedings of the CPME for the Twenty-first Century Warrior (1998: 1-2) suggest that 
contemporary officer development must instil the following vital attributes: 
e First and foremost, fundamental competence as a soldier; 
* Personal qualities that range from dedication to duty to adaptability to 
changing situations; 
o Leadership ability; 
9 Education in subjects as disparate as military history and the place of the 
Military in society; and, 
e In an era of revolutionary change, an increasingly sophisticated mastery of 
technology that qualifies officers, among other things, to make decisions about 
the best technologies to fill operational needs and to use technology in 
conducting operations. 
All these roles inevitably have direct implications for military training and education, 
as will be further clarified in the forthcoming sections of this chapter. 
An effective system of officer preparation must therefore be responsive to present-day 
national security concerns, as well as to various other functional and societal needs. Its 
mission cannot be restricted to preparation for war. To better serve their profession and 
its members, the Military must prepare its aspiring officers in essential military- 
specific competences, encompassing skills of leadership and 
battle, in the management 
of human and material resources, and in the mastery of science and technology to solve 
military problems. Like all other professions, they must rise to the challenges of the 
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twenty-first century in terms of knowledge, expertise, and readiness to fulfil multiple 
tasks, in times of both peace and war. 
2.12 Rationale for a Balanced High Quality Officer Preparation 
Programme 
Throughout history, the Military has endeavoured to reflect the needs of the society it 
serves and evolve just as society itself is evolving. Huntington (1957: 2) pointed out 
that the military institutions of any society are shaped essentially by two forces: a 
functional imperative and a societal imperative. The former stems from the threats to 
the security of the state and nation, and the latter arises from social forces, ideologies 
and institutions dominant in society. Huntington warned that military institutions that 
are shaped purely by functional imperatives may be impossible to contain under 
civilian control, while those that focus more on adjusting to and reflecting social 
values may become incapable of performing their military function effectively. 
Finding the right balance between the functional and the societal imperatives is 
therefore vital both for the security of the state and for the effectiveness of the 
Military. Such a balance, according to Janowitz (1969: 10), is best achieved through 
the development of a professionally competent Military which is aware of both 
imperatives. Thus, the education of the military officer in modem times must not only 
equip him with the necessary military skills that he needs to perform his military 
duties, but also provide him with the essential knowledge that enables him to interact 
and have meaningful relations with the larger society that he is committed to serve. 
Intellectual education, according to Clausewitz (1993: 117), is also vital for 
understanding behaviour on the battlefield itself He explains that while generally 
"tactical rules" are useful skills as instruments of war, stereotyped reactions may not be 
appropriate in some situations. In fact, they may even prove counterproductive if they 
inhibit creative initiatives and the necessary flexibility to adapt to situations. Military 
leaders need to be educated in independent thinking in order to be able to respond 
positively and effectively to unexpected situations. 
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Strachan (1983: 83) too, stresses that military leaders must not only possess or develop 
strength of will, but also cultivate the intellect and flair that will potentially enable 
them to improvise tactics, rather than attempt to impose prescribed solutions on every 
situation. Again, such knowledge, skills and flair can only be acquired through the 
development of their critical faculties. 
Balancing military training and education with liberal education in the preparation of 
officers first emerged as a vital necessity during the military educational reforms of the 
nineteenth century (ibid: 70) when the enlightened Prussian aristocracy saw that the 
best way to ensure the democratic control of the Military was through the device of 
professionalisation. This was a revolutionary idea that was to gradually banish "noble 
birth" as the essential criterion for admission to military schools, as was the case in 
almost all European states. 
The professionalisation of the Military meant that recruitment into the officer corps 
was to be based on similar principles to those of other professions, that is on abilities 
rather than social background. This required the provision of both general, liberal 
education and vocational education. This new military officer preparation philosophy 
quickly gave rise to the establishment of scores of cadet schools throughout Europe 
and the United States, all seeking to modernise their armed forces by means of the 
infusion of a professional element in the education and training of their officer recruits. 
According to Hennessey (1987: 75), more and more emerging armed forces began to 
abandon their concentration on classical education and training, their emphasis on the 
importance of character over knowledge, and their neglect of the sciences. Along with 
this change began the collapse of the principle of "blind obedience", previously 
deemed essential in commander-subordinate relationships. In its place, a less directive 
form of command and control was promoted, particularly by the Germans, who 
invented the concept of Auftragstaktik. The term refers to a higher quality of obedience 
based on intellectual and technical attributes that enable a subordinate commander to 
comprehend the key element of his superior's intentions, which 
he then converts into 
prompt action appropriate to the situation faced, and consistent with the overall 
military plan, which he fully understands. 
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Moreover, when Huntington (1957: 48) stated that military officers needed to develop 
their analytical skills and judgement through a broad-based education, in addition to 
their vocational training, what he was really saying was that such individuals would 
not be able to appreciate their professional role fully without exposure to both forms of 
training and education. A broad-based education , in the view of Sarkesian (198 1: ix), 
ensures that the military professionals that our institutions produce are more than 
mindless battlefield technicians who treat moral and ethical criteria as matters of 
tactical expediency. Huntington went as far as to suggest that the neglect of social 
sciences in the preparation of officers could run the risk of producing "mercenaries", 
rather than responsible professionals who are aware of their obligations to society. On 
this issue, Janowitz (1960: 426) was in full agreement with Huntington and was 
generally in favour of the openness of the Military to the civilian world. This, he 
suggested, was achievable through education. In fact, Janowitz proposed that in 
preparing military officers, at least one year of the military academy course should be 
completed in a civilian university, and most, if not all postgraduate degrees should be 
obtained in civilian universities. Clearly, there seems to be considerable enthusiasm for 
the benefits of a broadly based education for the Military, including both vocational 
and liberal elements. One further reason for this, according to Janowitz (ibid: 435), is 
society's implicit fear of losing civilian control over the Military. 
For most contemporary governments, however, especially those that have benefited 
from, and continue to enjoy a long history of stability, civilian control of the Military 
is unquestioned and professionally accepted. A more pragmatic reason for the 
promotion of a broad-based military education is the need for the Military to inspire 
confidence in their judgements by being thoroughly competent and professional in 
their role as advisors on strategic matters to the civilian leaders of their country. 
2.13 Levels of Officer Training and Education 
As Janowitz (1960: 139) pointed out, since, generally speaking, the military hierarchy 
can be divided into three levels: tactical officers, middle-level or operational 
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commanders, and senior or strategic-level generals, the sequence of professional 
education necessarily fits this division. The training and education of officers is 
therefore a continuous process that spreads over their entire career life. Not only this, 
but such training and education are mandatory and essential for professional 
advancement and promotion (Arnold 1993: 3). To take the Saudi example, at the 
tactical level, a career officer will first attend a service academy at which he takes 
specialist, basic, and advanced courses. Next, at the operational level, he will attend 
the General Command and Staff College. Finally, at the senior strategic level, selected 
second level officers will attend the War College. Apart from this, many officers in 
Saudi Arabia are offered generous opportunities to attend graduate and postgraduate 
courses at military and civilian institutions both at home and abroad throughout their 
careers. Figure 2.2 summarises the three levels of officer training and education. 
Since this investigation proposes to focus on the preparation of National Guard officers 
at KKMA, the research scope will consequently be limited to the study of the first part 
of the first level of officer training and education, namely cadet commissioning. 
Professional (3) 
Strategic Level 
Professional (2) 
Operational Level 
Professional (1) Tactical Level 
Military I Specialisation 
Academy 
Cadet 
Basic I Advanced 
Courses I Courses 
General Command and 
Staff College 
Lieutenant to Captain 
Major to Lieutenant 
Colonel 
Figure 2-2 Levels of officer training and education 
War College and 
Strategic Study 
Colonel to General 
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2.14 Elements of Officer Training and Education Programmes 
Many military establishments around the world, including those of Saud' Arabia, have 
a comprehensive system of military officer preparation, where both training and 
education are provided to develop competent military cadres. As stated earlier, officer 
corps in most parts of the world over the past century, particularly after the Second 
World War, have evolved by updating and expanding their training and education 
systems, not only to reduce the gap between them and other professions in the civilian 
world, but also to keep up with the rapid advances and deepening complexities of 
strategic changes, science and technology. A consistent pattern in the preparation of 
officers in many countries is that professional courses tend to be a mixture of training 
and education at all levels, but with a stronger emphasis on training at the initial and 
lower levels of instruction, and gradually greater attention to professional education at 
higher levels (Jordan 1971: 218). 
Training involves both the professional socialisation, or "indoctrination" of members 
of the Military, and the development of their physical capacities. It prepares them for 
coping with military life as well as for their soldiering role on the battlefield. 
Education, on the other hand, is mostly conducted in the classroom and primarily 
consists of technical, scientific subjects, usually closely related to military-specific 
needs. It will be referred to here as "professional" or "vocational" preparation, because 
it relates directly to the domain of expertise of the military profession, that of the 
management of battle. However, the requirement for the balanced education of military 
officers necessitates the inclusion of liberal education in their preparation programmes. 
Altogether, therefore, four fundamental components of military officer preparation can 
be distinguished: military socialisation/indoctrination; physical training and 
development; professional/vocational education; and general liberal education. 
2.15 Officer Preparation in Military Academies - General Picture 
Until the mid-eighteenth century, military training was restricted to repetitive skills 
and to acquiring knowledge of weaponry and tactics primarily from practical 
experience on the battlefield. Advances in technology and warfare, however, led to the 
establishment of service academies in the Western World specifically for training 
professional officers. The Prussians were pioneers in this field, founding the 
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Kriegsakademie (War Academy) in 18 10. 
Current trends in officer preparation reflect the rapid changes brought about by 
advances in the various fields of science and technology and are geared to meet 
national security requirements. Officer preparation programmes continue to stress the 
scientific character of their curricula, but recent curriculum changes have introduced 
greater emphasis on humanities and social science subjects. 
Service academies are to some extent unique institutions, due to their strong academic 
orientation and overall high standards, combined with rigorous physical and character- 
building programmes. In many ways, the service academies set the standards of 
performance and behaviour for the whole military profession. Many of them in fact 
claim to rival the best civilian universities in the world. This is because they are 
generally extremely competitive and selective in terms of recruitment and promotion. 
Among the world-famous academies are West Point in the United States, Sandhurst in 
the United Kingdom, and St. Cyr in France, all founded in 1802. 
Generally, cadet systems are tailored to the needs of each country. Because of this, the 
cadet syllabus may vary in terms of duration ftom a period of 12 months to 4-5 years, 
and may consist of two or more track systems within the same academy. Variations 
also exist in their staffing patterns, syllabus content, where and when the courses are 
held, and in their choices of, distribution, and emphasis of subject areas. Some 
academies, such as West Point in the USA and the Royal Military Academy of 
Belgium are more like military universities, conferring a Bachelor of Science degree 
on commission and offering their graduates further chances to extend their educational 
experience at postgraduate level at civilian colleges and universities. 
2.16 Theoretical Framework for this Study 
The discussion of military professionalism and officer training and education has 
emphasised the importance of a well-rounded and balanced preparation of military 
officers. This philosophy derives from the nature of military tasks in the modem world 
26 
and from societal expectations of the Military. High standards of expertise are essential 
for effective performance of military missions, hence the need to train and educate 
members of the profession in the theory and practice of the management and 
implementation of battle in all its technical and scientific aspects. This aspect of 
military officer preparation covers what has been referred to earlier as the 
professional/vocational element of military preparation, which is the first component 
of the proposed theoretical framework for this study. 
The second crucial facet of military officer preparation relates to his transformation 
from a civilian into a soldier, a process known as "military socialisation" or 
"indoctrination". Its objectives are the intemalisation of the ethos of the military 
profession, the assimilation of values associated with military service, and the overall 
conditioning of its members to fit into the mould of the Military (Ellis and Moore 
1974: 79). In preparing an officer, socialisation begins from the first day of entry into 
the military institution and continues throughout his preparation. 
Officer education is of course incomplete without general liberal education, as stressed 
by Strachan (1983: 83); Huntington (1957: 48); Janowitz (1960: 204) and Masland and 
Radway (1957: 30-46), who advocate a broad-based education for officers for the 
purpose of enhancing their mental and intellectual capacities and versatility to enable 
them to fulfil the diverse missions and tasks of their careers. Therefore, liberal 
education forins a third fundamental element of military officer preparation, and the 
third component of our present research. 
It goes almost without saying that the physical training and development of new 
entrants to the profession are crucial for their ability as soldiers to survive and win on 
the battlefield (Field Manual 1992: iii). For this reason, fitness programmes are part 
and parcel of military culture. Military literature recognises that a high level of 
physical fitness has many benefits apart from improving the combat readiness and 
survivability of soldiers (Janowitz 1960: 130). Many believe that Physical training 
invigorates individuals, enhances their productivity and mental alertness, promotes 
team cohesion (RMAB 2001), increases their stamina and power, and contributes 
positively to the development of character and sense of duty. Consequently, officer 
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preparation programmes in any military institution in the world always include a 
significant element of physical fitness nurturing. Hence, this is the fourth component 
of this study. 
Finally, earlier it was indicated that one of the major criteria of professionalism for any 
organisation is the restricted entry into the profession (Denaro, 1995: 37). It is also the 
view of many military experts that the preparation of military officers can be made 
more effective if it is subject to competition and rigorous selection both at the point of 
entry and throughout the progranune of instruction. Selection is therefore the fifth and 
last component that completes the proposed theoretical framework for this study. 
The five components briefly outlined above represent the foundation upon which most 
service academy officer preparation programmes are based. Significantly, most -if not 
all- curricular activities designed for training and educating cadets neatly fit into one of 
the five areas identified. This is why it is suggested that this investigation should be 
guided by and limited to the exploration of the theory and practice associated with 
these five dimensions of officer preparation. Altogether, they provide a comprehensive 
picture and a basis for the evaluation of the state of officer training and education at 
KKMA. The complete theoretical framework is shown in Figure 4.2 below. Notice that 
the proposed framework is deliberately shaped in the form of a five-pointed star 
model, which in a way symbolises the insignia for Second Lieutenant that is awarded 
in most service academies of the world to cadets who successfully complete their 
officer preparation programme on graduation day. 
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Selection 
Indoctrination 
Liberal 
Education 
Physical 
Fitness 
Vocational 
Training 
Figure 2-3 Theoretical framework for the evaluation of KKMA's junior officer preparation programme. 
2.17 Conclusion 
The present chapter has clarified what is meant by the professional education and 
training of military officers in contemporary times. It highlighted some distinctive 
features of professionalism, their bearing on the military profession and on the way 
officers are to be educated and trained to fulfil the roles expected of them effectively. 
On the basis of such knowledge, a theoretical framework has been derived to serve as a 
guide in the collection and analysis of empirical data for the evaluation of KKMA's 
junior officer programme. 
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Chapter Three 
Features of Effective Junior Officer Preparation 
3.1 Introduction 
Effective junior officer education and training is concerned with questions such as: 
Who should and who should not be an officer? How should potential candidates be 
selected? How should they be indoctrinated into military culture and values? What 
should be the content of the vocational progamme? How much theory and how much 
practice? How much general education is necessary and from what disciplines? What 
is the place of physical fitness in officer preparation? (Converse 1998: 7). These are 
only some of the questions answered in this chapter, based on military literature and 
the experiences of a number of successful military academies such as Sandhurst, UK 
and West Point, USA. 
The chapter defines and explores each of the five officer preparation programme 
components (see Figure 2.3), their nature, elements, purposes and benefits, and 
conditions for success, and the potential barriers that can reduce or prevent their 
effectiveness. Where relevant, an account is also given of modem trends affecting 
certain aspects of the programme components, together with common reactions to 
them. 
3.2 Junior Officer Recruitment and Selection 
The use of sound recruitment and selection methods is an important prerequisite for 
effective junior officer preparation. Recruits represent the raw material from which 
future officers are developed. Inevitably, their quality will to some extent be reflected 
in the finished product (Cooper & Robson 1995: 6). This section delves into why 
recruitment and selection must be approached systematically, and how this could be. 
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3.2.1 Importance of Systematic Officer Recruitment and Selection 
Any organisation aiming for excellence must give the greatest possible attention to its 
recruitment and selection methods in order to attract and recruit high-quality 
candidates (RMC Report 1997: 32). Carrying out this twin process - recruitment and 
selection - systematically is very important, especially because each year military 
institutions must decide on the suitability of several hundred candidates, from which a 
small number is chosen. It is also important because those who are recruited are trained 
to become tomorrow's leaders. 
Saier (1995: 4) states that systematic methods of recruitment and selection are 
important for at least three reasons. First, they save considerable efforts, time, and 
money, which are spent on individuals who, in the end, prove to be incapable of fitting 
into military life and carrying out their duties properly. Secondly, and maybe more 
importantly, systematic recruitment and selection prevent great harm to the military, 
particularly to its reputation. Unsystematic selection may allow incompetent and 
undesirable candidates to join the military and subsequently tarnish its image. Thirdly, 
systematic recruitment and selection ensure that every new member is capable of 
making a contribution to the achievement of the mission, ideals and goals, and 
generally to the effectiveness of the military. 
Moreover, all military institutions need assurance that those who begin training with 
them will finish training and be useful to them; after all they spend a lot of money on 
them. This is why the Military spare no efforts in looking for high-quality recruits, 
testing them rigorously to ascertain their physical and mental abilities, and choosing 
the best among them. It is a well-known fact that military academies, for example, 
have very low selection rates, precisely because they are very keen to select the best 
and not allow unsuitable recruits to join their ranks. 
Not allowing unsuitable recruits to slip through the selection net is very important, 
according to Saier (ibid: 15), who explains how dangerous this can be by quoting the 
story of a West Point cadet who was described by people who knew him as 
"indifferent, easy-going, and happy-go-lucky". This cadet was later reported to have 
lost half of his regiment and surrendered himself and his men without seriously 
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engaging the enemy. Another example of bad selection mentioned by Noonan (2001: 5) 
is the shocking involvement of three junior US officers serving in former Yugoslavia 
in the interrogation at gunpoint of an ethnic Albanian, and the rape of an eleven-year- 
old Kosovar girl. The cases caused great concern in America about the suitability of 
the officer selection procedure that allowed such men to be recruited into the Military. 
Clearly, sound recruitment and selection methods must provide accurate assessment of 
recruits' values and abilities, as well as correct predictions about their future 
performance; otherwise mistakes of this kind will be repeated again and again (Cary et 
al. 1998: 589-90). A well-thought-out recruitment strategy and a systematic selection 
process are vital to attract and select candidates with the best potentials to make 
excellent future military officers. Definitions of recruitment and selection, and how 
their objectives can best be achieved are discussed in turn next. 
3.2.2 Recruitment Methods 
Recruitment refers to reaching out and attracting a pool of potential candidates from 
which to select the ones needed to satisfy the academy's needs (Millett 1992: 87; 
Mosley et al. 1996: 301). Recruitment approaches can be classified into two main 
categories, passive and proactive. The passive recruitment approach relies on 
interested applicants who make personal inquiries directly to the academy, or 
indirectly through service families. The pro-active approach consists in seeking out or 
attracting potential candidates through various methods. Altogether, there are at least 
five main methods of recruiting candidates for officer training and education. The first 
is the referral method, that is the passive method, which relies on recommendations 
made by current members to ffiends and relatives who have the appropriate qualities 
and qualifications. However, although the referral method is an excellent way of 
recruiting cadets, because current academy members know the requirements of 
military life and the personal abilities needed to encourage those who would 
potentially make good officers, the method is not reliable enough to provide sufficient 
numbers of applicants to choose from each year. 
The second recruitment method is through advertising in newspapers and magazines. 
This is a very effective, flexible, and relatively inexpensive method of recruitment. 
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However, other media can also be used, such as radio and television. These can be 
very effective and may include interviews with current academy cadets and feature the 
advantages and benefits of an officer career. 
A third recruitment method is through schools, colleges, and universities. Most 
successful military academies in the world do some type of campus recruiting. These 
activities are usually coordinated by local career officers. 
A fourth recruitment method is through Open Days, organised to bring people into the 
academies to see for themselves what they have to offer. Here, visitors are taken for a 
guided tour of the academies and given information on all aspects related to entry 
requirements, admission procedure, course contents, learning and sports facilities etc. 
The tours act as an exceptionally good recruitment tool, because they offer greater 
awareness and first-hand experience of military academy life to interested candidates. 
A fifth, increasingly popular method of recruitment is through computerised databases 
using the Internet. For many Western academies, this is fast becoming the primary 
method of recruiting. 
In their efforts to reach out to the best qualified candidates, successful military 
academies have a recruitment strategy that aims for the largest possible pool of 
applicants that not only enables them to choose the most suitable candidates, but also 
to show a high degree of selectivity in the eyes of the public and ftinding authorities. 
Effective recruitment campaigns prepare the way for effective selection, provided it 
too is conducted systematically. 
3.2.3 Selection Procedure 
Selection is about collecting and using information to make a decision on whether an 
applicant is suitable for cadetship. In theory, therefore, selection is simple: a number of 
criteria are used to separate applicants who fulfil them from those who 
do not by 
looking at their records of academic performance, character, and abilities. 
Unfortunately, selection is not that simple. Military academies that aim for excellence 
use a much more complicated process of selection to ensure that 
those that are 
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admitted into them possess high performance potentials, and at the same time keep out 
those who are undesirable. 
To qualify for selection in most military academies, candidates must meet a number of 
eligibility criteria, including age limit, citizenship, marital and legal status, legal etc. 
They are also generally required to fill in a questionnaire or an application form before 
they are even considered for selection. From then on, if they qualify, they go through a 
battery of tests that have the effect of eliminating all but the most suitable candidates, 
who are eventually accepted. 
For the staff involved in the selection process, selection means collecting data using a 
number of assessment methods that produce information relevant to the applicant's 
abilities to fit into the role for which they will be trained and educated in a military 
environment. Then, they need to combine that information in a way that reflects the 
applicant's overall suitability before a judgement is made on whether they are to be 
admitted into the academy or not. 
According to Downes (1983: 228), prior to World War 11, the system of officer 
selection in many countries was unsystematic, relied on traditional recruitment sources 
(family members and relatives of serving officers), and was conducted by officers who 
tended to favour candidates with similar backgrounds to their own. The process was 
entirely subjective and rested on the results of a personal interview with senior 
officers, who made decisions on the suitability of prospective candidates. However, 
after the war, the need for a more reliable method of selection was strongly felt, 
especially when other professional organisations began to use effective recruitment 
techniques developed by human resource specialists. Today, military academies make 
use of a variety of techniques adapted for their purposes, in order to make their 
selections more effective. 
A review of the relevant literature shows that most military establishments use at least 
3 to 4 or more methods of selection, which they apply to all their applicants before 
they make a judgement on whether they are to be admitted or not. Altogether, it is 
possible to identify seven main selection methods which are widely used, not only in 
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the selection of military personnel, but also in other contexts. These methods fit neatly 
into a seven-step procedure adapted from Mosley et al. (1996) which suggests that all 
organisations ought to include most, and ideally all, the proposed steps to make good 
selections of personnel. Figure 3.1 below summarises these steps. It is then followed 
by a brief discussion of each selection step. 
Figure 3-1 A suggested seven -step procedure for selecting cadets. 
(Adapted from Mosley et al. 1996: 304) 
Application Form 
Most military establishments begin the selection procedure by compiling a short 
list of 
potential candidates based on the examination of application 
forms, which in some 
cases are preceded by an initial interview. Both result 
in the elimination of obviously 
unsuitable applicants. Not meeting basic eligibility requirements, such as of 
nationality, age, and genuine interest 
in a military career leads to prompt rejection 
Selection steps Some characteristics to look for 
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(Woycheshim 1999: 1). The application form itself is a particularly useful tool, which 
usually starts a candidate file as soon as it is received (USMA Admissions 2001). 
Thompson (1999: 2) states that it should at least include: personal details, such as date 
and place of birth (verified), academic history (qualifications, involvement in sports, 
and extracurricular activities), employment- if applicable, civil/ police prosecutions, 
hobbies, and interests. 
Medical Test 
Candidates who are considered eligible are invited for a medical check-up to ensure 
that they meet medical standards. They are checked for vision, hearing, physical and 
mental disabilities, epidemic diseases etc. Lesceve (1999: 5) states that the main aim of 
this phase is basically economy and work saving. If there are any candidates who 
suffer from obvious disorders or abnormalities that can be detected at this stage, 
determining them early can save time and work. According to Williams et al. (1999: 1), 
in some military establishments approximately 25% of candidates do not pass the 
medical test and are therefore rejected early in the process of selection. 
Physical fitness Test 
Most officer training institutions include a physical fitness test. This typically involves 
pull-ups to test strength, sit-ups to test endurance, a run to measure aerobic endurance, 
and an obstacle course to test agility. In some cases, these tests do not lead to direct 
pass or fail decisions, but candidates get a performance grade that is taken into account 
in the overall assessment (Bekmezci 1999: 5). 
Cognitive Assessment 
Here, the assessors want to obtain an evaluation of the intellectual potential of 
candidates. Tests used measure verbal and abstract reasoning, memory, organisational 
abilities, intelligence, etc. Computer-based tests now exist (Hardinge 
1999: 174; 
Devriendt 1999: 3; Bekmezci 1995: 5). 
Socio-Psychological Tests 
The vast majority of officer training and education institutions nowadays also make 
use of a battery of socio-psychological tests. 
The psychological tests attempt to 
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determine that the candidate is of adequate maturity for his/her age, is emotionally 
stable, independent, sociable, and generally capable of ftinctioning in stressful 
situations. The social aspect relates to the individual's ability to interact and cooperate 
with others in a group. In many cases, candidates take a personality inventory test, 
which adds more sophistication to the selection process. Saier (1995: 16-30) argues 
that personality evaluations make admission procedures more systematic. He supports 
his view with research evidence that shows that the successful completion of cadet 
courses can be directly linked to the psychological makeup of candidates before 
training begins. He discusses the usefulness of at least four popular personality tests 
including the well-known Myers-Briggs-Type Indicator, The California Psychological 
Inventory, The Minnesota Multiphatic Personality Inventory, and the Sixteen 
Personality Factor Tests. The RMA of Belgium includes a Motivational Inventory to 
measure acceptance of the military way of living and vocational values (Devriendt 
1999: 3). However, Cook and Klumper (1999: 8) warn of possible bias in these tests. 
This is why they suggest that their results should be used to indicate areas that should 
be further probed during the in-depth interview. 
Both social and psychological information about the candidate can be obtained using 
the paper-and-pencil method, but also through situational role-play techniques, which 
are becoming more and more popular. They consist in mimicking realistic military 
tasks in which candidates take part while they are being observed by a number of 
assessors who will rate them for their performance and the appropriateness of their 
response in the situations. Other well-known situational techniques are the "structured 
discussion group" and the "leaderless group discussion". The point of these tests is to 
observe and rate participants on several aspects of their behaviour and contribution to 
the discussion. Another technique is the "videotape scenario", in which pauses are 
made and candidates are asked to indicate what action they would take if they were in 
the situation presented in the tape. Finally, the latest emerging technique for the 21s' 
Century is the "computer-generated virtual reality" method. This is an even more 
sophisticated and cheaper alternative to the other time-consuming and resource- 
intensive situational tests (Coulton et al. 1995: 4-22; Cook and Klumper 1999: 8, 
Devriendt 1999: 6; Akkerman 1993: 78). This group of tests is usually given great 
weight in the total assessment of candidates and is, according to Truszczynski & 
37 
Terelake (1999: 4), responsible for almost a fifth of all rejections in some military 
institutions. 
The In-Depth Interview 
The interview is the oldest and the most relied upon tool in military personnel selection 
(Bekmezci 1999: 6). It is also still the most successful selection tool. During the in- 
depth interview, all the information about the applicant is brought together at one 
point. It is also an opportunity to obtain clarifications and further checks on the 
candidate's attitudes, feelings, and intentions. Preparation for this phase of the 
selection, which comes before the final decision on the suitability of the candidate, is 
taken very seriously by assessors, and is based on all the information collected so far 
on him, including his application form, medical record, references, educational 
records, and performance in previous tests (Thompson 1999: 1-2). Some typical 
questions asked would be: " Why do you think you qualify to join the Academy? 
Which field of study are you interested in? Why? How would you like to contribute to 
the Military? " Other questions relate to the applicant's vision and capacity or potential 
for leadership (Carlsted & Widen 1999: 5). 
The in-depth interview helps complete the picture of the candidates by revealing 
strengths or weaknesses, which will either increase or reduce the prospects of their 
trainability. It also allows the candidates a chance to ask questions, and acts as a final 
filter before a final judgement is made on whether to accept or reject them (Thompson 
1999: 1-2) 
Some military establishments use the interview method for several data collection 
purposes, while others use it as a main selection instrument. Others still use it to make 
a psychological assessment of each candidate. To improve objectivity and accuracy, at 
least two assessors are used: one qualified psychologist and one experienced selection 
officer. The psychological interview is used to identify and evaluate a wide variety of 
personality traits that are presumed to relate to the requirements of the officer 
profession (Birke 1995: 5). Among the numerous and vaned lists of qualities claimed 
to be assessed during the interview are: "sociological functioning, 
discipline, 
psychological stability, will to achieve, sportsmanship, suitability 
for international 
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missions, leadership capabilities, motivation for wishing to join the specific force, 
function hoping to train for, knowledge of the desired function" (Visser 1999: 2). 
Others have longer lists with many similar items. For example, Truzczynski (1999: 2) 
lists 17 traits, some positive, some negative, including "courage, leadership potential, 
maturity, ability to cope with stress and the unexpected" and "aggressiveness, egoism, 
intolerance, susceptibility to stress" and others. 
The Selection Decision 
Making the final selection decision involves both objective and subjective judgements 
on the part of the evaluators as to whether each applicant possesses or lacks the 
required knowledges, skills, abilities, and other characteristics known as KSAO's. All 
the information about the applicant collected throughout the selection is taken into 
account. Evaluators use their experience in evaluating previous candidates (and their 
subsequent performance) to make the decision. The quality of their judgement depends 
upon their skill in integrating all the relevant information before acting on it. Experts 
insist that accuracy and fairness in selection require that all assessors who have 
participated in the procedure have a say in deciding on the suitability of candidates. 
Discussions between assessors should resolve any differences of opinion; if not, a vote 
can be taken (Birke 1999: 4; Thompson 1999: 4; Cook & Klumper 1999: 9) 
An important consideration when information is combined to make selection decisions 
is whether to use a compensatory or a non-compensatory method. This is besides the 
fact that some KSAO"s are given greater weight than others. In a compensatory 
method, low levels on some KSAO's can be compensated for by high levels on others, 
provided that there is motivation for improvement. In a non-compensatory method, the 
reverse applies (Cary et al. 1998: 589-90). 
Validity and Reliability of Recruitment and Selection Instruments 
Experts in military human resources advise that all recruitment and selection 
techniques must stand the test of validity and reliability if they are to be useful. They 
must be valid in the sense that they can be demonstrated to measure what they are 
intended to measure, and they must be reliable, that is accurate and dependable. What 
this means in practice is that recruiter and selectors must be well aware of the precise 
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qualities they are looking for, and that they are using appropriate instruments to reach 
and recruit those who possess them. 
Moreover, all military establishments use a battery of tests, most deliberately chosen, 
and all aiming to identify hopefully the best trainable candidates with the best 
prospects for success, while at the same time avoiding costly mistakes. However, there 
is also agreement that there is no best way to predict future performance, nor is it 
possible to make 100% accurate predictions in this respect. To increase the likelihood 
of getting it right, measurements of KSAO's must be based on the equivalent of a "job 
analysis" of the future officer's duties, that is on the ftinctions they will be performing, 
as well as the environment in which they will be operating. For these reasons, selection 
procedures must be reviewed periodically to examine whether they are successfully 
selecting high quality candidates now, and whether they are capable of selecting the 
best candidates for future needs. The danger is that some recruitment and selection 
procedures are rarely challenged and evaluated to verify their foundations (Rumsey 
1999: 1-9; Truszczynski 1999: 4; Bailey 1999: 3-6; Cook & Klumper 1999: 2). 
3.3 Indoctrination 
As in other professions, military officer training and education includes an element of 
socialisation. In military literature, this is often referred to as 'indoctrination', but 
military indoctrination is not the same as 'brain-washing' even if it is usually intense 
and painful (Yardly 1987: 108). Essentially indoctrination is a process of induction and 
assimilation (Kelly & Gibson 1996: 8). It aims to transform the civilian recruits into 
military cadets who look, think, walk, talk, and act like soldiers. Researchers also use 
the terms 'military culture' and 'enculturation' in discussing indoctrination. The term 
military culture is useful because when new recruits enter a military academy, they 
know they must leave behind their civilian identity and ways of behaving because 
these are very different from how they will be expected to think and behave in a 
military environment. They actually enter a new culture, which is unique to the 
military profession (Zinni 2001: 4). Culture is the way an organisation thinks and how 
it does things (Sutherland & Canwell 1997: 217). It also includes norms of individual 
and collective behaviour (Snider et al. 1999: 7). Military culture is something that all 
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military personnel and cadets share, but newcomers learn it gradually over the period 
of their training and education, although as a rule, like all soldiers, they receive a 
heavy dose of it upon entry to the academy. Before discussing the nature, functions, 
and problems associated with indoctrination, it is useful to begin with a brief 
introduction to military culture and to the agents of military culture, both of which are 
essential for understanding the process of military indoctrination. 
3.3.1 Military Culture 
Military establishments are strong organisations with strong cultures that dominate 
almost every aspect of the lives of their members (Handy 1985: 142). Military culture 
is role and power-orientated. It is based on rigid hierarchy and control. It is also 
characterised by relative stability, predictability and strong values, such as loyalty, 
sacrifice and the like. The literature on organisational culture suggests that each 
organisation has its own particular 'miniature society' or community, which is unique 
to itself It has its own beliefs, values, myths, heroes, and generally behaves very much 
like a larger form of society, or sub-culture (Sutherland and Canwell 1997: 219). This 
is certainly true of military academies, although they very much share the features of 
the general military culture (Soesters and Recht 1998: 183). The literature on military 
academies reveals that most western military academies like to portray themselves as 
having a strong military cultures and identities, and as having a reputation for 
upholding military values and a commitment to excellence. West Point (USA) and 
Sandhurst (UK) are examples of military academies with an international reputation 
for excellence in military culture. 
The strong identity of the best military academies in the world is reinforced by what 
are known as cultural artefacts, which refer to a strict dress code (uniforms), the 
general appearance of the buildings, logos, Code of Honour, ceremonies, etc. Figure 
3.2 below identifies some military artefacts: 
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Military jargon 
Logos 
Rites, rituals, 
& Ceremonies 
Appearance 
of Buildings Basic Values 
Military Organisation 
Artefacts 
Dress code 
Stories & Myths 
History \1/ Exemplary heroes 
Traditions Behaviour code 
(role-models) 
Figure 3-2 Examples of military organisation artefacts 
( based on Sutherland & Canwell 1997: 220) 
Military organisation artefacts, in turn, serve to reinforce the values of the military 
academy. Rites of passage, for example, mark changes of status and roles, e. g. from a 
civilian into a cadet upon entry into the academy and from a cadet into an officer on 
leaving the academy. One of the effects of socialisation is to introduce the newcomers 
to the culture of the academy and military culture in general. Military organisation 
artefacts act as agents of socialisation, but there are others, too. 
3.3.2 Agents of Indoctrination 
USMA Prospectus. 2001 states that everyone cadets come in contact with during their 
training and education could potentially be an agent of socialisation. Other items in the 
environment also play a role in the socialisation of cadets. Figure 3.3 below shows 
some primary agents of cadet socialisation: 
42 
Dominant leader 
The Academy's 
expectations & ethos 
Disciplinary rules 
/ Military goals \ ýrimary Agents of cadet 4 7 Socialisation Senior Cadets 
/ Artefacts Teachers & Staff 
Mission 
Statement 
Figure 3-3 Some primary agents of military Indoctrination 
(based on Sutherland & Canwell 1997: 223) 
Other influences on military culture in general are the general public, the press and the 
government, who may exercise pressure on military institutions to make them 
accountable for their standards and actions (Yardley 1987: 249). Finally, the desire of 
the institution to be known as a professional organisation is a further influence on its 
culture and enculturation process. 
3.3.3 Nature of the Indoctrination Process 
For most recruits, military indoctrination begins from day one at the academy. While 
all aspects of the military environment, artefacts etc, contribute to their indoctrination 
throughout their training and education there is little doubt that the single most 
important and formative experience of their new life as aspiring officers is that of basic 
military training (BMT). This almost universally consists of six to eight weeks' 
intensive training and indoctrination intended to transform them from civilians into 
soldiers. The process is swift, abrupt and painful, and is designed to mark a complete 
break with civilian life and identity (Lovell 1979: 96; Jordan, 1971: 358). U'Ren 
(1974: 18) describes this period as "the most shocking experience of a new cadet's 
life''. Indeed, often within minutes of arriving at the academy, newcomers typically 
find themselves stripped of all possessions, standing to attention, unsuspecting that 
they are in for a ruthless reprogramming of their attitudes, thoughts, and 
behaviours, 
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which begins almost the instant they don their uniforms. 
In describing indoctrination in West Point (USA), Downes (1983: 309-10) notes that 
the new entrants are effectively relieved of their civilian identity and thrown 
immediately into an environment that does not recognise their past status and 
achievements. They are suddenly dressed and treated like hundreds of others from 
different backgrounds, and in no time, they learn that group identity, needs, pride, etc. 
must take precedence over individuality. They also learn to cope with exhaustion, fear 
of failure, deprivation, and stress. It is during this period too, that they learn the basic 
skills of soldiering and the rudiments of leadership (Goggin 1988: 133). 
Indoctrination is undoubtedly a very trying period, during which a great deal of 
physical and mental stress is placed upon the trainees, who must obey without 
questioning hundreds of orders and comply with rules and regulations instantly and 
faultlessly or face punishment. Downes (1983: 310) notes that cadets learn almost in a 
'Pavlovian manner' that punishment will always follow errors and failures to comply 
with orders or rules. An atmosphere of tension and anxiety dominates almost every 
minute of their time, day or night. Because of this they learn a valuable survival 
lesson: obey and conforin, or face the consequences. 
According to Ellis and Moore (1974: 77), many military establishments have a tradition 
of inflicting stress and discomfort, and even tolerate a degree of bullying as part of 
new cadet indoctrination. They consider the ordeal they put them through an intrinsic 
part of military training (ibid: 364). For some cadets, this period of indoctrination can 
be decisive, forcing them to reconsider whether they have made the right decision in 
joining the military. At this point some resign, others are dismissed for reasons of 
incompatibility. Thus indoctrination has the function of a further selection step, rooting 
out those who may have slipped through the selection net and revealed themselves to 
be incapable of functioning under conditions of prolonged stress. But indoctrination 
has many other important functions. 
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3.3.4 Functions of Military Indoctrination 
Ellis & Moore (1974: 77) and Moss (1996: 9) emphasise that behind the physical and 
mental pressures that have to be endured by the new cadets, initial indoctrination has 
many important functions, all of which are directly or indirectly linked with 
organisational and military effectiveness. In the view of many, the end result of the 
academy's apparent unreasonableness and the harassment of cadets is to instil in them 
the ability to manage time and make rapid decisions in moments of extreme stress, to 
prepare them as leaders and enable them to work against deadlines. It is a way of 
training them for what they probably will be doing for many years of their working 
lives. Initial indoctrination also conditions the new cadets for reflex action under 
extreme stress, which is likely to be useful for survival in combat situations. It leads to 
physical hardness and mental toughness. It is during this period, too, that group 
cohesion, loyalty, and effort coordination are developed and appreciated. Most of all, it 
is a period during which the foundations of military culture, i. e. its values, are 
assimilated (Goggin 1988: 134) 
Of all military values, obedience is perhaps the most crucial. Huntington (1957: 74) 
describes it as a "supreme virtue", not just for ideological reasons, but because it is 
vital for discipline and control and for the successful management of mission 
operations. Williams (1995: 25) and Van Loon (1997: 18) state that professionalism 
involves the willingness to obey orders from superiors without which chaos may 
result. The second most emphasised value in military culture is uniformity, which is 
reflected in the correct wearing of uniforms, the care and presentation of military 
equipment, military rituals, and the courtesy of etiquette both within and outside of the 
institution. Downes (1983: 318) notes that the military system seeks to remove the 
distinctions and differences individuals acquire in the civilian world, and create a 
uniformity of ideas, attitudes, actions, and reactions compatible with the values and 
ethos of the Military. She observes that the new entrants to the military institution 
often enter it as a disparate, disorganised group, but that within a short period of time, 
they are transformed into a homogeneous troop, "all marching to the beat of the same 
drummer". Most military writers also stress the importance of commitment to the 
military profession, which is strongly tested both during the selection process and 
during basic training (McAlister 1995: 88). Military socialisation, which obviously 
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continues beyond basic training, although with much less intensity, fosters 
commitment to military values and to the military profession, the loss of which would 
be damaging to its credibility and combat effectiveness (Moss 1996: 8-20). 
Other military values which the cadets are likely to come across during their 
socialisation are competition, the importance of the missioný initiative, enthusiasm, 
team-spirit, tradition, valour, patriotism, decisiveness, will power and determination, 
confidence, the ability to communicate, sense of humour, and personality, not to 
mention integrity (U'ren 1974: 5 Downes 1983: 341, Moss 1996: 8, Denaro 1995: 38; 
Larson 1995: 34). Vitas (1999: 49), on the other hand, sums up the most important 
military values as honour, obedience, integrity, loyalty, and service. 
3.3.5 Blocks to Successful Indoctrination 
It is important to bear in mind that the fundamental aim of military indoctrination is 
the effective transformation and preparation of civilian recruits first into cadets, and 
then into competent and confident officers who are useful to the units to which they are 
posted. To be successful, indoctrination will also need to weed out those who are unfit 
or unsuitable for a military career. It will avoid alienating recruits, and instead instil in 
them respect and pride in becoming new members of a unique organisation. It will 
therefore imbue them with the virtues of military culture and values. In summary, as 
indicated earlier in this section on indoctrination, it will successfully convert 
candidates who made it through the selection process into individuals who truly look, 
think, walk, talk, and act like military officers. 
Effective indoctrination can, however, be hampered by a number of difficulties and 
obstacles. Forney (2000) conducted an in-depth historical study of the socialisation of 
cadets in which he identified at least ten major hurdles to successful indoctrination. 
Perhaps the first and most obvious source of difficulty is poor selection at the point of 
entry into the academy. Clearly, however good the indoctrination programme may be, 
it will still fail to make good officers of individuals who are unsuitable for military life 
because they lack the necessary qualities. A second obstacle is the perception that the 
socialisation system may be out of date and unrepresentative of society. If it isl it will 
fail to be accepted and internalised. Calls for indoctrination to be realistic, to be in step 
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with the times is a common theme in military literature. A third obstacle is that some 
harmful traditions and rituals that give a bad name to the Military are slow to dle and 
are passed down from one class to another, even when they may be contrary to 
regulations, such as harsh punishments and abuses. A fourth related obstacle is the fact 
that in many academies the responsibility for cadet indoctrination is unduly left in the 
hands of the senior cadets (upperclassmen), who may be only two or three years older 
and not fully mature. In the worst situations they will tend to take their frustrations out 
on the junior cadets by subjecting them to cruel and unjustified punishments and 
bizarre rituals, sometimes to the point of driving them out of the academy. They will 
even compete on who is the harshest on the new cadets, sometimes under the 
approving eyes of commanding officers. A fifth obstacle is the often-noted 
ambivalence felt about harsh indoctrination by the cadets themselves, who, on the one 
hand have to suffer severe treatment at the hands of their trainers and upperclassmen, 
which at times they may find unbearable; on the other hand none of them wish to 
belong to a class of cadets who had an easy time, particularly during the intensive 
indoctrination period of basic training, a reputation that could follow them for years in 
their military careers. A sixth obstacle is the necessity to reconcile military goals with 
academic priorities. Both compete for cadet time and commitment, and both have for 
more than half a century been clashing with each other, with supporters on each side. 
The end result is that compromises have to be made, but one thing is certain: 
overemphasis on indoctrination at the expense of academics is no longer acceptable in 
most, if not all modem military academies in the world. A seventh obstacle is the 
feeling by cadets that they are always trying to cram thirty hours of work into a 
twenty-four hour day. Many feel overwhelmed by competing demands on their time. 
An eighth obstacle is the overemphasis on conformity and obedience at the expense of 
initiative and creativity. Good officer indoctrination must achieve a balance here. A 
ninth obstacle is military academies' tendency to be very resistant to change. Academy 
officials are generally very protective of their values and traditions, even if some of 
them are thought to have outlived their usefulness, or are based on unproven 
assumptions. Finally, a tenth obstacle is the low morale that is created by controversies 
and scandals following cheating incidents or breaches of academy rules and 
regulations by cadets or staff members. All have a negative effect on the socialisation 
process because they do not inspire confidence and trust in the system, which the 
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cadets are supposed to respect and conforrn to. 
3.3.6 Changing Trends 
The predominance of an authoritarian, punishment-oriented leadership style, 
perpetuated by military trainers and senior cadets in some military institutions, has 
come under severe criticism in recent years, and is nowadays increasingly viewed as 
inappropriate to contemporary needs. Thirty years ago, Janowitz (1971: xx iii) 
predicted that the modem trend was toward a gradual elimination of brutal induction 
procedures, excessive inspections, undue harassment, and degrading experiences. 
However, Ellis and Moore (1974: 74 - 79) reported strong resistance among many 
military officers and senior cadets to "being overly reasonable" in the socialisation of 
new recruits. They argued that to be a cadet one had to go through the "stress factor" 
and that to eliminate the traditional rites of passage would lead to deterioration in the 
standards of discipline, and to the loss of an important tool of military socialisation. 
Consequently, current socialisation processes are unlikely to display a substantial 
departure from the practices of the past. A second major shift in the patterns of military 
socialisation, as noted by Ellis and Moore (1974: 75), Williams (1995: 25), and Moss 
(1996: 12) is the realisation that a man can only be led by fear for so long, and that the 
emphasis now needs to be on identifying shared values, common goals, and nurturing 
team spirit without j eopardising authority. 
3.4 Vocational Programme 
Doctors, lawyers, teachers, and other professionals have their own specific domains of 
expertise, and so does the military officer. According to Huntington (1957: 11), Hackett 
(1983: 202) and Garnett (2001: 1), the military officer is responsible for the ordered 
management of armed conflicts on behalf of the society he serves. As a servant of 
society, his principal role is to lead and win the nation's wars as, when and 
in the 
manner in which society expects him to. This is a function that 
distinguishes to the 
military officer, and an activity that is vital to the survival of the nation, the 
integrity of 
its territory, its values, and the way of life that it holds dear. In recent times, the areas 
of expertise of the military officer have expanded into unconventional areas of activity, 
placing new demands on the capacity of military professionals and requiring constant 
adjustments of military officer preparation programmes. 
As in the presentation of other 
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pillars of officer preparation, the discussion begins with the elements of the 
professional component, continues with the requirements for a successful professional 
component programme, and ends with the potential blocks to a successful professional 
component programme. 
3.4.1 Elements of the Vocational Programme 
The professional component of officer preparation essentially consists of four 
elements: basic military skills, military knowledge, leadership, and the development of 
appropriate attitudes and character that go with professional officership (Yardley 
1987: 184; Schwarzkopf in Palmer 1992: 9; Chilcot 1999: 59). To these nowadays are 
added other spheres of expertise, particularly management, communication skills, and 
various other skills related to military operations other than war (MOOTW) duties. 
3.4.1.1 Basic Military Skills 
Basic military training has been and always will be an essential part of the preparation 
of all officers (Yardley 1987: 109). This is because the officer is first and foremost a 
soldier and a warrior (Kelley 1996: 104). It includes infantry training, perfecting 
shooting skills, and drill. Janjua (1994) compared the training systems of six military 
academies: West Point, Sandhurst, and those of North Korea. ) Japan, Turkey, and 
Pakistan, and found that among their most salient features were that basic soldiering 
skills were mostly concentrated during the cadets' first year, with warfare training and 
exercises in five out of six academies being deferred to the summer months. From the 
second year onwards, all military training was geared towards leadership. RMC 
(2001), Yardley (1987), and Janjua (1994) also reported military academies' tendency 
to devote disproportionate attention to military drill and parades despite conflicting 
views on their usefulness. 
3.4.1.2 Military Knowledge 
This is essentially concerned with the technical and tactical aspects of military 
expertise, both in theory and practice. Here, cadets are trained and educated 
in 
understanding and using the technological "tools of the 
trade"', that is all equipment, 
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weapon systems, the systems that operate and control weapon systems, computers, and 
other physical items that officers operate, manage, and control in a manner and to the 
standards expected. The objective here is to make sure that they are able to set up, 
operate, and maintain equipment and resources efficiently and effectively to support 
their soldiers. Tactical skills, on the other hand, have to do with movements, location 
and relocation, how to lay out a defensive perimeter to secure and protect an area 
against enemy attack and the like. Tactical skills also involve knowledge of how men 
fight with maximum energy and commitment, a knowledge derived from the 
experience of others and from historical lessons. The objective of the tactical aspect is 
to master the skill of combining technical skills with people and ideas and applying 
them to fight and win (ALDH 2001: 39-43) 
A review of how a number of military academies in the world cover this aspect of the 
professional preparation of officer cadets reveals that there are wide variations in the 
nature and extent of military knowledge content provided for cadets. Variations also 
sometimes exist within the same military academy from one course to another. Most 
importantly, content depends on the purpose of the programme. If the goal is to 
produce junior officers who, after completing the course, can join their operation units 
and immediately start performing as competent platoon leaders, and no more than that, 
then the military subjects in the curriculum will tend to focus on short-term usable 
technical and tactical skills, usually also placing an emphasis on the relevance to 
military needs in most, if not all aspects of officer preparation. On the other hand, if 
the preparation programme's goal is to groom cadets for a lifelong officer career, and 
for potentially higher-level responsibilities, then there will be as much concern with 
immediate military needs as with the long-term effectiveness of the military 
organisation, a concern that will be reflected in a more inter-disciplinary and broad- 
based programme than in the former model. In the latter case, the learning environment 
also tends to resemble that of a university rather than a barracks. The programme is 
also referred to as an undergraduate course, often ending with the award of a 
Bachelor's degree. 
An undergraduate military course generally covers military- specific subjects such as 
50 
Military Science, Military History, Military Law, Terrain Analysis, etc. but also a 
range of general academic subjects such as Mathematics, Physics, Engineering, I. T, 
etc, which are thought to be of relevance to military science and technology thought 
processes. Hence, there is considerable overlap between the 'specifically military' and 
the 'general academic' aspects of military knowledge (RMC 2001: 37), which is why 
both are covered in the development of military expertise. As a rule, the longer the 
time spent at a military academy, the more it is possible to aim for technical, tactical 
and academic brilliance. Conversely, the shorter the time, the more likely that the 
course will be more concerned with technical and tactical proficiency than with 
academic excellence (Dodd 1978: 52; Yardley 1987: 247; Janjua 1994: 85). 
Which specific subjects should be included in this aspect of the curriculum is a 
question that is best left to experienced military educationalists and commanders, 
because it appears that each military academy consciously tailors its programme 
content to suit the circumstances and needs of the country in terms of security and 
defence. This being said, it is useful to note that most respected military academies in 
the world, such as West Point in the USA, the Royal Military College of Canada, and 
the Japanese Military Academy attempt to draw their programmes directly from 
contemporary and anticipated future military needs. A second feature of their 
programmes is that they have a strong science/ engineering foundation (RMC 
2001: 15). Finally, they are all broad-based and varied, offering both breadth and depth 
as well as a degree of choice of specialisation. Solid military knowledge helps to foster 
good leadership, but it is only one of several other necessary ingredients of effective 
leadership. 
3.4.1.3 Leadership 
Leadership training must be central to everything that cadets do at the military 
academy (RMC 2001: 45). Yardley (1987: 197) notes that at Sandhurst, everything 
is 
taught through the medium of leadership, both theoretical and practical, with a strong 
emphasis on relevance to ensure that everything the cadets do has a useful purpose. 
Why is leadership so important? Because it is almost synonymous with officership, 
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and also because as a junior officer on his first assignment, the new graduate will be 
expected to be able to lead a platoon of about 40 soldiers, or/and be a technical service 
officer, or/and head a special branch, or hold a similar position of responsibility for 
men and resources. He may also serve as a deputy company commander, coordinating 
activities and leading tasks involving 150 to 200 soldiers (Pemsteiner 2001: 82). 
Clearly, every cadet must learn how to confidently and competently organise and lead 
men, in times of both war and peace (Dodd 1978: 54; Keller 2001: 17) 
All the military academies reviewed for this important portion of the professional 
component of officer preparation recognise the vital importance of leadership skills. 
However, not all of them provide the structures, the resources and the necessary 
programme to ensure that the objective of producing capable and effective leaders can 
be achieved. Many seem to expect leadership to simply emerge, while others, such as 
West Point (USA) and Annapolis (USA), for example, see their missions as to be the 
producers of the 'best leaders in the world' (Thomas 200: 14). These academies 
actually have a separate department for leadership development. Palmer (1992: 6) 
rightly sees that "the academies' very reason for being revolves around leadership", 
therefore it is essential for all military academies to have a serious leadership 
programme, both theoretical and practical. 
Leadership is admittedly not an easy subject to teach. Yet, new officers would fail in 
their missions if they did not possess the adequate knowledge and skills to be effective 
leaders. And since experience is not enough, leadership can and must be taught (Taylor 
1977: 9), drawing on modem scientific theories and from sound analysis of historical 
examples of successful and unsuccessful leaderships (Garnett 2001: 1-26). In a paper 
entitled "Why Arabs lose wars", Atkine (2000: 19) contends that leadership may be the 
greatest weakness of Arab training systems and discusses several flaws in their 
leadership styles and approaches. Thus, it is useful to review the available methods of 
developing leadership, as well as the qualities of effective military leadership. 
To begin with, the probability of producing superior leaders is greatly enhanced by 
Starting with the best possible candidates, those with 'latent leadership abilities' or 
with the best potential to make good leaders (Dodd 1978: 55; RMC 2001: 17). Apart 
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from this, in most military academies in the world cadets are strongly encouraged to 
serve in positions of cadet leadership and to seek responsibility in a variety of 
activities, including sports and extra-curricular activities. For example, most make use 
of the practice of having upperclassmen. They are also offered opportunities to hold 
command positions during summer military training, military exercises and field 
training with operational troops (Janjua 1994: 74). 
Many researchers emphasise that leadership development is facilitated by setting 
exemplary role models, because cadets also learn leadership behaviour through 
observation and interaction with officers they come in contact with (RMC 2001: 8; 
Atkine 2000: 22; Garnett 2001: ii; McCoy 1996: 29; Ul'man 1990: 29; Thomas 2000: 8; 
Reimer 1998: 59). All potential role models, particularly company officers and 
instructors, must therefore be aware of the messages, good and bad, they are sending 
through their performance, conduct and attitudes, and the standards they set in front of 
cadets. 
Experimentation with peers during practical sessions is also mentioned as a useful 
method of leadership development as it combines interaction, observation, and 
reflection. Theory, of course, is an important part of this leaming process, and the 
literature contains a wide range of theories of leadership. Ideally, a balance should be 
maintained between theory and practice (Csoka 1985: 2) and links between them 
should be frequently pointed out by instructors and company officers. Finally, Thomas 
(2000: 55-60) cites recent initiatives taken by both West Point and Annapolis to 
enhance the development of leadership in their cadets. Among these are, first, the 
establishment of a leadership development department with an in-house library and 
research facilities. Secondly, leadership fellows, from among retired officers with 
command experience, were invited to participate in classroom teaching and serve as a 
mentoring resource. Thirdly, distinguished guest speakers were invited to address 
cadets on leadership topics throughout the academic year. Fourthly, video case studies 
were developed or acquired to serve as a teaching resource, bridging the gap between 
theory and practice. Fifthly, the idea of a conference, or a series of conferences on 
leadership was proposed. Together, these are thought to be a good way of bringing 
together the accumulated experiences and knowledge of many leadership experts for 
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the benefit of all participants. 
As for the qualities of effective leadership military academies ought to aim for in 
developing cadets who will be tomorrow's leaders, there seems to be no doubt 
nowadays that outdated, purely authoritarian methods of leadership, based on fear and 
unquestioning obedience from followers is inappropriate and counter-productive 
(Atkine 2000: 20). Leadership is wrongly linked with privilege instead of 
responsibility by some officers, according to Thomas (2000: 44). It is also wrongly 
measured by "who has the shiniest shoes and does the most push-ups". It is too often 
characterised by distance, even contempt for the ordinary soldier by officers who, 
instead of leading by example, inspiring confidence, trust, and respect, "refuse to get 
their hands dirty" (Atkine 2000: 20 - 24). The modem enlightened view of successful 
leadership is one that can transform ordinary soldiers into extraordinary performers. 
USMA's (2001: 95) vision of an effective leader is that he should be able to learn to 
lead by will, intellect, initiative, and boldness. He must be an inspiring leader who, 
through his competence and character, eams the respect and trust of his subordinates, 
and stimulates willing obedience and enthusiasm. He will be their teacher, trainer, and 
mentor. He will be aware that one of his most important responsibilities is to consider 
the well-being of his soldiers, without whom mission accomplishment would be 
impossible (Ganoczy 2001: 73; Garnett 2001: 1-26; Kelley 1996: 107; Garnett 2001: 1- 
26; Kelley 1996: 107). Above all, according to Garnett (2001: vi); Woodward (1995: 1), 
Carbuncle (1996: 102) and Konig (2001: 5), the modem leader must be taught not what 
to think but how to think. In Educating Army Leaders for the 21" Century, Dudevoir 
(2000: 4) stresses that leadership development programmes must aim to produce 
leaders who are capable of thinking critically and creatively, and who can act 
independently in accordance with the intent of their superiors, rather than leaders that 
sit and wait for orders. 
Leadership is the ordered application of military force. It was defined earlier as the 
primary duty of an officer. Beyond the battlefield, the modem officer is increasingly 
called upon to perforin managerial, administrative duties which are also vital 
for the 
effective running of the military organisation to which he belongs (Keller 
2001: 17; 
Vitas 1999: 47). 
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3.4.1.4 Management 
The preparation of professional military officers nowadays includes equipping them 
with at least the basic principles of administration and management so that they can 
contribute to running the affairs of the Military, in times of both peace and war. Budget 
restrictions and downsized forces in many military organisations have led to the need 
for efficiency in managing human resources, equipment, supplies etc. and the need for 
the Military to be able to justify their expenditures, interact with other organisations 
and enter into negotiations with the government to secure resources and maintain their 
capabilities (Yardley 1987: 118; Cvrcek 1991: 145). Some military experts view this 
development with scepticism and some regret because cost-effectiveness does not in 
their opinion go well with operational effectiveness (Moss 1996: 12; Hackett 
1983: 1995). Whether in the role of a manager or a leader, the officer needs good 
communication skills to interact at all levels. 
3.4.1.5 Communication Skills 
Developing good communication skills is an essential part of the preparation of the 
modem military officer. This is not new; the Military have always been aware of the 
importance of good communications for combat effectiveness and for survival. They 
know that good communication enables intentions and plans to be well understood, 
encouragement of and genuine concern for individuals to be conveyed, and morale to 
be lifted (Downey 1977: 177; Hamilton 1986: 203). Recognising the importance of 
good communication, Sandhurst (UK) has for some years now had a separate 
communications department, which is responsible for the development of cadets' 
communication skills, particularly face-to-face interviewing, briefings, presentation 
etc. These are particularly important in image-conscious Western military institutions, 
whose staff need to be trained in coping with media and public scrutiny. Most military 
academies also provide a range of foreign language courses, which could prove useful 
in foreign postings and international missions (Yardley 1987: 114). 
55 
3.4.1.6 New Areas of Expertise 
Since the Military are no longer limited to fighting conventional wars against 
conventional enemies and are frequently expected to conduct military operations other 
than war (MOOTW), such as pursuing terrorists or drug warlords, providing 
humanitarian relief, containing regional conflicts, peace keeping/making etc., military 
academies see it as their duty to equip future officers with the appropriate knowledge 
and skills to cope with this new mix of roles and commitments. Unfortunately, the 
essential competences required to succeed in carrying out such missions are still 
largely unknown, because the environments in which they take place are unpredictable, 
and full of ambiguity, uncertainty, and risk. What is known for certain is that such 
complex operations require leaders with greater intellectual capacity than ever before, 
so that they can make wise, responsible, and creative decisions (Garnett 2001: 1-26). 
Other unstoppable areas of change adding to the required competences of all present 
and future officers are information and technology, which are evolving at 
unprecedented levels of speed. According to Dudevoir (2001: 7), if changes continue to 
increase at the present speed - and there is evidence that changes will progress at an 
even faster rate in the future - then military academies must reconsider their 
programmes in order to apply necessary modifications to them and ensure that they 
stay current with the important advances and concepts of the time. Professional 
military education and training must give the officers of the future the confidence they 
need to perform in new operating environments (Kelley 1996: 107). 
3.4.2 Requirements of a Successful Vocational Programme 
A synthesis of the most important factors that can contribute to the successful 
development of the professional component part of officer preparation can be 
formulated as follows. 
Firstly, an effective professional programme must be derived directly from the precise 
occupations and duties the junior officers are likely to be called on to Perform after 
graduation. It must address specific military needs and reflect the attributes that 
the 
academy seeks to develop in its graduates. It must equally 
be consistent with the 
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current and anticipated future needs of the Military, if the officers are to be equipped 
with relevant and useful knowledge and skills 
Secondly, an effective professional component will strive to equip cadets with high 
levels of expertise, and recognise the need for flexibility In thought and action. It must 
encourage critical thinking, creativity, and adaptability to new situations. It must teach 
them how to think, rather than what to think. 
Thirdly, an effective professional component must strike the right balance between 
theory and practice. It must encourage experimentation, provide constant feedback and 
reflection, and build the cadets' confidence in their growing theoretical and practical 
expertise in all aspects of this component. 
Fourthly, an effective professional component teaches cadets that leadership is not, as 
viewed by some, a matter of status and privilege, but a position of responsibility. It 
encourages not distance between the leader and the led, but closeness, understanding, 
care, and cooperation. It relies on willing obedience and commitment, based on trust 
rather than on fear and forced compliance. Any deficiencies in the above-mentioned 
factors of effectiveness related to the professional component could reduce its 
successful development by the cadets. But there are also other factors that could 
hamper success in this area. 
3.4.3 Blocks to a Successful Vocational Programme 
Potentially the most serious block to a successful professional component is resistance 
to change, where change is needed to improve any aspect of this component. Not 
recognising the need to focus less on the superficial (drill, parades, etc. ) and replacing 
it by more useful activities can reduce its effectiveness. Laying the accent on 
classroom teaching and the rote learning of training publications, instead of 
encouraging cadets to use their creative potentials can also have a negative effect on 
the effectiveness of this component. Finally, failing to provide a leaming climate that 
aims for and demonstrates commitment to high standards of expertise will inevitably 
lead to a professional development that falls short of ever achieving excellence. 
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3.5 Liberal Education 
Apart from the need for a solid grounding in professional military knowledge and 
skills, most academy officer preparation programmes in the world recognise the 
importance and value of liberal education in the overall professional development of 
aspiring officers. Most military educators see it as a requirement and even a necessity 
and consider that it plays an increasingly vital role in equipping current and future 
leaders with the knowledge and attitudes they need to meet the challenges of the 
modem world and have a successful military career. This section defines what liberal 
education is, then discusses its purposes, continues with an overview of the main 
features characterising an effective liberal education component, and ends with a 
review of potential constraints and concerns regarding certain aspects of liberal 
education programmes. 
3.5.1 Defining Liberal Education 
According to Adler (2002: 2), liberal education has traditionally been defined as the 
study of any subject of knowledge that is not vocational, such as rhetoric, grammar, 
logic, and other disciplines intended to develop the faculties of the human mind, those 
powers of intelligence and imagination without which no intellectual work can be 
accomplished. Liberal education, he adds, is not tied to certain academic subjects, 
such as philosophy, history, literature, music, art, and other so-called "humanities", 
because in the liberal arts tradition, scientific disciplines, such as mathematics and 
physics, are considered equally liberal, that is, equally able to develop the powers of 
the mind. Importantly also, Adler does not confine liberal education to intellectual 
education or to the cultivation of the mind. He extends it to include moral training, if 
its aim is to instil good moral habits or virtues such as prudence and integrity. The 
modem definition of liberal education, he also notes, encompasses many more 
sciences, both natural and social. 
3.5.2 Purposes of Liberal Education 
In a detailed analysis of the purposes and benefits of 
liberal education for all 
professionals, Harris (1991: 4) argues that many students are surprised at 
the number of 
general education classes they must take in order to graduate. 
They wonder why they 
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have to take subjects that have apparently no link with their chosen professional field 
or major. Why study history, literature, philosophy, music, art, or any other subject 
that does not directly help to train them for a profession? Would it not be better to 
concentrate all efforts on acquiring and sharpening the specialised, vocational 
knowledge and skills specifically needed for the function or occupation one is hoping 
to be prepared for? Despite these objections, many military writers and educationalists 
are of the view that the preparation of officers would be incomplete without liberal 
education, which is why officer preparation programmes have undergone increasing 
liberalisation since the end of World War 11. It is also for this reason that most military 
academies in the world incorporate an invariably strong liberal component in their 
officer preparation. From the literature, it is possible to identify general benefits 
common to all members of any profession, as well as benefits specific to aspiring 
professional military officers. 
3.5.3 General Purposes 
Harris (1991: 5) enumerates seven major general benefits that a broad-based liberal 
education can provide. First, liberal education teaches us how to think. It broadens the 
mind, makes it better at grasping ideas, concentration, following arguments, and 
distinguishing what is important from what is trivial. It teaches us how to organise and 
structure our thoughts and arrive at sensible, rational solutions to problems. Crucially, 
it teaches us how to think for ourselves and form our own opinions, attitudes and 
beliefs, based not on the authority of others, but on our own comprehension and 
evaluation of arguments and evidence. The wider our knowledge of subject areas, the 
more we are able to think independently, make good judgements, and the less we are 
dazzled or overwhelmed by issues outside our discipline of specialty. 
Second, liberal education teaches us how to learn and enhances our creative capacities. 
No institution, however great, can teach in three or four years everything we need to 
know now or in the future. Liberal education helps us to develop transferable learning 
habits to cope with new, difficult and unfamiliar knowledge. Knowledge of many 
subject areas also enables the cross- fertili sation of ideas, their extended applications 
and wider relevance to other areas (Lewis and Liegler 1998: 49). 
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Third, liberal education allows us to see things whole and makes us realise that our 
chosen field of knowledge is only an angle or a partial view, and that reality is more 
complex. It forces us to recognise that some problems require solutions combining a 
wide range of knowledge from diverse disciplines. It teaches us that to perform well in 
our jobs, we need more knowledge than that of one field. 
Fourth, liberal education sows the seeds of wisdom and faith. It enhances the in-depth 
consideration of issues, separates the superficial from the significant, and stimulates us 
to seek evidence from every realm of knowledge before making a judgement or taking 
action. It also makes us marvel at the wonders of knowledge and creation. 
Fifth, liberal education makes us better at imparting knowledge to others. It makes us 
better communicators and better listeners. It contributes, sixthly, to our happiness as 
individuals. It gives us a break from our narrow field of competence and provides us 
with opportunities to explore endless knowledge avenues for pleasure and 
improvement of our understanding of the world and of people. Seventh, it can enhance 
our understanding of the moral and spiritual dimensions of our actions. It can provide 
us with a useful framework, purpose and direction for difficult decisions. 
Finally, Harris (ibid: 8) concludes that liberal education is without a doubt the best aid 
to any professional study. He asserts that a man who has learned to think, reason, 
compare, discriminate, who has refined his taste, fonned his judgement, and sharpened 
his mental vision will not at once be a professional soldier, engineer, or other, but he 
will be placed in an ideal state of intellect that allows him to pursue any profession 
with ease, versatility, and success. In a similar vein, Adler (2002: 2) stresses that the 
aim of liberal education is not to produce scientists or develop professional 
competence, although it is indispensable for any profession. It produces individuals 
who can do their jobs responsibly and who know how to use their minds and are able 
to think for themselves, whether they intend to be scientists or not. 
Empirical support for the usefulness of liberal education comes from surveys and 
personal testimonies. Snider (1985: 4-6) examined the results of several studies 
totalling over 88,000 top executives in the USA. Overall, the studies provided 
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evidence that the general intellectual skills developed through liberal education 
increased in importance over time, facilitated promotions to higher executive positions, 
and placed those who possessed them at a clear advantage over those whose 
backgrounds were narrowly vocational, such as engineers and business school 
graduates. They were, among other things, favoured for their superior coping abilities 
in the face of uncertainty and for their creativity and communication skills. Snider also 
reported the testimony of a very highly successful American executive who attributed 
his success to qualities of flexibility, adaptability, and creativity fostered by his strong 
broad-based liberal education background. He is quoted as saying, he said: "I have 
had nineteen jobs in my career, and at least seven of them were new. They had never 
existed before. How do you prepare for jobs like that? Well, based on my experience, 
you get an English degree..., and then you learn as much as you can about as many 
subjects as you can absorb. Y) 
Now, if the benefits of liberal education are increasingly recognised in the civilian 
sector, the question is how much does this apply to military officers? Pritchard (1999: 
23-6) considers that in the predominantly unpredictable twenty-first century world in 
which the Military has to perform more diversified combat and non-combat tasks, 
officer development must include at least four core competencies: (a) Tactical, 
technical and technological (incl. IT) proficiency; (b) Cognitive skills and abilities, 
such as numerical comprehension, oral communication and problem solving; (c) 
Interpersonal skills and abilities, such as skill in human relations and teamwork ability; 
and (d) Personal characteristics, such as decisiveness and tenacity. 
In addition, Pritchard specifies ten "differentiating competencies" which he believes 
are necessary for high-performance leadership of change and people, qualities that will 
distinguish between superior and satisfactory leadership in the twenty-first century. 
These are: (1) Continuous learning - increasing current proficiencies, rapidly 
understanding and using new information and mastering new skills; (2) Awareness - 
knowing the interrelationships of and keeping current on key military, political, 
economic and social issues, trends and events that affect the military organisation; (3) 
Flexibility - being open to change and 
having a tolerance for ambiguity, as well as 
being able to adjust rapidly to new situations and priorities; (4) Resilience - recovering 
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quickly from setbacks and having the capacity to bounce back amid intense pressure-, 
(5) Initiative - working without close supervision, always looking for ways to improve 
matters; (6) Creativity - generating original ideas or innovative solutions-, (7) 
Entrepreneurship - identifying and taking prudent risks, and being unafraid to take 
responsibility for them; (8) Persuasive influence - the ability to affect the opinions, 
judgements or behaviours of others, for example in mediation; (9) Partnering - 
building and working with ad hoc coalitions and groups requiring rapid integration; 
and (10) Commitment - being a creator and sustainer of loyalty to organisational 
culture and values. 
Pritchard concludes by saying that the effective junior leader in the coming decades of 
the 21 st century will be sensitive to cultural diversity, race and other individual 
differences. He will have well-developed interpersonal skills, and will be able to adapt 
leadership style to a variety of situations. This new era leader will be able to tackle 
ambiguous problems in fluid situations, and be able to use independent, mature 
judgement and initiative with an awareness of the implications of his decisions and 
actions. 
Despite the obvious differences between professional military and civilian managerial 
activities, in terms of the skills involved, values, outlooks etc, Vitas (1999: 48), Snider 
(1985: 6-7), and Masland and Radway (1957: 30-46) argue that there are fundamental 
similarities between the activities of military officers in peacetime and those of civilian 
corporate managers. Both need interpersonal and administrative skills, as well as the 
ability to use human and material resources effectively, although in different 
environments. Snider (1985: 6-7) notes that a large and growing number of military 
positions are essentially managerial in character. They involve skills such as 
procurement, research and development, supply, maintenance, financial management, 
etc. all of which are common to both the civilian and military sectors. If anything, he 
stresses, such activities must be accomplished with greater efficiency for combat 
effectiveness, and for reasons of accountability at all times anyway. Vitas (1999: 50) 
goes even further, suggesting that although preparation for combat will always be the 
first role priority for officers and the military in general, the fact is that for most 
countries not engaged in conflict, combat operations have become and remain only a 
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fraction of armed forces activities nowadays. The military profession, he notes, cannot 
be limited to waging war, as it is expected to contribute to various aspects of national 
and international security matters, such as fighting terrorism and drug trafficking, 
peace-keeping, relief operations etc. All these new roles necessarily have implications 
for the early education of officers in which liberal education plays a vital part. All the 
preceding arguments lend support to the relevance of liberal education to the 
preparation of military officers. However, there are even more specific purposes for 
the importance of liberal education in preparing cadets for officership. 
3.5.3.1 Military-Specific Purposes 
Recognising the importance of liberal education in the preparation of officers does not 
mean that it can serve as a substitute for training in combat and leadership skills, or 
that intellectual skills will somehow eventually translate into effective leadership in 
battle (Rothenberg 1998: 153). However, generally, post-World War Two military 
analysts, historians, and educationalists seem to be convinced that liberal education has 
direct relevance to professional military effectiveness itself. They see it as an essential 
tool to educate the minds of future military leaders, to improve their performance as 
leaders of men, to guard against repetition of the costly mistakes of the past, and as a 
contributing factor to maintaining peace and harmony between the nations. 
An adequate officer preparation programme, according to Vitas (1999: 51-2), 
stimulates value formation and strengthens qualities of integrity, discipline, honour, 
duty, justice and the like, inspired by patient and sensitive teachers. Most of these 
qualities can be acquired as a consequence - or even be the subject - of liberal arts 
classes. It is claimed that liberal education cultivates the ethos of service to state and 
people. It develops a sense that officers are not simply "trained killers" ( ibid: 49) but 
trusted defenders of the state rather than a threat to it, and an embodiment of the 
values, common cause, and identity of the society that sends them into combat 
(Dingman 1998: 157). It fosters those attributes of mind that enable officers to 
understand what they are fighting for, and why force may be justly and rationally 
applied (Converse 1998: 57). It also teaches officers to treat ordinary soldiers as 
human beings and respect their dignity (Boog 1998: 120); the lack of this quality is a 
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particular weakness in Arab leadership, according to Atkine (2000: 19). Arab officers 
are allegedly noted for being rigid and distant from the men under their command, and 
for keeping contact with them through generally poorly educated and excessively harsh 
corporals and sergeants. This, according to Sullivan (1998: 78), usually produces 
brittle military forces in which command and control tend to collapse under severe 
battlefield conditions, as they did in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Insights from the social 
sciences may lead to more enlightened leadership that knows human nature, finds ways 
to maintain cohesion and motivates men to fight and win. These insights, in addition to 
other aspects of liberal education, can promote good communication skills and an 
appreciation of individual strengths and weaknesses. 
Exposure to liberal education, it is hoped, enhances military officers' ability to think 
critically, and encourages creativity, innovation, and initiative, unless stifled by rigid 
supervision from above. Nothing is worse in battle than officers who stand still 
waiting for directions in emergency situations instead of exercising independent 
judgement (Kirkpatrick 1998: 104; Sullivan 1998: 77). The study of history, moreover, 
gives access to a wealth of learning on military strategies that worked or did not work, 
not least in terms of the training and education of officers. For example, the German 
experience in the Second World War was an example of the devastating effects of 
producing officers who were technically proficient but generally ignorant of war's 
political and strategic dimensions (Boog 1998: 127). At the other extreme is France's 
defeat in 1940, which military historians attribute to a "failure of leadership at every 
level", but more fundamentally to an educational philosophy that gave primacy to 
general education over practical military training (Converse 1998: 47). In contrast, 
Kirkpatrick (1998: 100) suggests that a key factor in American military success in the 
Second World War was its effective officer preparation programmes, which produced 
remarkable young men, most of whom had only trained to serve as company grade 
officers, who took the initiative and emerged rapidly to become generals who could 
organise, motivate, train, and lead divisions in battle. The history of military education 
also teaches us, among other things, that the separation of military officers 
from 
society, through elitism or alienation, is fraught with perils 
for both (Dingman 1998: 
170). Japan before 1945 is a case in point, and so is Russia after the revolutions of 
1917 and 1991. 
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Furthermore, liberal education introduces student officers to the world. It increases 
their knowledge and understanding of recent and ongoing historical events; it exposes 
them to the diverse cultures and behaviours of human kind; and it teaches them the 
challenges and delights of new languages. All these are intended to produce officers 
capable of meaningful action in a world of alliances, lethal weapons, and considerable 
envirom-nental uncertainty. 
Last but not least, military officers are not mere instruments of war. They are people, 
with families, occupational career needs, interests, and ambitions like any others. 
Many feel that being given the opportunity to learn transferable skills, partly through 
liberal education, is an added motivation to their commitment to service in the 
Military, and an important security factor to fall back on should they return to civilian 
life. This is an essential feature of an effective liberal education programme in the 
preparation of aspiring officers nowadays, but there are several others, discussed next. 
3.5.4 Features of an Effective Liberal Education Programme 
A thorough search for the essential characteristics of what constitutes an ideal liberal 
education programme component in the preparation of the officer of the twenty-first 
century reveals wide variations of views and practices among scholars and military 
academies. Some, as will be discussed in the final part of this section, would even 
favour reducing its size to a minimum or even eliminating it altogether from the 
military curriculum. Others see it as a key to the preparation of the whole man, the 
scholar and warrior he should be if he is to meet the challenges of the new century 
(Effland and Reed 2001: 82). Generally, however, most military academies in the 
world are attentive to the trends set by US service academies in particular, but none 
necessarily copy them since each has distinct needs and goals that determine the nature 
of its programmes. Still, it is instructive to bring together those features that 
characterise what is widely considered to be a forward-looking, modem 
liberal 
education component in the preparation of current and future military officers. 
In a rare in-depth study of liberal education in the service academies 
in the United 
States, Simons (1965: 8-18) identified three main types of abilities and personality 
traits which liberal education might be expected to produce in those who 
have 
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undergone it. First, those who have had a liberal education should have acquired a 
broad knowledge of the various major areas of learning - the natural sciences, the 
social sciences, and the humanities, including the fine arts. According to Shafer & 
Putnam (1998: 169), Dudevoir (2000: 14), (Wirth 1994: 595) and Snider (1985: 4), the 
broader the better, and the more it will contribute to producing well-rounded 
individuals. However, as Simons noted, in view of the rapidly accelerating rate of 
growth of knowledge, cadets cannot be expected to cover everything that is known in 
those areas during their preparation for officership. They can only be expected to 
become familiar with the basic facts and principles of the various disciplines. A cadet 
who completes three, four, or more years of a professional preparation with however 
distinguished a record in engineering, nuclear physics, or whatever, but with little or 
no knowledge of literature, history, philosophy, etc. cannot be said to be liberally 
educated. It is unlikely that he will be able to think and act effectively in his 
occupation and in many other life situations. Keller (2001: 29) and Albrecht (2001: 96) 
believe that the liberal component in officer preparation must ideally be equivalent to 
civilian programmes of the same level in terms of standard. It would also ideally 
include a wide range of attractive courses of contemporary interest and relevance. 
Mere possession of facts, however, does not guarantee the efficient and imaginative 
use of the mind. 
Second, then, according to Simons (1965: 8-18), liberal education ought to cultivate 
reasoning skills and habits, the capacity to think logically and clearly, and the ability to 
organise one's thoughts. It must enable cadets to order and interpret complex issues 
and bring their full intellectual resources skilfully to bear on the solution of a problem. 
Just as they must have some knowledge of many fields, they must also learn various 
forms of reasoning other than those of their main fields of interest. They must 
understand the appropriateness of objective and subjective evaluations, gain insights 
into human motivation, and know how to follow a scientific procedure, construct 
hypotheses, make accurate observations based on evidence, and arrive at conclusions. 
It must also equip the cadets with good communication skills, both oral and written, so 
that they can convey their knowledge effectively and fully understand the nuances and 
details of good communication. 
In current and future military operating environments, characterised by rapid change 
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and intensifying complexity, a curriculum instruction that fosters reasoned, critical, 
and creative thinking is more needed than ever before. Knowledge obtained merely in 
the form of accumulated facts committed to memory is of limited use and has a short 
shelf life. Moreover, a good liberal education programme must encourage independent 
learning, intellectual curiosity, and continuous, lifelong learning (Garnett 2001: 1-28; 
Converse 1998: xi; Lamkin 1998: 16-50; Whiteman 1998: 18; Kenney 1996: 62). It 
should above all teach cadets how to think, not what to think (Harris 1991: 1). 
Third, although a rich knowledge of facts, and good reasoning and communication 
skills are valuable intellectual assets, they must be complemented by the virtues of 
wisdom, tolerance, sensitivity and integrity. Larson (1995: 34 -7) states that a good 
liberal education should not miss opportunities to highlight the moral - ethical content 
or implications of issues. It should also encourage the learners to make them 
instinctively part of their judgements and decisions. Such qualities linked to 
personality and character must be cultivated throughout the cadets' education because 
they reflect the liberally educated person par excellence. Liberally educated people 
have certain values and have formed, or at least considered, a certain philosophy of 
life. They know their limitations and have respect for the views and rights of others. 
They are humbled by the vastness of the knowledge they do not know, and continually 
seek to learn and improve their understanding of people and the world they live in. 
Whether the above three broad purposes of liberal education will really be achieved 
will largely depend on the cadets' teachers, their teaching methods and approaches, 
and on whether their environment is conducive to learning or not. It will depend on 
the extent to which teachers emphasise the interrelationships of subjects with one 
another, as well as their ethical dimensions. And, crucially, it will depend on whether 
teachers can resist the temptation to emphasise trivial details, fact memorisation, and 
the preoccupation with the cultivation of the specialised knowledge and techniques of 
their own narrow field of intellectual activity at the expense of the broader principles 
and objectives of liberal education. 
In addition to the three broad conditions for a truly liberal education programme 
discussed so far, a number of other conditions are frequently mentioned in recent 
67 
literature. Thus, the fourth condition, in the belief of several researchers and writers, is 
that a liberal education programme should provide a balance of courses from the 
humanities and the social sciences on the one hand, and vocational-utilitarian subjects 
on the other hand. Neither should be allowed to overwhelm the other (Effland and 
Reed 2001: 86; Hall 2000: 3; Williams 112000: 41). 
Fifth, a good liberal education programme should include an element of choice. In this 
way, excessively heavy workloads can be avoided, interest and motivation to learn are 
maintained, and the risk of producing uniformed 'grey thinkers' (Vitas 1999: 7) forced 
into 'intellectual torture' (Kirkpatrick 1998: 102) is prevented. Most modem military 
academies also allow students the choice of in-depth study from among a number of 
liberal subjects in the form of a major (West Point Red Book, May 2001). Sixth, 
opinions vary on whether the content of liberal education, and anything included in the 
officer preparation programme generally, should stand the test of relevance or not. 
Some believe that many subjects may have no apparent, self-evident usefulness, 
because they are thought to have long-term value, or indirect benefits (Barker 2000: 
10; Kenney 1996: 58). Others strongly insist on relevance (RMC Report 2001: 36), 
especially when financial limitations impose it (Downes 1998: 142; 1991: 136). 
However, Effland and Reed (2001: 88) state that if relevance is deemed important, 
then it must be emphasised. Relevance is also clearly related to the desired 'product' 
at the end of the initial officer preparation period. For example, in the USA both 
Spartan (warrior) and Athenian (intellectual) aspects of officer education and training 
are equally valued, because it is not unusual for military officers to take up civilian 
posts, either after a short commission or at a later stage of their careers. In the UK, on 
the other hand, where the curriculum for educating and training officers is strictly 
limited to military-relevant subjects and activities, there is no deliberate intent to 
prepare recruits for anything other than immediate military needs, which is why 
courses are on the whole comparatively short and vocationally based (RMAS 2002 
Prospectus). A glimpse at the subjects offered by the Swiss Military College for 
ir preparing military officers also shows insistence on relevance since most of the' 
liberal education courses are qualified as 'military', such as military sociology, 
military psychology, military didactics, military history, etc., all taught by senior 
military officers (Kach 2001: 32). 
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Not unrelated is the seventh and final criterion for a good liberal education 
programme, which is to equip officer aspirants with transferable skills. These are 
skills that can be transferred from one subject to another (Harris 1991: 3) and from one 
situation to another, such as from a military occupation to a civilian one. They lead to 
a fusion of capabilities (Kenney 1996: 58) and ensure professional flexibility. In this 
way, joining and leaving the Military is facilitated (Albrecht 1999: 95). It is also likely 
to make officer careers more attractive to high-quality candidates who would otherwise 
not opt for military commission and take up a military career (Steinkamm 1999: 16). 
3.5.5 Constraints and Concerns regarding Liberal Education Programmes 
As military academies continue to move towards greater liberalisation of their 
curricula and closer integration with civilian higher education, growing concern is felt 
by many traditionalists that such institutions are in danger of weakening their 
fundamental dedication to the distinct mission of the military profession. Some argue 
that change has gone too far in the wrong direction and even call for a return to more 
Spartan values and less emphasis on intellectual and occupational pursuits that have 
allegedly precipitated much of the erosion of the uniqueness of the military profession. 
Even what is arguably the best military academy in the world, West Point, was 
recently criticised as having too great a focus on intellectual subjects. In a 1998 White 
Paper compiled by USMA's Class of 195 1, West Point's curriculum was judged to be 
"imbalanced in favour of academic versus military leadership training" and that it was 
"becoming too closely aligned with the academic concerns of public institutions and 
losing its focus on training future Army leaders" (Thomas 2000: 50). 
Similarly, in a strongly critical paper, Smith (1996: 1- 10) laments that the academies 
are becoming "mini-liberal arts universities instead of the military-technical 
institutions of yore". The author blames falling military standards and values on what 
he perceives to be the excessive liberalisation of the curriculum, which he claims has 
had counter-productive repercussions on many aspects of officer preparation, including 
a reduction in the rigour of indoctrination, cheating and other scandals reported over 
recent years, the easing of dress codes, etc. He is even in favour of terininating many 
of the freedoms that came with the liberalisation of the curriculum including all liberal 
arts degree programmes, and redirecting the curriculum towards an exclusive focus on 
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war sciences and technology. The Military, he stresses, must not forget that leadership 
in combat is the ultimate purpose of officer preparation, not intellectual sophistication. 
Effland and Reed (2001: 88) point out that hard sciences and technology only address 
a portion of the skills needed for leadership in the twenty-first century but, they 
suggest, the balance in military education does not have to come from subjecting all 
future officers to in-depth liberal education, but can be found through forming an 
officer corps composed of widely assorted specialists. Military academies need to ask 
themselves whether they are preparing specialists or generalists (Snider 1985: 4), and in 
any case need to strike the right balance between the proportion of generally 
professionally oriented instruction and that related to courses completely outside the 
military-occupational field, that is those designed to prepare cadets for the broad 
responsibilities of citizenship and for an informed and intelligent personal life (Simons 
1965: xi). 
Another major issue related to the teaching of liberal education as part of the 
preparation of junior officers is whether it is at all possible to offer a genuinely liberal 
education within a military environment, and whether it would be more appropriate 
and more effective to make arrangements for it to be obtained in civilian universities. 
Strong arguments exist on both sides (Cheeseman and Hall 1997: 8; Kotze and Steele 
1995: 24). Vitas (1999: 47) contends that the depth of insight and inquiry needed in 
dealing with modem and future military and non-military tasks is best found in civilian 
liberal arts institutions. Future military leaders, he argues, need a first-class liberal 
education that is unrestrained by the military environment. They need the same liberal 
education as their civilian peers in order to share the same values and awareness of the 
world, and so that in future they can be more effective in their role of "nudging 
political leaders toward sensible and realistic expectations and decisions" involving 
national security (ibid: 51). Little surprise, therefore, that countries like the United 
Kingdom and Australia prefer to fund or recruit civilian university graduates before 
providing them with professional military education and training (Cheeseman & Hall 
1997: 2). Kach (1999: 38) and RMC Report (2001: 36) oppose this approach, 
favouring the view that intellectual and professional military development should best 
go hand in hand, and that the military environment 
does not have to be the crippling 
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constraint it is made out to be. Officer aspirants must and can learn that there is a time 
for independent thought, imagination, ingenuity, and initiative, as well as a time for 
discipline, teamwork, conformity, and loyalty. These two sets of values are not 
incompatible but complementary in the preparation of officers (Mason 1986: 4-5). 
Some even feel that the military environment presents the advantage of being free from 
civilian distractions. 
Finally, to provide good quality liberal education, time for thought and analysis, on 
which truly liberal learning depends, must be made available to cadets. With pressures 
from all sides, and the tendency to attempt to cover the maximum amount of subject 
matter in a minimum amount of time, courses often take on the character of a race that 
is not conducive to good learning. The hectic pace of life in a military academy also 
makes it sometimes very difficult for students to read or research in depth (Janjua 
1994: 85; Downes 1991: 136; Simon 1965: 206-7; Caforio 1998: 160). 
3.6 Physical Fitness 
This is the fifth and last pillar of junior officer preparation, but by no means the least 
important one. Without it, military training is incomplete, which is why it is part of 
every officer preparation programme in the world. This section highlights why 
physical fitness is important, its benefits, the place it is accorded in some military 
academies, and what constitutes an ideal fitness programme, and reviews a number of 
barriers to its effectiveness. 
3.6.1 Importance of Physical Fitness 
Most people nowadays know about the importance of physical fitness for their good 
health but, for the Military, physical fitness is an essential element of soldier training. 
Military sport means more than improving the physique of the soldier. Military sport 
specialists strongly believe in the complementary value of physical training for 
military preparedness (Pope 1995: 441-8; Janowitz 1960: 130). They believe that 
developing needed physical strength, flexibility, and endurance transforms cadets into 
hardened men upon whom the safety of the nation may depend. They also believe that 
the sporting experience can help cadets relate to war pressures and that the experience 
of the playing field is in a way a framework for war experiences (USMA 200 1: 1). 
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Moreover, because officers are soldiers who must always be ready to answer the call of 
duty and be able to cope with prolonged physical action in hostile and stressful 
situations, they must never allow themselves to be physically unfit. They must be able 
to function well under the most difficult and threatening situations, including in 
chemically or biologically contaminated environments. They cannot afford to stop for 
a break after every physical effort, and must keep going no matter how tired they are; 
otherwise, they may be endangering their own lives and those of their soldiers, and risk 
failing in their mission. As future leaders of troops, cadets must aim for the 
achievement of exemplary fitness (RMC Report 2001: 50; CFAO 2001: 1). 
Despite these arguments in favour of physical fitness, there are some who mistakenly 
believe that modem battle techniques and technology have removed the need for it. 
Clearly, this is an ill-informed view that ignores the reality of war and the many 
benefits of physical fitness, not only for the individual soldier, but also for the military 
organisation as a whole. 
3.6.2 Benefits of Physical Fitness 
For the individual cadet or soldier, physical fitness is valuable because, among other 
things, it gives him energy, increases his productivity and alertness, and increases his 
stamina, power, and confidence (Field Manual 1992: iii). For the regiment and the 
academy, physical fitness not only improves combat readiness and survivability, but 
also contributes positively to the development of character, sense of duty, team 
cohesion, and team spirit. Physical fitness also leads to a healthy morale and can 
relieve the monotony of military drilling (Pope 1995: 447; RMAB 2001: 2). More 
benefits are revealed in the next section. 
3.6.3 Components of Total Physical Fitness 
Experts distinguish four components of total fitness. These are (1) cardiorespiratory 
fitness; (2) muscular fitness; (3) flexibility; and (4) body composition / weight control 
(Gindhart 1999: 3-, Field Manual 1992: iii). Each component is now defined and 
discussed in ten-ns of its importance and role in total fitness and good health. 
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3.6.3.1 Cardiorespiratory Fitness 
This is the heart's ability to pump blood and deliver oxygen throughout the body. It 
allows the body to cope with tiredness and enables it to keep going. It makes it 
possible for the soldier to run, swim, climb, etc. for long periods of time without 
excessive discomfort. Good cardiorespiratory fitness is clearly essential for survival in 
combat. The way to achieve this aspect of fitness is through regular exercise. Research 
shows that regular exercise also positively affects the psychological well-being of the 
individual. It reduces stress, depression, and the chances of having a heart attack. 
Studies conducted in the United States showed significant improvements in the 
psychological health of subjects who regularly exercised. Test results showed 
decreased levels of anxiety, depression, fatigue, and confusion. Other studies also 
showed that regular exercise can help improve memory and other brain functions 
(Harig 2001: 6; Nieman 1986: 252). 
3.6.3.2 Muscular Fitness 
Muscular fitness is the strength and endurance of one's muscles. This can be shown in 
how many push-ups or sit-ups one can do, for example, or how good one is at pulling, 
pushing, or lifting heavy weights. Strength training, such as weight lifting, increases 
the muscles' size and power, and - among other things - improves the appearance and 
self- confidence of the individual, while at the same time reducing the amount of fat in 
the body. More importantly, while exercises such as jogging and walking are good for 
the lower body muscles and bones, weight training complements them by benefiting 
the other parts of the body, such as the arms, shoulders, etc. (Field Manual 1992: iii). 
3.6.3.3 Flexibility 
Flexibility is the ability of joints to articulate through the full range of their 
movements. Poor flexibility is common among inactive people. The problem with 
inactivity is that muscles settle into a permanent state of contraction. Stretching 
exercises help restore muscle flexibility, reduce tension and back pain, and prevent 
muscle injuries (Watney 1989: 15). 
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3.6.3.4 Body Composition / Weight Control 
Body composition concerns the relative amounts of fat and lean body tissue that 
constitute the human body. It is expressed in a percentage of body fat measurement. 
Air Force pilots, for example, are familiar with this concept, as they are used to 
managing their body composition, which is believed to affect their flying skills. 
3.6.4 Requirements for Physical Fitness Programme Success 
Harig (2001: 4), Gindhart (1999: 12), and Watney (1989: 15) emphasise that a 
complete physical fitness programme must include training, and observance of the 
requirements of the four components of total fitness just discussed. To ensure 
implementation, however, programmes must be supported by policies defining what 
physical fitness is, and how to achieve its goals. Next, it is important to establish a 
well-developed fitness plan requiring weekly, if not daily, participation in fitness 
training (at least 3-5 hours per week). Instructors implementing the fitness programme 
must be well trained and be able to set reasonably high standards, but they must also 
be careful not to force cadets to a point where serious injuries might occur. Regular 
fitness programme evaluations and feedbacks help keep cadets in good shape. 
In addition to these requirements, guidelines for developing programmes to improve 
and maintain physical fitness levels for all military personnel, including cadets, 
emphasise the importance of certain basic physical training principles. These are: (1) 
regularity, that is the expectation that each of the four components must be practised at 
least three times per week; (2) progression, the gradual increase in intensity and / or 
duration of exercises; (3) balance, which ensures that none of the fitness components is 
ignored or overemphasised; (4) variety and choice, which increases motivation and 
progress and reduces boredom; (5) challenge, which is the opportunity to push oneself 
beyond one's limits to reach maximum performance, as far as possible (CAP Manual 
50-18 1996). 
The guidelines also stress that any fitness programme must observe four factors that 
promote successg easily remembered by their acronym FITT, which stands for 
Frequency, Intensity, Time, and Type of exercise. Briefly, frequency requires cadets to 
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exercise 3-5 times per week; intensity requires exerci ises to be hard enough to rai se the 
heart rate reserve (HRR) (details of how this is calculated are given in Field Manual 
1992); time depends on the type of exercise being done, but overall 20-30 minutes 
represent a minimum; and finally type refers to the kind of exercise perforined, which 
must fit the target component (Field Manual 1992: 1-4; CAP Manual 1996: 3). A 
summary of the FITT factors applied to the components of total fitness is given in 
Table 3.1 below. 
Table 3-1 FITT Factors Applied to Physical Conditioning Programme (CAP Manual 50-18 
(1996): 3) 
C ardio respiratory Muscular Muscular Muscular Flexibility 
Endurance Strength Endurance Strength and 
Muscular 
Endurance 
Frequency 3 times/week 3' -5 3 times/week Warin-up and 
3-5 times/week 
times/week Cool-down 
Stretch before 
and after each 
exercise session. 
Development 
Stretching 
To improve 
flexibility, 
stretch 
2-3 times/week. 
Intensity 3-7RM** 12+RM 8-12 RM Tension and 
alight 60 - 90% HRR discomfort; 
NOT PAIN 
Time The time The time The time Warm-up and 
required to do 3- required to do required to do cool-down 20 minutes or more 7 repetitions of 12+ 8-12 Stretches 
each exercise repetitions of repetitions of 10-15 
each exercise each seconds/stretch 
exercise Developmental 
stretches 
30-60 
Seconds/stretch 
Type Stretching P assive Free Weights Static 
Running 
-machines P. N. F Resistance Swimming Partner-resisted Exercises * 
Cross-country Body-weight Exercises (Pushups/pull-ups/d, ps, etc. ) 
Skiing 
Rowing 
Bicycling 
Jumping Rope 
Walking/Hiking 
Stair Climbing 
Abbreviations 
*HRR = Heart Rate Reserve 
**RM = Repetition Maximum ***PNF = 
Propnoceptive Neuromuscular Facilitation 
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Having discussed the main factors that promote a successful cadet physical fitness 
programme, it is now useful to review some of the factors that prevent success. 
3.6.5 Barriers to Physical Fitness 
Kelley (2000) has reviewed the literature on the factors that present obstacles to 
physical fitness in the Military. She discusses many obstacles throughout her work, the 
most important of which is that policies for fitness programmes are sometimes not 
fully implemented or complied with, particularly at lower levels of command, or by 
physical trainers. The second most important factor is, she claims, cultural: one study 
conducted in the US by Duffy et al. (1996) in support of this view shows lower 
physical activity levels among Mexican Americans, compared to white and black 
Americans. Additionally, Kelley points out that some cultural environments tend to be 
more fitness-conscious than others. The third frequently mentioned barrier is 
geographic location and climate; the argument is that some are favourable and others 
are not. 
Other, more specific barriers mentioned include the lack of role models among 
educators, trainers, and staff, failure to create an exercise-friendly environment, lack of 
access to physical fitness facilities, not exercising 3-5 times per week, cadets' lack of 
or insufficient awareness of the many benefits of fitness, or lack of confidence in their 
ability to be physically fit. To these barriers can be added that too often, physical 
activities are not enjoyed by all cadets, particularly if the element of choice is lacking, 
with the result that they may experience training sessions as a burden or a bore; worst 
of all perhaps, if additional physical training is wrongly used as punishment for 
inability to perform well, or for some other reason. 
3.6.6 Military Academies' Physical Fitness Programmes 
In the final part of this section, the physical fitness programmes provisions of 
four 
Western military academies are examined to see what can 
be learrit from their 
approach to planning and implementing this aspect of cadet preparation 
for officership. 
The first of these academies is the United States 
Military Academy of West Point 
(USMA) which boasts of its historical commitment to athletics. 
The academy strongly 
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emphasises the competitive aspect of cadets' physical training. Cadet teams take part 
in at least 26 competitive sports, in which about 30% of all academy cadets are 
involved. The Academy also competes in about 25 sports with other colleges both 
regionally and nationally. West Point is also proud that through its extensive athletics 
programme "every cadet competes and is challenged at the highest level of physical 
ability". It has a sports department that views athletics as an opportunity for all cadets 
to develop self-confidence and self-discipline, a sense of fair play, team spirit, and the 
ability to think and act under stress, all working towards the achievement of the 
mission and purpose of the military academy (West Point Prospectus 200 1: 1). 
The second academy is the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst (RMAS), which is 
also for good reasons proud of its long tradition of excellence in all aspects of its 
training and education of officers, including physical fitness and sports. The Sandhurst 
Diary (2001: 1-5) indicates that the overall purpose of its physical fitness programme 
is "to ensure that every cadet leaves Sandhurst in top physical condition and will be 
able to supervise the fitness training of the soldiers who will be under their command". 
Thus, cadets are not only expected to achieve a high standard of physical fitness, but 
they also learn how to organise and conduct physical and recreational training. The 
physical fitness programme takes into account physical fitness activities such as the 
challenges of the obstacle course, long endurance marches, adventurous training 
expeditions, parachuting, gliding, sailing, aqua-diving, and even Scottish country 
dancing, not to mention parades and all intramural and extramural team sports. All 
these activities are part of the sports syllabus and are designed to build the confidence, 
courage, and resourcefulness of the leaders of the future. 
The Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) also has a sports department to properly 
plan and implement its sports activities. In its four-year programme, the RMC aims "to 
enable each cadet to attain a high level of physical fitness and achieve a satisfactory 
level of sports skills". Like all members of the Canadian forces, its cadets are trained to 
be physically fit to meet future military operational requirements, so that they are well 
prepared to perform in prolonged and stressful situations. 
The programme includes 
basic knowledge of a wide variety of sports, and expects all cadets to participate 
in one 
or more competitive team sports within the college or 
between colleges and other 
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establishments (RMC Prospectus 2001: 1). The RMC also stresses the recreational 
aspect of sports, and also rewards members who demonstrate exceptional levels of 
performance through awards and other encouragements (CFAO 50: 1-4). 
Finally, the Royal Military Academy of Belgium (RMAB) aims for two goals in its 
physical fitness programme: to have the students reach a strong physical condition, and 
at the same time develop in them a liking for sports and outdoor activities. In its 
curriculum, five hours of physical training are prescribed, and cadets are expected to 
voluntarily spend extra time maintaining good physical fitness. The RMAB describes 
its programme as an attractive and balanced programme of physical education that "not 
only takes students to a high standard of physical fitness during their officer 
preparation, but also teaches them to coach others during sporting activities" (RMAB 
Prospectus 2001: 1). 
Interestingly, during their first two years at RMAB, the cadets' physical fitness 
programme is planned; after that they take responsibility for their own fitness, but must 
still do five hours of sports per week. The choice of activities is wide and includes 
swimming, judo, and martial arts, as well as competitive sports inside and outside the 
academy. The final year emphasises "sports methodology", which is intended to 
prepare them to take responsibility for the physical training of their troops in the 
future. 
The RMAB prospectus states that the "whole approach to physical education has a 
sound scientific basis", monitored by its own team of experts, who ensure that progress 
and balance are achieved by all the cadets throughout their preparation as officers. It 
stresses that physical education is "a policy part of its integrated education" and that 
those cadets who do not meet the standards of the twice -yearly evaluations cannot 
become officers. 
The physical fitness programmes just discussed are those of four of the best military 
academies in the world. It can be seen that they share many characteristics in terms of 
goals and how these are designed to be achieved. All four programmes seem to be well 
planned, stressing the importance of physical training as a preparation 
for military 
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readiness. Each also not only expects high standards of performance and the 
participation of all cadets in competitive sports, but also prepares them to coach others 
so that they can take care of the physical fitness of their own troops in the future. 
Another common point is that the academies appear to integrate well other physical 
activities in their fitness programmes. Finally, at least two out of the four academies 
explicitly stress that physical fitness activities can and should be enjoyable. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter completes the survey of military literature. It has attempted to offer a 
detailed account of the significance of and the role played by each of the five junior 
officer preparation programme components, with a particular emphasis on the features 
that make them effective and ineffective in the education and training of new recruits 
into the profession. Together with Chapter Two, it will constitute the basis upon which 
KY, MA's junior officer programme will be assessed in terms of performance. The next 
chapter outlines and explains the research strategy and procedures chosen for gathering 
data to be used as evidence in the evaluation of K-KMA's programme and in answering 
research questions of this study. 
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Chapter Four 
Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter One, the main objective of this study is to evaluate KKMA's 
junior officer preparation programme. This chapter outlines and explains the 
methodological procedures that were employed to collect and analyse the research 
data, which are subsequently used as evidence for the evaluation of the various aspects 
of the programme in question and for answering the research questions. 
The early sections of the present chapter justify the study's choice of research design 
and data collection instruments. These are followed by a description of the stages and 
steps followed in constructing the main instrument of this study, the questionnaire, 
including its pilot testing. The research population and sample are then specified. 
Details of the field study implementation and the appropriate data analysis methods to 
be used are then presented. Next, issues of validity and reliability, as well as the ethical 
dimension of conducting this research are addressed. 
4.2 Programme Evaluation - Value, Purposes and Focus 
Robson (2002: 202-9) states that much social research endeavour can be thought of as 
some kind of evaluation, or as having an evaluative dimension. Evaluations are 
important because they help identify strengths and weaknesses in a particular 
programme. They may indicate that changes are needed in the programme, or that 
certain aspects of it work or do not work, or whether the programme meets the needs 
of those taking part in it or not; and thus may assist in its improvement. Evaluation 
necessarily requires systematic data collection relating to the various aspects of the 
programme. It also needs to be comprehensive, according to Harrison (1990: 271), and 
focus on its total value. This agrees with the intent of the present researcher, which has 
resulted in the decision to assess the effectiveness of all five components of KKMA's 
junior officer programme. In addition, each programme component is examined in 
tenns of its content, delivery methods, the conditions under which it is delivered, and 
80 
outcomes. Finally, Robson (ibid) stresses that a proper evaluation must, among other 
things, be worthwhile and feasible, and carried out fairly, ethically and sensitively. 
This advice is incorporated within the guiding principles used in conducting this 
research. 
4.3 Research Design 
There are several types of research design in social research and researchers are 
expected to select or devise an appropriate one that will enable them to achieve their 
research objectives. A research design is basically a data collection approach or a 
"strategy". Bell (2002: 7) and Brannen (2003: 3) stress that no single design is better or 
worse than any other. Different approaches also use different data collection methods, 
and no approach dictates or rejects the use of any particular method. Quantitative 
research, for example, is primarily concerned with quantified or statistical facts and 
generalisations, while qualitative research is essentially concerned with the individual's 
"perceptions of the world", rather than statistics. However, Tashakkori and Teddlie 
(1998: 5) point out that most social and behavioural science researchers now use 
multiple methods combining quantitative and qualitative techniques. In other words, 
they use whatever method or methods they deem appropriate for their investigations, 
instead of relying on one method exclusively. 
Saunders et al. (2003: 88-91), Allan (1991: 177), Powell (1997: 144) and Robson 
(2002: 290) support the use of multiple method designs because it is advantageous to 
do so. The important thing is that the researcher has valid reasons for his or her 
research strategy decisions and that the general plan will enable him/her to answer the 
research questions. Robson (2002: 371) recommends the adoption of multiple methods 
because they can be used in complementary fashion to enhance the interpretability of 
the data obtained. Thus, in a primarily quantitative study such as the present one, the 
interpretation of statistical results can be enhanced by qualitative narrative accounts, or 
quotes from respondents. 
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4.4 Design Applicable to this Study 
The design applicable to this research is a multiple method design integrating the use 
of three instruments: questionnaire, interview and documentary analysis. It could also 
be termed "a multi-method evaluation design" (Robson 2000: 81). It was chosen for 
this research because it permits triangulation, an issue to be discussed shortly. Before 
that, it is worth outlining Robson's five design components, which he stresses should 
be borne in mind when carrying out any research. These are: (1) the purpose of the 
study; (2) the theory, or conceptual framework linking the phenomena being studied; 
(3) the research questions; the data collection methods, how they are analysed and 
shown to be trustworthy; and (4) the sampling strategy. Figure 4.1 below shows how 
the five design components interact. 
Purpose 
Research 
Questions 
Theory 
Sampling 
Strategy 
Figure 4-1 Research design framework (adopted from Robson 2002) 
The purposes of the evaluation and the theoretical framework in this study helped 
determine the study's research questions. In tum, the research questions helped 
determine suitable methods of data collection (discussed below). They also 
helped to 
deten-nine the necessary sampling strategy because it is impractical to collect 
information from everyone involved in KKMA's officer preparation programme. 
The purpose of the evaluation was specified in Chapter 
One. The theoretical 
framework linking the five programme components was developed and discussed 
together with the research questions in Chapter Two. 
Only two of Robson's design 
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components remain to be discussed, the data collection methods and the sampling 
strategy. However, other associated issues are also examined. 
Returning to the reasons for choosing a multiple method approach, its most obvious 
advantage, as many researchers argue, is that it allows triangulation (Robson 2002: 
370, Cohen et al. 2000: 112, Brannen 2003: 11). This research in fact uses two types of 
triangulation mentioned by Denzin (1988, cited in Robson 2002: 174): data 
triangulation, i. e. the use of more than one method of data collection (survey, 
interview, documents); and methodological triangulation, i. e. combining quantitative 
and qualitative approaches. 
Finally, this study's research design is also influenced by Downes' (1991: 2) suggestion 
that a programme evaluation should be guided by three key questions: "How is it 
done? "; "How well is it done? " and "How can it be improved? " These questions give 
further direction as to what kind of issues need to be investigated in relation to each of 
the five programme components, and narrow down its scope to the main concerns of 
the evaluation. Figure 4.2 adds these dimensions to the theoretical framework of the 
study. 
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Figure 4-2 Methodological Framework 
4.5 Research Instruments 
Having decided to conduct a programme evaluation and specified the research 
questions, the next step is to collect the evidence required. Decisions have to be made 
about which instruments are best for the purposes of this investigation, and then the 
data collecting instruments must be designed to do the job (Bell 2002: 101). Robson 
(2000: 82) cites essentially four broad ways of gathering information for evaluation 
research: (1) observing what is happening; (11) interviewing those involved; (111) 
getting views or opinions through a survey questionnaire; and (IV) getting hold of 
documents such as programme descriptions and the like. For practical reasons, namely 
limited time and resources, as well as infeasibility, observation of KKMA's officer 
preparation programme was ruled out. Additionally, being a graduate of the Academy, 
the researcher is unlikely to gain any knowledge through observation that is not 
already known to him. 
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4.5.1 Documents 
The starting point in the programme evaluation is to get hold of the official written 
curriculum, course outlines, and other course documents to get a picture of the 
prescribed programme. These documents in effect constitute the objectives or targets 
the Academy sets itself to meet in implementing its junior officer training and 
education. Prescribed programmes also represent the ideal against which actual 
implementation could be compared (Saunders et al. 2003: 201). Their examination and 
comparison with questionnaire and interview data contribute to the task of evaluating 
the effectiveness of the various outcomes of junior officer preparation at KKMA. 
4.5.2 Interviews 
To obtain multiple viewpoints in evaluating the effectiveness of KKMA's junior 
officer programme, three top military academy executives are interviewed: the Deputy 
Superintendent, the Director of Cadet Training and Education, and the Battalion 
Commander. These high-ranking officers are directly concerned with the programme 
to be evaluated. Their views and opinions are needed to establish convergence or 
divergence of results and add insights to the findings. Of the three basic types of 
interview, structured, semi- structured, and open or unstructured, the semi-structured 
format best serves the requirements of this study. It is the right form of interview 
because it allows both flexibility and control in the interviewer-interviewee interaction. 
Control is needed to ensure that the most important issues are covered, and flexibility 
is needed so that in-depth evidence is given, and potentially unexpected points are 
allowed to be made freely. 
Semi-structured interviews require the use of predetermined questions with fixed 
wording. These are usually asked in a pre-set order, but this can be changed to suit the 
situation. A degree of skill is needed to make good use of the element of flexibility and 
yet remain focused on the agenda (Robson 2002: 273). Like all interviews, they require 
careful preparation. If possible, they should also be taped (ibid: 278). In situations 
where tape-recording is not possible detailed notes should be taken, preferably at the 
time of conducting the interview (Robson 2000: 94). 
4.5.3 Questionnaire 
The decision to use the questionnaire as the main instrument of data collection 
for this 
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study was forced by the need to extract evaluation data from a large number of 
graduating cadets and their trainers and instructors. The assumption is that these 
individuals have had first-hand experience of KKMA's officer preparation programme, 
therefore they are in an ideal position to express their views and opinions of it in terms 
of effectiveness. Moreover, as Saunders et al. (2003: 28 1) point out, the questionnaire 
provides an efficient and relatively inexpensive way of collecting responses from a 
large sample prior to quantitative analysis, usually by computer. Another advantage of 
the questionnaire is that it can be completed anonymously and can potentially result in 
the greater objectivity and accuracy of the responses. 
The greatest incentive for choosing the questionnaire as the main data collection tool 
for this study is the almost guaranteed access to the desired population sample for the 
questionnaire since, in the words of Kidder & Judd (1986: 224), they are "captive" in 
the Academy. As a result, they feel obliged to respond. A very high response rate can 
thus be expected under these circumstances. The biggest hurdles are in the preparation 
stages that precede the questionnaire administration, including its construction and 
translation, selection of a representative sample, obtaining permission to conduct the 
survey, and making the necessary arrangements for the organised assembly of 
respondents in a suitable location to complete it. These are all issues considered in this 
chapter. 
4.6 Questionnaire Construction 
A questionnaire is not produced by sitting down and trying to think of some interesting 
questions to ask. Rather, the questions must be designed to help achieve the goals of 
the research and, in particular, to answer the research questions (Robson 2002: 
141). 
To arrive at the final version of the questionnaire for this study, the construction 
process went through three stages: a planning stage, a designing stage, and a pilot 
testing stage. 
4.6.1 Planning Stage 
A good questionnaire needs to be well planned. 
Time spent planning precisely what 
data need to be collected ensures that no useless 
data are obtained (Saunders et al. 
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2003: 289). Adequate data will provide evidence on the basis of which the research 
questions can be answered. Steps taken to this effect for this research included a 
thorough review of military literature, academy curricula and internet sites, and visits 
to KKMA, the Egyptian Military Academy, and Sandhurst (UK). Identifying key areas 
to be covered by the questionnaire was a major concern. It was vital to remember that 
the questionnaire's mission was to tap the respondents' perceptions of the effectiveness 
or otherwise of five programme components: selection, indoctrination, vocational 
education, liberal education and physical fitness. Evaluations of each of these areas 
had to be detailed, precise and relevant. 
4.6.2 Designing Stage 
Questionnaire design begins with adopting, adapting, and/or developing suitable 
questions for inclusion in the instrument. It involves making several other decisions, 
such as on the appropriate wording of individual questions, structure, presentation, 
layout, choosing which other related questions need to be asked, choosing a method of 
asking questions, which questions need to be initially left open, the length of the 
questionnaire, choice of rating scale, and providing clear instructions. Concerning the 
present study, only a handful of existing questions was adopted (1/0 questions, Part I 
Q2), the rest were all created by the researcher taking into account the principles of 
good questionnaire design, available in all good research methodology books. The 
researcher also derived ideas from past researchers' best practice and advice from his 
supervisor. 
The questionnaire in its final form (see Appendix 1) was drafted and rewritten several 
times. It includes 146 items. Its length was a problem and participants were made 
aware of this at the outset. The time it took to complete ranged from one hour to one 
hour and a half. It needed to be completed in one sitting to avoid colludsion and the 
contamination of results. 
The structure of the questionnaire follows closely that of the theoretical framework. It 
contains five parts, each corresponding to a specific component of the framework. Part 
I deals with Recruitment and Selection, Part II with Military Indoctrination, Part III 
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with Vocational Education and Training, Part IV with Liberal Education, and Part V 
with Physical Fitness (see Table 4.1). Similar sets of questions were asked in the 
interests of consistency and easy completion. For example, each part (except Part 1) 
begins by asking for perceptions of the importance of the officer preparation 
component in question, followed by an assessment of views and opinions on the 
effectiveness of key elements or aspects of the programme component, the approaches 
and methods used in their delivery, the emphasis or importance they are given by the 
Academy, whether the specific programme is yielding the expected outcomes or not, 
and a measurement of overall satisfaction, which also provides a consistency check 
regarding the respondents' answers. Each part ends with an assessment of the impacts 
of a number of obstacles on the effectiveness of the component. Additional specific 
questions were added to complete the picture for each component, for example on 
issues of balance in the programmes, relevance of certain elements, suitability of the 
learning environment, and others. 
Each part of the questionnaire begins with a statement of purpose, and instructions on 
how to answer the questions. For most questions, respondents were asked to provide 
their responses by circling a number on a 5-point Likert scale. In this way, the 
responses obtained would be uniform and amenable to statistical analysis by computer. 
The questionnaire is accompanied by a covering letter, carefully worded to explain the 
purpose and potential value of the research, and stressing complete anonymity and 
confidentiality. The letter also urges respondents to give truthful responses. The 
questionnaire ends with a postscript expressing thanks. 
Finally, before piloting the questionnaire, a draft version was circulated among a 
number of knowledgeable people for comments and suggestions. This step led to 
revisions, the rewording of certain questions and the removal of other defects. 
Details 
of the questionnaire scheme are given below: 
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Table 4-1 The scheme of the questionnaire 
Part No. Title Questions No. 
Selection and Recruitment I to 19 
Indoctrination 20 to 59 
Vocational Training 60 to 80 
IV Liberal Education 81 to 115 
V Physical Fitness 116 to 146 
4.6.3 Pilot Testing Stage 
According to Saunders et al. (2003: 308), Kidder & Judd (1986: 233) and Robson 
(2002: 254), pre-testing questionnaires is absolutely essential and should not be 
confused with its informal examination by "experts". Proper piloting involves 
respondents from the same population as the actual study. According to Salant & 
Dillman (1994), it needs to answer the following questions: 
I. Does each question measure what it is intended to measure? 
2. Do respondents understand all the words? 
3. Are questions interpreted similarly by all respondents? 
4. Does each close-ended question have an answer that applies to each 
respondent? 
5. Does the questionnaire create a positive impression - one that motivates people 
to answer it? 
6. Are the answers the respondents can choose from correct? (Are some missing? 
Do some elicit uninterpretable answers? ) 
7. Does any aspect of the questionnaire suggest bias on the part of the researcher? 
In addition to the above, Bell (2002: 128) adds: 
8. How long did the questionnaire take to complete? 
9. Were the instructions clear? 
10. Did the respondents object to answering any of the questions? 
Were there any major topic omissions9 
12. Was the layout clear/attractive? 
13. Any other comments? 
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Responses to the above questions, according to their authors, should enable revision 
and improvements to the questionnaire, which will make it ready for the main field 
study. It could also save considerable time and effort at the analysis stage. 
Armed with this wealth of advice, the present researcher conducted a pilot study at 
KKMA over a period of two weeks (from 4/4/02 to 19/4/02). Since the target 
population for this research is made up of two groups, Class 1999 final year cadets and 
teaching staff, fifteen cadets and six staff members were requested to participate in this 
phase. All enthusiastically agreed to take part by filling in the questionnaire and adding 
their views and comments on various aspects of the data-gathering instrument. 
Reactions to the questionnaire were positive and encouraging. Respondents felt that 
issues of real concern to them had been covered and several suggestions were made for 
improving it. Most of them found the questionnaire long, but "interesting", and that the 
questionnaire content was generally appropriate and relevant. The questionnaires were 
completed by the cadets in the presence of the researcher, who to observed reactions 
and assisted if required. Staff members preferred to take the questionnaire home and 
returned it within three days. The cadets took up to ninety minutes to complete the 
questionnaire. No questions were left unanswered and none presented special 
difficulties. 
Once the pilot study was completed, the present researcher took the data to the 
Department of Statistics at King Saud University (KSU) in Riyadh in order to assess it 
for reliability. With the help of an expert statistician, the questionnaire was evaluated 
for reliability section by section, then question by question. Some questions indicated 
low reliability, especially in sections I and 11. As a result, some questions were 
removed and others were amended in order to ensure high reliability during the field 
study. Moreover, all open questions were closed on the basis of the answers obtained 
from the respondents. Apart from these changes, the questionnaire was satisfactory. 
Finally, the pilot study was an opportunity to make further contacts with the Academy 
authorities to ensure that the purpose of the survey was well understood and that there 
would be no problems of access during the field study. 
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4.7 Interview Questions 
Preparation, needless to stress, is just as important for the interviews with the 
commanders as it is for the questionnaire. Bearing in mind that the purposes of the 
interviews in this study is to obtain the perspectives of three top military executives on 
the effectiveness of KKMA's junior officer preparation programme and to pen-nit 
triangulation, the questions necessarily needed to be focused on essentially the same 
issues. Interviewees are, however, also to be asked Downesthird question "How can it 
be improved? " in relation to certain issues in each component. Naturally, a limit has to 
be placed on the number of questions to ensure willing co-operation and so that the 
agreed duration of the interaction will not be exceeded. Thus, between four to six 
questions were formulated for each programme component (see Appendix 2). The 
questions are all open-ended to allow for in-depth exploration. 
4.8 Research Population and Sample 
The previous sections have covered the methods and tools used in this study for 
collecting information to answer the research questions. It is now time to specify from 
whom the information is going to be gathered. In deciding to conduct this research, the 
present researcher chose to restrict the investigation to one institution, KKMA. Even 
so, it is impracticable to attempt to include all members of the Academy in the study, 
as in a census. For reasons of access, feasibility, costs, and time constraint, a sample 
will need to be drawn. However, this must be done in such a way that the selected 
sample of respondents is, as far as possible, representative of the population as a 
whole. Generalisations can then be made from the findings (Bell 2002: 126, Robson 
2000: 101). 
First, it is worth noting who, from among all the members of the Academy, are 
excluded from the investigation, namely non-teaching staff and mature, fast-track 
trainee officers. In other words, the target population for the survey comprises all Class 
1999 cadets on the regular officer preparation programme. Thus, the population of the 
study consists of two groups or strata: 
(a) all teaching staff, both military and civilian directly involved with Class 1999 
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training and education, numbering 70 in total, of whom 50 are military officers 
and 20 are civilians; 
(b) all final year, Class 1999 cadets of the regular programme, numbering 400. 
4.8.1 Sampling Method 
For the purposes of this research, random sampling is appropriate because we wish to 
select a non-biased, representative sample of respondents. In this way, we can be 
reasonably confident that the findings in this research will be true of the whole 
population from which the sample was drawn. In random sampling, every individual 
has an equal chance of being selected, if the process is carried out properly (see 
Saunders et al. 2003: 150-187; Kidder & Judd 1986: 143-167 for detailed examples of 
procedures and other forms of sampling). 
For obvious reasons, including triangulation in the analysis of results, two independent 
sub-samples are needed: cadets and teaching staff members. This means that the 
method needed can now be referred to as "stratified random sampling". In stratified 
random sampling, a simple random sample is taken from each sub-sample, and the 
sub-samples are then joined to form the total sample (Kidder & Judd 1986: 158). In 
view of the fact that the sub-samples are disproportionate in terms of numbers, 
stratified proportionate sampling is not appropriate. Instead, the decision was taken to 
include all members of teaching staff in the sample and randomly select 25% of the 
400-strong cadet population. Robson (2002: 262) argues that it is perfectly acceptable 
to increase the number of elements in a group, as was done here, when using 
stratifying sampling because "it makes sense". 
As for the precise random sampling method used to select cadets, the procedure was 
made simple by the fact that the cadets in the sampling frame are organised by the 
Academy into two separate companies, each comprising 200 cadets. The present 
researcher asked company commanders to select 50 cadets randomly from each 
company. To do this, it was suggested that they should select a digit (I or 4) randomly, 
then select every fourth case (multiples of 4) right through their cadet list. 
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4.9 Main Field Study 
The nature of the chosen research design for this study required the researcher to 
collect data through three instruments: a written structured questionnaire, a semi- 
structured interview, and documentary research. Arrangements were therefore made by 
the researcher to travel to Saudi Arabia to conduct the main field study between 
20/5/02 and 31/8/02. This period coincided with two important events at King Khaled 
Military Academy. The first is the end of the preparation programme for Class 1999 
cadets, the target population of this study. The timing was deliberate because it was 
judged that the cadets were at this particular juncture of their career in possession of a 
complete picture of KKMA's officer preparation programme, which they had 
experienced for three years. This period also coincided with the busy annual activities 
of the Academy's selection committee, which was beginning the laborious process of 
selecting new cadets for Class 2002. 
4.9.1 Questionnaire Administration 
Having carefully designed, pilot-tested and amended the questionnaire, and finalised 
the precise sampling strategy to be used, the researcher then proceeded with the main 
data collection operation. Saunders et al. (2003: 310) point out that the way a 
questionnaire is administered will have a direct impact on the response rate and the 
quality of the data obtained. Consequently, to maximise response rate and data quality, 
the researcher first obtained official approval to go ahead with the field study 
implementation at the Academy. Next, arrangements were made to gather all the study 
sample cadets in a large hall in the presence of the present researcher and a number of 
colleagues who had agreed to lend a hand. Once all were seated, the present researcher 
explained the nature, purpose, and significance of the research, and requested the 
cadets' full co-operation, promising complete confidentiality and anonymity. In 
addition to reiterating the main points mentioned in the covering letter which precedes 
the questionnaire to encourage enthusiastic participation (see Appendix 1), the present 
researcher gave further instructions, stressing to the cadets the importance of filling in 
the questionnaire truthfully, to the best of their knowledge, and without consulting 
with their neighbours. They were also urged to answer all the questions without 
exception. 
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Self-completed questionnaires administered on a group basis in the presence of the 
present researcher present many advantages, according to research methodology 
writers (Saunders et al. 2003: 3 10; Bell 2002: 128; Robson 2002: 236; Kidder & Judd 
1986: 224). The method raises the perceived importance of the study and gives the 
researcher the opportunity to monitor questionnaire completion, answer potential 
questions, and generally maximise the response rate. As predicted by Kidder & Judd 
(ibid: 224), under the circumstances, the researcher was able to obtain 100 per cent 
response rate from the cadets. As for the questionnaires intended to be distributed to 
the teaching staff sample, seventy in total, these were hand-delivered to them by the 
researcher. All completed questionnaires were returned within three weeks 
approximately. Table 4.2 below shows the distribution of survey questionnaires 
administered and returned. 
Table 4-2 Questionnaire distribution and response rate 
Participants Questionnaires 
Distributed 
Questionnaires 
Returned 
Response Rate 
Cadets 100 100 100% 
Military Teaching 50 40 80% 
Staff 
Civilian Teaching 20 7 35% 
Staff 
Total 170 147 Average 86.4%, 
As the figures from the above table show, response rates were very satisfactory. Non- 
responses on the part of teaching staff were due to the fact that the data collection was 
conducted during the very busy period of the preparation for Class 1999 graduation, as 
well as the beginning of the annual leave for civilian staff. 
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4.9.2 Interviews with Commanders 
Permission to interview top Academy officials was granted without hesitation by the 
Deputy Superintendent of KKMA (Cl), who also agreed to be interviewed himself. 
Both the Director of Cadet Training and Education (C2), and the Battalion Commander 
(0) confirmed their willingness to be interviewed upon request. It is worth reiterating 
that the purpose of the semi-structured interviews was to obtain their perspectives 
concerning the effectiveness of KKMA's junior officer programme, which Class 1999 
had only just completed. The interviews were conducted according to the following 
procedure: 
(i) After prior contacts to confirm participation in the study, interview 
appointments were arranged at the commander's convenience. 
(ii) On the agreed interview day, the researcher introduced himself and explained 
the aims of the study and the purpose of the interview. Assurance was given 
that no individuals would be identified in the results and that their answers 
would only be used for research purposes. By this time an initial rapport had 
been established 
(Ili) The researcher then posed the interview questions (see Appendix 2), listening 
carefully and probing for specific examples. 
(iv) The interview was closed with a final question asking the interviewers if they 
had anything to add, at the end of which they were thanked for generously 
offering their time and contribution to the study. 
The time needed to complete the interviews varied from ninety minutes to two hours. 
The commanders judged the use of the tape-recorder inappropriate but did not object to 
note-taking. The researcher was able to record exact quotes from the informants on 
various issues, first in brief note form, then completed them immediately after each 
interview session. 
4.9.3 Examination of Documents 
Much of the documentary evidence needed for this study had already been made 
available to the researcher during earlier visits to the Academy, particularly for the 
Pilot Study. Programme guides were accessible to anyone for academic and research 
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purposes. In some cases, the researcher was even allowed to examine and take notes 
from restricted distribution or classified documents once his credentials and his official 
permission to conduct the study were checked. 
4.9.4 Data Analysis 
Analysis of the qualitative data from both the semi-structured interviews and the 
documentary research was straightforward, since they were comparatively less 
voluminous that those gathered from the survey. Documentary analysis was simply a 
matter of selecting and summarising relevant data, then tabulating them where 
appropriate. They were intended to be displayed as the "official line" or the "how it is 
done" part of the results in relation to each component. "How well is it done? ", it will 
be remembered, was to be obtained through the questionnaire and interviews . Since 
the interviews involved only three participants, no statistical analysis was needed, and 
analysis was restricted to highlighting significant qualitative quotes on key issues. 
Analysis of the results of the survey questionnaire, however, proved more laborious 
and sophisticated, requiring the use of an SPSS computer package (statistics package 
for the Social Sciences). The following techniques were therefore used: 
I. Data regarding the respondents' background were coded and entered into the 
computer. For example, staff member was coded I and cadets 2. SPSS 
package was used to calculate frequency percentages in each category of 
information. 
2. Frequency tables: This is a method of summarising data for individual 
variables in a table forin (frequency distribution) so that specific values can 
be read and interpreted. Percentage values were calculated and tabulated for 
all items pertaining to a respondent's perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes. 
3. The mean is the simple average of all scores for a particular group. Its value 
takes into account the value of each individual score (Johnson 1977: 59). It is 
used to detect similarities and differences in group and overall scores. It was 
computed by adding all the scores for a particular variable together and 
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dividing them by the total number of respondents in each group, i. e. cadets 
and teaching staff, then for both groups combined, i. e. for the whole sample. 
To give a practical example, suppose we only had 10 respondents in each 
group, we add up all the relevant scores (e. g. 5+3+4+1 etc, as in the example 
below), then divide by the number of respondents (N). Thus, adding the 
scores together, we obtain the total: 
5+3+4+1+2+4+2+3+5+4 = Total 33 
Score total 33 
Mean - N(respondents) = 10 = 
3.3 (Mean Value) 
4. Standard deviation (SD): This provides a measure of the extent to which 
scores are scattered around the mean. The greater the scatter of the mean, the 
greater the standard deviation. Its value reflects the deviation of scores from 
the mean. Thus, if the standard deviation is low, this means that the values 
considered are close to the mean, and the mean is an accurate reflection of 
the results. 
5. The t-test: The t-test is a powerful statistical technique which is used to 
explore whether there are differences between the means of two unrelated 
samples (Oppenheim 1992: 287). It is a test that enables the researcher to 
compare two means to determine the probability that the difference between 
the means is a real one, i. e. one that would also be reflected in the whole 
population, rather than the result of chance (Tukman 1975: 231). For 
instance, suppose that we want to know how cadets and teaching staff differ 
in rating the overall effectiveness of KKMA's recruitment and selection 
system. To do so, we need to calculate the average cadet rating (mean) and 
that of the teaching staff, then look at the difference and its level of 
significance. 
6. Significance level: Observing sample means is not enough to conclude that 
the difference is real and not a coincidence. We need to calculate probability, 
with a value ranging from zero to one. If the P (Probability) value is small, 
we conclude that the difference between the sample means 
is unlikely to be a 
coincidence. We conclude instead that the populations 
have different means, 
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or that the difference is significant. In this research, a probability p :!! ý. 05 
means that the difference is sufficiently high (significant). When P goes 
down as far as p= . 000, this means that the differences are bigger and most 
obvious. 
4.9.5 Credibility of the Research 
The trustworthiness of a piece of research is usually measured by the extent to which it 
gives sufficient detail about procedures, equipment, etc. that warrant the conclusions 
reached and enable the reader to carry out an exact replication of the study if desired 
(Robson 2002: 109). This chapter and the appendices attached to the thesis do just that. 
For the qualitative data, evaluative criteria such as consistency of perceptions and 
triangulation between the research participants' views were used as evaluative criteria 
of credibility. In this respect, no significant inconsistencies or contradictions were 
detected in the findings that might cast doubt on the validity or reliability of the 
qualitative contributions offered by the research participants. For the quantitative data, 
other standard means of assuring validity and reliability were used (Robson 2002: 
168). 
4.9.6 Validity 
The validity of this study's main instrument, the survey questionnaire, concerns the 
extent to which this instrument measures what it is intended to measure (Bell 2002: 
104). To ensure the validity of the questionnaire in terms of content, format, question 
wording, sequence, length and so on a first draft was submitted for evaluation by at 
least two university staff members in the UK. The questionnaire was also pre-tested on 
three doctoral students. Several amendments were subsequently applied to it following 
comments and suggestions. Further evaluations of the questionnaire including its 
translated version in Arabic were carried out. Special emphasis was placed on the 
statistical analysability of the data that would be gathered by the questionnaire. 
Altogether, four individuals contributed to its improvement. Details of this are given 
below in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4-3 Contributors to the improvement of the questionnaire instrument 
No. Assessor Position Place of work 
I Dr Hussein Sirriyeh Senior Lecturer, Department of University of 
Arabic and Middle Eastern Studies Leeds 
2 Lieutenant Colonel Cadet company commander, Senior KKMA 
Dr Abdulkarim Lecturer and member of Selection 
Alrumian and Recruitment Committee 
3 Dr Obaid Alharbi Senior Lecturer, Department of King Saud 
Statistics University (KSU) 
4 Dr H. Karamalla Consultant Department of Statistic Riyadh Chamber 
of Commerce 
4.9.7 Reliability 
Reliability has been defined by Eltinge & Roberts (1993: 72) as "the level of 
consistency or stability of an instrument". This means that the instrument in question, 
the survey questionnaire, should give similar results if it is applied again in a similar 
context (Cohen et al 2000: 117). For the purposes of this research, the researcher used 
the Cronbach Alpha to check internal consistency reliability. The findings revealed a 
reliability of 0.93. This value indicates the level of consistency of the participants' 
responses from item to item. The calculation is carried out by comparing the standard 
deviation for each item (Thorridike & Hagen 1977: 460). The 0.93 value resulting from 
Cronbach Alpha Coefficient tells us that there was agreement and internal consistency 
amongst the participants' responses in the study. It tells us that there was little variation 
between the test items, suggesting that the participants' responses were free from 
chance error. This is a high reliability value, sufficiently dependable for the statistical 
analysis to reach reasonable conclusions. 
99 
4.9.8 Ethics of the Research 
Ethics refers to the appropriateness of the researcher's conduct throughout the research, 
particularly towards those who become the object of his/her work. However, ethical 
concerns pen-neate research, especially evaluation research, across all its stages from 
planning, seeking access to the organisation(s) and respondents, collecting, analysing, 
and reporting the data. 
It must be appreciated that the decision to conduct this programme evaluation within 
SANG's military academy, KKMA, is a matter of considerable sensitivity. Yet, the 
researcher was granted official permission to conduct the research, and was provided 
with almost unrestricted access to infori-nation not ordinarily accessible to the general 
public, as long as it was used for academic purposes only. The Academy's authorities 
did not feel threatened by the evaluation of its programme. Quite the contrary; they 
expressed interest and readiness to welcome constructive criticism. Moreover, in 
administering the questionnaire and conducting interviews, the researcher assured the 
participants of confidentiality and anonymity in order to secure their informed consent 
and co-operation. In both cases, the researcher was placed in a position of trust. The 
ethical course for the researcher is to honour that trust, but at the same time try to seek 
an understanding of the situation by "telling it as it is" and as it is perceived by its 
sample of infon-nants (Saunders et al. 2003; Robson 2002; Gill & Johnson 1997; 
Kidder & Judd 1986). 
4.9.9 Conclusion 
The credibility of a piece of research is closely linked with the methods and techniques 
it uses to collect and analyse valid and reliable evidence which forms the basis upon 
which the conclusions of the research are drawn. It also depends upon the extent to 
which it reflects principles of effective design accumulated from the experiences of 
other researchers. This chapter has attempted to show awareness of such 
considerations in making methodological decisions. It also demonstrated that the 
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research design and methods to be used in collecting and analysing data were 
necessarily shaped by feasibility constraints as well as by a balanced regard for 
objectivity and ethical considerations. Chapters Five to Nine present the statistical 
results of the study together with their analysis. 
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Chapter Five 
Findings Related to Recruitment and Selection 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter Five discusses the field study results related to the component of recruitment 
and selection obtained through the main instrument of this study, the questionnaire, as 
well as those gathered through face-to-face interviews with three military commanders 
and the examination of relevant documents by the present researcher. 
The main body of the chapter consists of two parts. The first part is based on 
documentary data sources and essentially outlines the main routes to officership at 
KKMA and the methods used to attract and recruit candidates, and describes the 
selection procedure from the administrative pre-selection step through to how the final 
selection decision is made. The second part represents the bulk of this chapter. It gives 
and interprets the statistical findings derived from the survey participants' responses 
and the qualitative reactions of the commanders interviewed to the main issues 
covered. 
5.2 Current Recruitment and Selection Practices at KKMA: 
Documents Analysis 
In order to understand and place the present situation regarding KKMA's officer 
recruitment and selection system in proper perspective, the present researcher gathered 
relevant information by reviewing documentary evidence from the admissions office. 
The summary that follows outlines the main recruitment methods and selection 
instruments currently in use at the Academy. It also describes the decision process for 
accepting officer applicants and briefly discusses the cultural context within which the 
selection process is conducted. 
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5.2.1 Ways to Become an Officer 
Generally, there are two ways to officership at KKMA: (a) the regular entry 
programme, and (b) the fast-track entry programme, (Figure 5.1). 
Two ways to officership 
Regular II Fast-track 
Qualifying Direct Entry 
Pre-Selection Graduate Course 
Selection II Selection 
Training & Training & 
Education 
II 
Education 
Graduation 
Figure 5-1 Ways to become an officer at KKMA 
The regular programme looks for applicants who have finished high school, which is 
typically completed at 17 or 18 years of age. This group represents the majority of 
applicants who receive training and education at KKMA. Successful applicants are 
exposed to intensive military training and education at a university 
level, covering a 
103 
wide range of subjects aimed at producing well-rounded officers. The programme lasts 
for three years leading to a Bachelor of Military Science Degree. Cadets receive free 
tuition, medical care, room and board, and are paid (2600 SR) monthly. Each year, 
approximately 300-400 recruits are enrolled through this programme, and the 
Academy annually produces 300-250 new SANG officers. Finally, these officers are 
entitled to a full career and can serve until retirement age. The fast-track programme, 
on the other hand, aims at recruiting specialists who already have a college or 
university degree in selected professions. These include doctors, dentists, engineers, 
computer specialists, psychologists, etc. For this programme, only approximately 50 
recruits are accepted at a time in a year when the course is being held, since the intake 
depends on SANG needs, centrally. The fast-track programme runs entirely separate 
courses lasting one year only, at the end of which successful candidates receive second 
lieutenant and a Diploma in Military Sciences. These officers are also entitled to a full 
career with SANG and can serve until retirement age. 
5.2.2 Recruitment Methods 
Caruth et al. (1988: 127) define recruitment as a process of locating individuals with 
appropriate qualifications and in sufficient numbers, and encouraging them to apply 
for vacancies in a particular organisation. As a military organisation KKMA is 
fortunate to be in the position of a popular producer of military officers for a 
prestigious employer, SANG. Those who succeed in securing acceptance with it can, 
after graduation, look forward to lifelong guaranteed employment and high social 
status. As a consequence, the Academy attracts approximately 10,000 interested 
candidates annually. Its main concern, therefore, is with quality rather than quantity. 
The Academy uses a variety of recruitment methods, including advertising in the 
national newspapers, usually once or twice a year, broadcasting the offer of a tour 
around the Academy on national radio and television once a year, organising school 
visits and an open day, participating in exhibitions, and publishing articles and general 
information and admission requirements in the KKMA Quarterly Magazine and the 
National Guard Monthly Magazine. Finally, the Academy is publicised in all 
(recruiting stations' located in the major cities of the Kingdom. These are places where 
applicants can receive information, talk to recruiters, and complete application forms. 
These recruiting stations do not perform selection operations. They merely provide 
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information, advice and help in completing application forms. Candidates thought to 
be ineligible may be discouraged or directed towards other service branches. 
5.2.3 Selection Procedure 
According to Caruth et al. (1988: 149), selection is the process of choosing from a 
group of applicants those who are deemed to be the best qualified for positions in an 
organisation. Selection, they add, is a most difficult process because it involves 
making judgements about people, their abilities, character, potential, etc. The selection 
procedure at KKMA is handled locally by a commission of selectors. The Academy 
processes about 10,000 applications per year, but numbers are reduced gradually 
starting with pre-selection based on academic reports, character references, career 
orientation, general suitability and so on. KKMA has no specific profile of the ideal 
officer candidate, except that he should meet certain basic requirements that allow him 
to be trained and educated successfully. In other words, the emphasis is primarily on 
'developing' military officers rather than seeking candidates with pre-existing officer 
qualities. 
The selection procedure follows seven distinct steps, and the whole process from 
beginning to end takes up to three months to complete, that is before final enrolment 
decisions are officially known and communicated to competing candidates. These 
steps include (1) administrative pre-selection; (2) initial medical check up; (3) physical 
fitness test; (4) written test; (5) interview; (6) comprehensive medical assessment; and 
(7) the decision (Figure 5.2). 
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Administrative 
Pre-selection Applicants can, 
thwreticall3be 
eliminated at any of 
these steps 
Initial Medical 
Check up* 
IF 
Physical 
Fitness Test 
IF 
Written 
Test 
Comprehensive 
Interview* Medical 
Assessment 
Board 
Decision 
Figure 5-2 KKMA's seven-step officer cadet selection system 
1. Administrative pre-selection 
Like all military academies in the world, KKMA has certain pre-determined eligibility 
requirements that candidates must meet before entering into the selection process. The 
admission criteria are made available in print to all candidates through the various 
recruitment venues. Applicants are rejected only if they do not meet the set criteria. 
These criteria are that each candidate must: 
Be a Saudi citizen by birth and origin. Exception is made for individuals born abroad 
106 
to Saudi parents working outside the Kingdom. 
* Possess a General High School Certificate, with 80-85% overall grades in 
science subjects 
9 Be aged between 17-24 years of age for the regular programme, and not older 
than 27 for the fast-track programme 
0 Pass the medical tests 
0 Pass the written tests 
o Pass the interview 
o Be single 
* Have good character and behaviour, and no criminal or previous prosecution 
record 
e Not be excluded from another establishment 
2. Initial medical check up 
The purpose of the initial medical test is to identify obvious disabilities and limitations 
to avoid risks in the physical fitness test which immediately follows it. This is both a 
precautionary measure to avoid injuries and a means of eliminating those who fail 
from further consideration. During this stage, checks are made on minimum height 
(1.65m), eyes, nose, throat, chest, posture, blood pressure, heart diseases, skin 
diseases, deformities and disfigurements, and flat feet. 
3. Physical fitness test 
Physical fitness is assessed through four activities: twenty push-ups, twenty sit ups, a 
3,200 meter run to be completed in maximum 12 minutes 15 second and a 1600 meter 
run to be completed in a maximum of 8 minutes. 
4. Written test 
This is a one-hour general knowledge assessment, covering language proficiency 
(Arabic and English), mathematics, and sciences. At the end of this test, candidates go 
straight to the interview. 
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5. Interview 
This standard part of officer selection aims to probe and add information to that 
already collected from other sources. It incorporates, among other things, the 
assessment of the candidate's general appearance, confidence, mental agility, 
awareness, motivation, service compatibility, and the overall impression of his 
potential of successful cadetship. Subsequently, a list for the first 2,000 suitable 
candidates based on test results and performance at the interview is published together 
with a cumulative score. This is a pre-approval in principle, but the decision is still 
conditional upon clearance from the comprehensive medical assessment. ) final 
screening by the selection board, and confirmation of acceptance by the National 
Guard High Command. 
6. Comprehensive medical assessment 
This is conducted at King Fahad National Guard Hospital. Here, candidates are 
subjected to extensive medical examinations and tests, such as analysis of blood and 
urine, spine and chest radiography, cardiovascular functions, etc. The aim is to detect 
disorders and incapacities on the basis of which applicants may be considered 
unsuitable for the functions and responsibilities of a military officer. 
7. The decision 
Final screening for a decision is carried out by the selection board. This consists of a 
chairman who is a high-ranking officer, usually a Brigadier, together with an assistant, 
a secretary, eight officers, and three senior civilian teaching staff members. Their task 
includes reaching consensus decisions on uncertain cases and finalising a top-down list 
of suitable candidates for enrolment. The exact number of applicants to be enlisted is 
eventually forwarded together with their files, and objective and subjective 
assessments to the National Guard High Command, who have the final say on this 
matter. It is believed that among the concerns of the High Command are issues of 
strategic importance, such as demonstrating regional, ethnic and tribal balance, and 
fairness to all sections of the social strata of the Saudi nation. 
108 
5.2.4 Cultural Context 
KKMA's selection process has been developed into what it is today: primarily 
influenced by military necessities and priorities, but also the result of cultural forces. 
Moral conduct, observance of Islamic teachings, and untainted reputation and honour 
play a vital role in the selection decision. However, there is a widespread belief that 
KKMA's selection system is not immune from the influence of wdsta or nepotism, a 
phenomenon that allegedly plagues many aspects of Saudi life. Whether real or 
imagined, there seems to be a perception that each year a number of recruits to the 
Academy are accepted irrespective of their aptitudes. 
5.3 Main Survey and Interview Findings 
The preceding section covered "How is the recruitment and selection process 
conducted at KKMAT' in theory. Now follows "How well is it being done? ", that is its 
evaluation through the perceptions of the participants in this research. 
5.3.1 How Class 1999 Was Recruited 
In designing the survey questionnaire (see Appendix 1), it seemed appropriate to begin 
by asking the sample of selected cadets how they first knew about KKMA. The 
question included five possible avenues derived from the literature. Figure 5.3 shows 
the frequency distribution of Class 1999 cadets participating in this study by various 
methods of recruitment to KKMA. 
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Recruitment methods 
0 Through friends 
5% 
2% 90/( 
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Representative 
N Open day 
El Other 
Figure 5-3 Distribution of Cadets by Various Methods of Recruitment to KKMA 
(Class 1999) (AI-I. Q1). 
As the figure shows, just over half (5 1 %) of all cadets surveyed indicated that they had 
first got to know about the Academy through personal inquiry, ranking first as a 
method of recruitment. This is followed by contacts with friends and relatives who are 
current Academy members (21%), ranking second in terms of frequency. The 
remaining 28% of cadets were recruited through media advertising, the open day tour 
of the Academy, or through an Academy representative's annual efforts to enlist new 
recruits from high schools. These results appear to suggest that K_KMA relies primarily 
on passive methods of recruitment; that is, on the personal initiatives of potential 
recruits rather than on seeking and reaching them through active methods. The 
literature survey conducted for this study shows that modem trends in officer 
recruitment and selection tend to be increasingly pro-active to maximise the chances of 
identifying and recruiting the highest possible proportion of top-quallty candidates. 
Anticipating that passive methods of recruitment would be the predominant approach 
at KKMA, the researcher included a question in the interviews with the commanders 
inviting them to explain why the Academy does not adopt more pro-active methods of 
N Personal Inquiry I 
El Media 
recruitment. 
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One commander (A2-CI)commented: 
"We don't see the need for aggressive recruitment techniques because we are already 
overwhelmed with applications. Each year, we receive in excess of 10,000 applications 
for officership of which 300 have to be turned down. Attracting more young people 
would only add to our costs and processing time. " 
Another commander (A2-C3) also pointed out: I know that other military academies, 
especially in Western countries, spend huge amounts of money on advertising and go 
out of their way to recruit officer cadets, but that is because military careers are not so 
popular there, with anti-militarism and so on. Here it's different-, more people want to 
become military officers than we can handle ... " 
The question is, are passive recruitment approaches effective enough to guarantee 
high-quality officer recruits? 
5.3.2 Institutionally or Occupationally Motivated Recruits? 
The second question in the first part of this questionnaire is of special interest because 
underlying it is an issue that has received substantial attention in military research; that 
is, the institution / occupation issue (1/0). Basically, it is argued by some researchers in 
the military field that institutionally motivated candidates make better and more 
committed officers than occupationally orientated individuals. Others disagree, but a 
more recent and enlightened group sees that there is no harin in new military recruits 
being driven by both institutional and occupational motives, as long as these are at 
least evenly balanced. To assess candidates' motivations along the 1/0 dimensions, the 
question asked them to rate six items adapted from Mosks & Wood (1988: 30) in terms 
of their influence on their decision to join KKMA. The results are displayed in Table 
5.1 below. 
Table5-1 Rating and ranking of cadets' reasons for joining KKMA (Al-I. Q2). 
Reason Mean Std. Ranking 
Deviation 
Pride in being in Military 4.59 
. 6-0 
Serve country 4.48 . 59 
F -2 
More attractive than 4.24 - . 90 3 
civilian 
Job security and 
retirement benefits 
4.10 
. 97 4 
Family traditions 3.36 1.22 5 
Skills suitable in civilian 2.85 1.30 6 
world 
Examination of Table 5.1 reveals that cadets' responses are evenly distributed on the 
six 1/0 measures, with "pride in being a military officer " (1) and I wanted to serve 
my country" (1) ranking first and second on the list respectively (means 4.59 and 4.48). 
These are closely followed by equally high means for the two occupational measures 
"job opportunities more attractive than in civilian sector" and "long-term job security 
and retirement benefits. " 
The least frequent institutional motivation is "to continue a family tradition of service 
to the Military", although with a not inconsiderable mean of 3.36. The last of cadets' 
concerns is "developing skills utilisable in the civilian world at some time in the 
future" with a low to moderate 2.85 mean. These findings provide some evidence that 
KKMA cadets are neither idealistic nor merely attracted to officer careers for 
occupational reasons only. Their motivations could be described as healthily balanced. 
5.3.3 Perceptions of Effectiveness of Key Aspects of KKMA's Recruitment 
and Selection 
In describing the components of the system of recruitment and selection earlier, the 
emphasis was on "how is it done? " Now, attention shifts to "how well is it done? ", 
which is why participants in this investigation were asked for their evaluations of 
various aspects of the system in question. 
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First, the survey respondents were requested to indicate their general perceptions of the 
extent to which KKMA genuinely gives the greatest possible attention to its 
recruitment and selection methods. Responses to this question are presented in Table 
5.2 below: 
Table 5-2 Respondents' perceptions of extent to which KKMA gives greatest attention to its 
recruitment and selection methods (Al-I. Q4-1). 
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Agree Strongly NI S. D SIG. L 
disagree agree agree 
000%% J 
5 12 24F 2-2 1.11 P=. 228 
(N S) 6.5 8.7 13 30.4 
5.5 11 20.5 24.7 
Note: C= cadet. TS= Training Staff. WS= whole sample. M= Mean. S. D Standard 
Deviation. Sig. L = Significance level. P= Probability 
Inspection of Table 5.2 shows that in all cases there is a larger proportion of support 
for the statement that KKMA gives the greatest attention to its recruitment and 
selection methods than there is for its rejection. Thus, a high 63.1 % of all respondents 
agree or strongly agree, and a low 16.5% disagree or strongly disagree with the 
statement, with an overall relatively high mean of (3.65). Interestingly, it appears that 
the views of the teaching staff group are less extreme than those of the cadets surveyed 
on both sides of the rating scale. However, when the t-test for the differences between 
the means was applied, no significant differences between the two groups emerged (P= 
. 228 (NS)). Nevertheless, 
it is perhaps worth wondering why 16.5% of all respondents 
disagree or strongly disagree and 20.5% of them are unsure on the question. Maybe an 
organisation that aims for excellence should expect an even higher vote of confidence 
(RMC Report 1997: 32), otherwise there could be doubts about its image and its use of 
a fair and systematic system of selection (Saier 1995: 4). 
In interviews with the three high-ranking commanders at the Academy who agreed to 
take part in this study, A2-C I asked whether in his view KKMA gave the greatest 
attention to its recruitment and selection methods, said: "I am satisfied that the 
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Academy does everything it can in terms of recruitment and selection, considering the 
pressures we are under. We respond to and seriously consider every application and 
inquiry we receive, and we are talking about thousands of them here. I am also sure 
that our local examiners and members of the selection board are competent and well- 
respected staff members who are aware of their responsibilities both to SANG and to 
the general public". A2-C2 and A2-C3 expressed much the same views on this 
question. 
Next, the respondents were asked about their perception of the extent to which KKMA 
uses reliable methods to reach and recruit the very best candidates for officership. 
Their responses were as follows: 
Table 5-3 Respondents' perceptions of extent to which KKMA uses reliable methods to recruit 
best candidates for officership ( Al-I. Q4-2). 
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Agree Strongly M S. D SIG. L 
disagree % agree agree 
0 vo % % 
26.3 2 2.2 22.2 1 6.1 P=. 120 
1 15.2 ] 23.9 1 1 17 1 1 6.5 1 (NS) 
Ltl 22.8 i 22.8 20.7 J = 1 6.2 F2q L I P--j L 
Table 5.3 shows that more respondents disagree than agree with the view that KKMA 
uses reliable methods. Combined percentages give 45.6% versus 33.8% respectively 
and 20.7% with no clear-cut opinion, the mean for the whole sample being low to 
moderate (2.71). T-test used to assess the difference between cadets and teaching 
staff s mean scores, (2.60) and (2.95) respectively, revealed no statistically significant 
difference (P= . 120 
(NS)). This indicates agreement among a large proportion of 
respondents that despite the perception that the Academy does its best and gives the 
greatest attention to its recruitment and selection methods, the methods it uses for 
reaching the very best candidates are not perceived to be reliable enough. This perhaps 
suggests that the time may have come to consider reviewing and updating these 
methods. 
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However, during their interviews all thee commanders, when questioned on this issue, 
were of the view that the Academy did not face problems in attracting recruits, which 
suggested that their recruiting methods were succeeding in attracting huge numbers of 
candidates from all walks of life and backgounds. 
A2-C I explained: "Being a National Guard Officer is a very attractive thIng nowadays 
in Saudi Arabia. Career benefits compare very favourably with civilian sector jobs, in 
addition to prestige and job security for life, as well as other fringe benefits, such as 
housing and so on. We not only attract a reasonable number of high-calibre candidates, 
but also many sons of powerful families in the Kingdom... Paradoxically, our problem 
is that too many young people apply, and all must be considered and be seen to be 
seriously considered. " 
Continuing to probe the respondents' perceptions of how good the current system of 
selection is, the next question asked them to say whether KKMA applies precise 
selection criteria in its admission procedure. Their responses produced the following 
results: 
Table 5-4 Respondents' perceptions of extent to which KKMA uses reliable methods to recruit 
best candidates for officership (Al-I. Q4-3). 
c 
TS 
ws 
Strongly 
disagree 
% 
Disagree 
0 
Somewhat 
agree 
% 
Agree 
0 
Strongly 
agree 
0/, )0 
M 
11 
S. D 
1 
SIG. L 
24.2 17.2 23.2 14.1 1.38 P=. 031 
8.7 13 26.1 39.1 13 3.34 1.13 (S) 
19.3 15.9 24.1 26.9 13.8 3.00 1.32 1 
Close examination of Table 5.4 reveals that overall, there is no overwhelming 
agreement among the respondents that KKMA applies precise criteria in its admission 
procedure, although more of them agree than disagree that this is the case, the overall 
mean being a lukewarm (3.00). Indeed, under half of them in total (40.7%) agree or 
strongly agree, and over a third (35.2%) disagree or strongly disagree with the 
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statement. The Mest for the difference between the means showed that there was a 
statistically significant difference between the results of the two groups of respondents 
(P=. 031 (S)), with more teaching staff members tending to agree than disagree, while 
the reverse is true for candidates. Again, it is a matter of some concern that almost one 
fifth (19.3%) of all the respondents surveyed strongly dismiss the view that the 
Academy strictly applies its set selection criteria in its admission procedure. This is not 
to say that it does not have them, only that they are not always applied as they should 
be. 
A2-C3 had this to say about KKMA's selection criteria: "Our selection criteria are, in 
theory, fine. They are comparable to those of many other military academies. The 
problem is in the application of these criteria. Unfortunately, we do not always have 
full control over this, especially when outsiders from the National Guard are involved 
in the selection process, including the selection board's decisions". A2-C 1, A2-C2 also 
admitted that there were difficulties in applying the admission rules. Both were in 
favour of raising the admission criteria to accept only graduate students, an option 
which in their opinion presents many advantages, such as raising the level of maturity 
of applicants, as well as raising standards. 
An important feature of a systematic and an effective selection system emphasised in 
the literature (Chapter 3, section 2.1) is that it spares no efforts in thoroughly assessing 
every aspect of the applicants' backgrounds, including physical and mental abilities, 
moral values, strengths, limitations, etc. No unsuitable recruits, it was stressed, ought 
to be allowed to slip through the net (Saier 1995: 4, Noonan 2001: 5, Cary et al. 
1998: 590). Hence, the respondents were asked to indicate their perceptions of the 
extent to which KKMA rigorously tests and chooses the best officer candidates before 
they are accepted to undergo officer training and education. Their responses yielded 
the following results: 
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Table 5-5 Respondents' perceptions of extent to which KKMA rigorously tests and chooses the 
best officer candidates at the point of entry during the admission procedure. (Al-I. Q4-4). 
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Agree Strongly M S. -D SIG. L 
disagree agree agree 
0 % % 
j 
% % 
C 24.2 28 __ 25.3 16.2 6.1 2.67 1.20 P=O 18 
TS 13 15.2 E 37 26.1 8.7 3.02 1.14 
E 
S) (S) 
I WS 1 1 20.7 ] 24.1 29 ] [: = F6 -9 = [ 1.20 1 
The data in Table 5.5 leaves no doubt that the surveyed respondents' perceptions lean 
towards scepticism regarding whether KKMA rigorously tests and chooses the best 
officer candidates before they begin training and education. The mean for the whole 
sample is a low to moderate (2.67) and it can be clearly seen that fewer respondents 
agreed or strongly agreed than disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. 
About a third of them (29%) only somewhat agree, implying that they may have 
reservations on the subject. Interestingly on this occasion, the cadets' views are 
predominantly negative (52.2%), while those of the teaching staff members are 
markedly less so (28.2%) in percentage terms, a discrepancy confin-ned as significant 
by the t-test applied to the means of the two groups (P= .0 18 (S)). This is another 
severe judgement on the nature of KKMA's selection system. 
Questioned on this point, A2-C2 argued: "Do we test and choose the best? Yes we do, 
but sometimes rules and guidelines are not observed and subjective judgements get the 
upper hand. " A2-C I observed: "We do our best, but we need to improve our methods, 
maybe introduce new ones used elsewhere, such as psychological assessments, so that 
we can be more accurate in our measurements. " 
The next two related questions were designed to elicit reactions towards the whole 
system of recruitment and selection. Beginning with the extent to which respondents 
believed that the present system was effective, Table 5.6 sums up their views on the 
issue: 
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Table 5-6 Respondents' perceptions of extent to which overall recruitment and selection svstem is 
effective (Al-I. Q4-5). 
c 
TS 
Ln 
Very Ineffective Somewhat Effective Very M S. D SIG. L 
ineffective effective effective 
% 
22.4 
% 
27.6 
% 
30.6 
% 
15.3 
% 
4.1 1 2.51 1.1-1 P= 
. 
339(NS) 
13 26.1 1.3 F-17-A 1 2.2 :1 1 2.69 
19.4 :] [-27.1 34 16 3.5 ] [2.56 
Effective recruitment and selection is about attracting and choosing recruits with the 
best qualities and potentials to make excellent future military officers. It is about 
ensuring that only the most suitable candidates are screened in, and those who are 
undesirable or incompetent are screened out, so that those who are accepted will have 
no difficulty fitting into the roles for which they will be trained and educated. It is 
about meeting the central objective of identifying and offering places only on the basis 
of merit for the best trainable candidates with the best prospects for success. 
Bearing in mind that no system is perfect, it is disappointing to note from Table 5.6 
that less than one fifth of all the survey participants hold clearly favourable reactions to 
the extent to which KKMA's recruitment and selection is effective. Thus, 16% of them 
rated it "effective" and only 3.5% "very effective". At the opposite end of the scale, on 
the other hand, 27.1 % of them evaluated the system as "ineffective" and 19.4% judged 
it to be "very ineffective". Unusually, over a third of all respondents assessed the 
system as "somewhat effective", a middle position indicating an inability to fully 
support it. The low to moderate overall mean for the whole sample removes doubts 
about the dominance of scepticism towards the effectiveness of KKMA's recruitment 
and selection system. A final look at Table 5.6 reveals that the t-test detected no 
statistically significant differences between the means for the two groups, cadets and 
teaching staff, regarding this issue (P= . 
399 (NS)). These results can only be seen as a 
depressing verdict on the nature of the current system of recruitment and selection. 
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On whether overall KKMA's recruitment and selection system is generally effective, 
the three commanders interviewed agreed that there was much room for improvement. 
A2-C2 bluntly rejected the idea that the current system was effective, giving these 
reasons: "It's not effective enough because there is little or no accountability. We need 
better and more accurate instruments of selection, more qualitative assessments, and 
less subjective decisions. Also, the frequent change of selection teams and Boards does 
not allow people to accumulate experience, learn and improve the whole process of 
selection. " A2-C I emphasised that the whole selection procedure should be left for 
KKMA to set up and manage without interference from above. As he pointed out: "We 
are trusted to run this Academy. So, we know perhaps better what infon-nation and 
measures are needed to judge whether certain candidates are suitable or not. It is after 
all we who bear responsibility for turning them into junior officers from day one till 
the day of their graduation. " 
Moving on to the assessment of the samples concerning the degree of satisfaction with 
KKMA's system of officer recruitment and selection, unsurprisingly similar findings 
were obtained (Table 5.7). 
Table 5-7 Respondents' overall degree of satisfaction with current recruitment and selection at 
KKMA (Al-I. Q4-6). 
Very Dissatisfied Somewhat Satisfied Very M S. D SIG. L 
dissatisfied Satisfied satisfied 
% % % % % 
23.5 18.4 30.6 18.4 1 1 9.2 [Ii7.26 P= . 
829 
TS 17.4 15.2 43.5 21.7 2.2 (NS) 
WS 21.57 
1 17.4 7 ý 34.7 19.4 6.9 
As might be expected, given the respondents' previous unfavourable evaluation of 
KKMA's current system of recruitment and selection, when they were asked to 
indicate their degree of satisfaction with it, it emerged that they were predominantly 
more ''dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied" (38.9%) than "satisfied" or "very satisfied" 
(26.3%), with a large group - over a third of them - (34.7%) sitting on the 
fence. The 
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low to moderate overall mean (2.72) confirms the magnitude of the respondents' 
unhappiness with the system. The absence of a statistically significant difference 
between the means for the two groups (P= . 829 (NS)), cadets and teaching staff, shows 
shared sentiments about the problem. Taken together with the results of Table 5.6, 
these findings send the message that there is substantial room for improvement with 
regard to the nature and manner in which officer recruitment and selection are 
conducted at KKMA. 
So far, the analysis has covered the evaluation of a number of key aspects of the 
selection system for officer aspirants at KKMA through the perceptions of cadets and 
teaching staff. To complete the picture, the survey went on to identify precisely which 
factors in the respondents' opinions constitute obstacles to a more effective recruitment 
and selection procedure at their Academy. Five main reasons singled out during the 
pilot study were therefore included in the survey for assessment. These are now 
discussed. 
5.3.4 Assessment of Negative Impact of Five Most Mentioned Factors on 
Recruitment and Selection at KKMA 
The five factors are in order of severity: (1) wista, the Arabic word for 'nepotism'; (2) 
the lack of independence of the selection board's decisions; (3) the excessively long 
selection procedure; (4) the late announcement of acceptance results; and (5) the over- 
emphasis on academic performance. Foremost among all these blocks, according to the 
survey respondents, is the issue of wasta. Table 5.8 summarises the perceived negative 
impact of this factor on recruitment and selection. 
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Table 5-8 Respondents' perceptions of negative impact of wasta on recruitment and selection 
(Al-I. Q5-2). 
Very Low Moderate High Very high M S. D SIG L 
low amount 
0 % % % % 
0 0 0 16.2 83.8 4.83 P=. 001(s) 
0 6.5 F 10.9 F 71.7 4.47 
F _WS1 i 10 2.1 3.4 80:: ] [: ý:. 7: 2 
No single issue related to selection was more strongly emphasised by the respondents 
than that of wasta. Some explanation is needed here to clarify this complex issue; 
wdsta has been defined as 'nepotism' by Al-Medlej (1997: 151). It is a well-known 
phenomenon in Arab culture. Various dictionaries define it as favouritism, the use of 
influence, connections, good offices, leverage, and even as a form of corruption (Al- 
Ammaj 1993: 241-3). More precisely, it is what someone with power or authority does 
to give or obtain preferential treatment for members of his/her family, relatives or 
friends. According to both researchers, this behaviour has its roots in the tribal heritage 
of the Arabs. wasta is generally seen as both an opportunity and a curse. It is viewed as 
an opportunity by those who benefit from it, and a curse by those who feel 
disadvantaged by it. It is tolerated because everybody makes use of it at some time in 
their life. wasta is viewed as a form of loyalty to one's group, family, clan etc. and 
refusing to use it when needed means letting them down, an attitude that can lead to 
social isolation in Saudi culture. 
In his study of decision-making in seven civilian Saudi higher education institutions, 
Al Medlej (1997: 151) found that the majority of the participants in his study (69%) 
disapproved of wdsta and denied using it, yet they all thought that it existed on a large 
scale and that it influenced the decision-making process in their institution. On the 
other hand, a minority (I I%) saw wasta as a minor problem and a harinless part of 
Arab culture. Al Medlej relates several examples illustrative of wasta. Here is one of 
them: "A student applies to become a member of a university sports centre. He is 
asked to go through the routine health check before being accepted. Subsequently, an 
outsider applies for membership by presenting a business card indicating his 
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relationship to a high level local manager. The result is that he is not only accepted 
straight away, but he is also exempt from going through the routine health check. " He 
adds that it is not unusual to see people handing over a written note ... or acting upon 
the recommendation of a highly placed official to "facilitate" a process or ensure 
preferential treatment (ibid: 161). He also notes that in Saudi Arabia, as in other Arab 
countries, there is a perception that placements and positions are often primarily 
obtained through wdsta, not earned through hard work and qualifications, especially in 
state run organisations (ibid:. 156). Al-Ammaj (1993 : 218) quotes a Saudi Service Ten 
Year Report showing that 82% of public-sector personnel employed during the decade 
(1980-89) were not selected on the basis of a systematic merit system. He blames this 
on the vagueness or absence of a legal framework to regulate the system and prevent 
abuses, one of which he refers to as "the exercise of influence", that is wasta. 
Bearing in mind that we are dealing with perceptions, which can be distorted at times, 
it is nevertheless alarming to see that every individual who took part in this survey 
recognises that wasta plays a part in the recruitment and selection of cadets at KKMA. 
As Table 5.8 shows, perceptions of the extent of its negative impact are 
overwhelmingly strong among both cadets and teaching staff, rating it 83.8% and 
71.7% "Very high" respectively. The t-test for the significance between the means also 
shows a statistically significant difference between the two group means (P= . 001(S)) 
indicating that the cadets viewed wasta even more unfavourably than their teachers. 
The very high overall mean (4.72) places this factor as the number one obstacle to 
effective recruitment and selection at KKMA. 
When this sensitive issue was raised in the interviews, A2-C I and A2-C3 accepted that 
wasta played a role in recruitment and selection, while A2-C2 downplayed its effect. 
Said A2-C 1: "The truth has to be told. wasta is a national problem, and as such we are 
not immune from it. Does anyone know how we can prevent it? Our job is to try to 
limit its effect, but we can't have our eyes and ears everywhere". A2-C3 gave a similar 
view stated: wasta is an undeniable fact of life in our society, and there's no 
law 
against it. It's in our heritage. People say we're only recommending someone, as you 
would when you write a reference, but the consequences of not complying are 
sometimes not easy to face. Indeed, sometimes you 
just have to do as you are told! ") 
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A2-C2 took a relaxed view of the problem, claiming: "I think people are a little 
paranoid about wdsta. They blame everything on wdsta. You have to prove yourself 
anyway. In the end, the chances are that you won't become an officer if you don't 
deserve to be one. " 
The second most serious factor perceived to negatively affect KKMA's recruitment 
and selection is the lack of independence of the selection board's decision making. 
Selection boards are generally made up of competent, experienced, and well-respected 
members of staff and are chaired by a high-ranking officer. They are the people with 
the huge responsibility of looking at all the information and measures relating to 
candidates and assessing their suitability and potential to make good quality officers- 
to-be. From experience, they can judge whether assessment standards are being met or 
not, and on the basis of merit they are able to make appropriate decisions. Their 
judgements can be trusted because they are normally fair and mostly objective. The 
fact that the respondents rated the lack of independence of the selection board in its 
deliberations the second most important obstacle seems to imply that the board at 
KKMA has no real teeth. Its power is reduced by the fact that the higher authorities 
have the final say, as well as possibly through the influence of wasta. Table 5.9 
displays the survey respondents' assessment of the negative effect of this factor on 
recruitment and selection. 
Table 5-9 Respondents' perceptions of negative impact of the lack of independence of selection 
board decisions (Al-I. Q5-1). 
Very low Low Moderate High Very high M S. D SIG. L 
amount 
% % % % % 
c 5.1 3 23.2 35.4 33.3 L 3.88 1.06 P=. 514 
- 1 2.2 15.2 1 21.7 26.1 34.8 1 3.76 1 1.15 (NS) 
4.1 6.9 22.8 32.! 33.8 - 1.09 
As can be seen from Table 5.9, a clear majority of all the respondents (66.2%) 
felt that 
the selection board did not have the influence it should have in matters of selection, 
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and that this negatively affected selection. The t-test revealed no significant difference 
between the two group means for cadets and teaching staff, (3-88) and (3.76) 
respectively, with (P= . 514 (NS)). The overall mean is relatively high (3.84). These 
results point to the need for more independence for the role of the selection board in 
recruitment and selection. 
The third obstacle is the excessively long selection procedure. This is not a problem 
that is unique to KKMA. However, in comparison with others, it seems to be much 
worse not only because of the very large number of applicants, approximately 10,000 a 
year, as noted earlier, but also because of the way it is applied. One member of the 
selection team told the researcher that the excessively long selection procedure was 
directly linked to the Academy's reluctance to deselect applicants too early for fear of 
upsetting their families. As a result, time, money, and efforts are stretched. This is a 
problem waiting for a solution. In the meantime, the respondents seem to be 
unanimous in thinking that it is a major obstacle to effective recruitment and selection. 
Table 5.10 shows the respondents' assessment of its negative impact. 
Table 5-10 Respondents' assessment of the negative impact of the excessively long selection 
procedure. (Al-I. Q5-3). 
Very Low Moderate High Very high NI S. D SIG. L 
low amount 
% % % % % 
1 14.1 21.2 1 1 34.3 1 29.3 P 0-11 P=. 078 
12.8 10.6 27.7 21.3 27.7 (NS) 
4.8 13 23.3 30.1 j 28.8 
-] 
= = L 
The figures in Table 5.10 once again show a majority consensus of 58.9% who rated 
the lengthy selection procedure as a major obstacle that is having a high or very high 
negative impact on recruitment and selection at KKMA. The differences between the 
mean responses for the two groups, cadets and teaching staff, as measured by the t-test 
remains negligible, (3.76) and (3.40) respectively, with (P= . 078 (NS)). Again, the 
overall mean is relatively high (3.65). 
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A2-C I justified the lengthy selection procedure: "I personally chaired a selection board 
for two years. Considering the thousands of applications we have to deal with, we are 
in fact very quick. You have to understand that the selection system here does not 
operate in the same way as in Europe for example. Applicants are not gradually 
deselected as they proceed through the selection process, in such a way that near the 
end you end up with a relatively manageable number of surviving candidates to choose 
from. Here, they have to be herded through virtually the whole process by the 
thousands. If you deselect them too soon, you'll have hundreds of families attempting 
to and succeeding in reinstating their sons into the selection process through wasta. 
Interviews have to be limited to ten or fifteen minutes, and two thousand 'suitable' 
candidates go through a medical examination at the rate of 100 per day. That's a huge 
and time-consuming burden. " 
The fourth obstacle to effective recruitment and selection at KKMA is the very late 
announcement of acceptance results each year. Obviously, this is linked with the 
lengthy selection procedure, particularly with the time it takes for the qualifying 2000 
candidates to be comprehensively assessed medically. The unfortunate consequence of 
this is that some of the best candidates are offered placements elsewhere to the 
detriment of KKMA. This waste of talent is less frequent in military academies in 
Europe. In Belgium, for example, aspiring officers undergo the different elements of 
the selection procedure before July each year, at which time decisions are made on 
who will be enlisted, and basic training begins in mid August with a minimum loss of 
candidates (Lescreve 2001: 7). Likewise, in Germany, according to Birke (2001: 22) 
applicants who are assessed as "well-suited" or even "most suited" are formally 
infori-ned of their success and offered a place the day after the decision to enlist them is 
made. Finally, according to Thompson et al. (2001: 26-7), successful candidates 
wishing to join the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst (RMAS) are so well selected 
that on qualification, they are virtually guaranteed a place at the Academy, and their 
pass is valid for a number of years, which means that they are to some extent in a 
position to choose when to enter the Academy. The delay in announcing results is 
clearly a serious obstacle confinned in the views of the survey participants. Table 5.11 
displays the respondents' assessment of its negative influence. 
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Table 5-11 Respondents' assessment of the negative impact of very late announcement of 
acceptance results in selection (A]-I. Q5-4). 
Very Low Moderate High Very high M S. D SIG. L 
low amount 
0 % % % % 
8.1 13.1 19.2 26.3 33.3 3.63 1.28 P=. 722 
12.8 1 10.6 1 17 I F 2-7.7 31.9 ý 3.55 1.38 38: ] (N S) 
9.6 12.3 18.5 L2ý. ý7 ý 32.9 
The results for this factor, ranked third in order of seriousness and negative impact on 
recruitment and selection, are comparable to those found for the second factor (Table 
5.11). Thus, a majority of 59.6% of respondents rated the late announcement of results 
as having a high or very high negative effect on recruitment and selection at KKMA. 
The Mest also found no significant differences between the mean scores of cadets and 
teaching staff, (3.63) and (3.55) respectively, with (P= . 722 (NS)). The overall mean 
for the whole sample is also relatively high (3.60). 
Asked if they had any comments to make about the late announcement of acceptance 
results, all three commanders interviewed were of the opinion that in view of the large 
number of applicants to be processed, delays were inevitable. 
Finally, the fifth obstacle to effective recruitment and selection at KKMA is what is 
perceived to be an overemphasis on academic or intellectual performance over other 
eligibility factors. According to Devriendt (1999: 3) traditional examinations still play 
an important role in officer selection procedures in many academies. This is because 
they are practical and relatively quick to implement and assess. They also provide 
evidence of the intellectual and mental abilities of the candidate, who will be expected 
to absorb large amounts of military knowledge during their education and training. 
Academic grades are also a convenient objective means of deselecting candidates who 
are unsuccessful in this area. Of course, academic achievement is not all that is 
required to make a good military officer. Other military academies, such as West Point 
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and Sandhurst also look for leadership potential, sociability, problem-solving ability, 
stress resistance, physical strength and other specific skills. However the assessment of 
these skills is time-consuming and resource - inten si ve. One can see why these abilities 
cannot be adequately assessed if the Academy has to process eight to ten thousand 
candidates, with a system that is reluctant to dismiss candidates too soon. 
Nevertheless, the respondents judged this factor to be an obstacle to good recruitment 
and selection. Table 5.12 shows the respondents' perceptions of how negative the 
overemphasis on academic performance is on recruitment and selection at KKMA. 
Table 5-12 Respondents' perceptions of negative effect of overemphasis on academic performance 
in selection (Al-I. Q5-5). 
Very low Low Moderate High Very high M S. D SIG. L 
amount 
0 0 % 0 L '1' % L 
27.3 18.2 26.3 13.1 15.2 1 
32.6 26.1 17.4 J -T-5.2 8.7 P=. 232 
F-ws 1 1 29 20.7 1 ý 23.4 1 1 13.8 1 1 13.1 (NS) 
Examination of Table 5.12 reveals no consensus on this issue among the respondents. 
Considering the whole sample, responses ranged from very low (29%) to very high 
(13.1 %) with the two highest percentages occurring for moderate amount (23.4%) and 
low. The mean score is low to moderate (2.6 1). The t-test applied to the mean scores of 
the two groups, cadets (2.7) and teaching staff (2.41), showed no statistically 
significant difference between them (P= . 232 
(NS)). The results indicate that there is a 
perceived overemphasis on academic performance in the selection procedure of 
KKMA, but there are wide disagreements on the extent of its negative impact on 
selection. This suggests that a more balanced skills and abilities assessment is 
desirable in selection. 
As stated earlier, an effective recruitment and selection programme is designed to 
prevent unsuitable and uncommitted individuals from joining a military academy, and 
possibly be a liability to it and to the Service that would employ them. Since the 
Class 
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1999 cadets were graduating shortly after this survey was conducted , it was considered 
appropriate to probe them on whether they would still come to KKMA if they could 
reconsider their decision. The thinking behind this is that the proportion of cadets who 
regret their decision to join KKMA may partly be a reflection of the ineffectiveness on 
the selection system of the Academy. This is so because the lack of total commitment 
on their part should have been detected early by the selection system. Table 5.13 gives 
the percentage distribution of cadets on whether or not they would make the same 
decision again. 
Table 5-13 Cadets' responses on whether they would still come to KKMA if they could reconsider 
their decision (Al-I. Q3). 
Definitely Probably Unsure Probably Definitely m S. D SIG. L 
not not yes yes 
0 % % % % 
C 0 1 12 3 64 4.49 
. 
747 P=. 000 
(S) 
It is a relief to note that the overwhelming majority of cadets surveyed said they would 
still come to KKMA if they could reconsider their decision (87%). Only 1% of them 
replied "probably not" and 12% were "unsure". The mean for the whole group is high 
(4.49, P= . 000 (S)). The very 
high significance level obtained by the application of the 
one sample Mest indicates that the overall mean is closer to the scale value 5 than 4. 
What these results possibly indicate is that despite its shortcomings KKMA is still for 
most cadets a positive and worthwhile experience. 
5.4 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter contains two broad parts. The first one outlined the main recruitment 
methods and selection instruments currently in use at KKMA, described the decision 
process for accepting applicants, and briefly touched on the role of the local cultural 
context in the admissions procedure. It also mentioned the two main ways to become 
an officer at KKMA, that is the regular and fast track entry programmes. It related that 
KKMA used a variety of recruitment methods, which attract very 
large numbers of 
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interested candidates each year. This part also showed that the selection procedure for 
officers, which takes about three months to complete, follows familiar steps found in 
other military academies, although it does not operate in exactly the same way, and has 
similar admission criteria. The huge differences with other systems is that KKMA is 
forced not to deselect candidates until near the end of the process, not out of choice, 
but under pressure and powerful influences from the external environment. 
The second part of this chapter presented an analysis of both survey and interview 
findings related to recruitment and selection. The presentation began with the 
examinations of how Class 1999 were recruited to KKMA and found that 
approximately three quarters of them approached the Academy through personal 
enquiry and contacts with current academy members than as a result of successful 
recruitment techniques used by the institution. Next, the cadets' motivations for 
joining KKMA were assessed. They were found to be evenly balanced between 
institutional and occupational measures. Following this, both cadets' and teaching 
staff s perceptions of the effectiveness of various aspects of KKMA's recruitment and 
selection were presented and interpreted. 
The most salient findings are that the majority of the respondents who took part in this 
study believe that although KKMA appears to give great attention to its recruitment 
and selection methods, in practice its recruitment methods are not as effective as they 
could be if the Academy is to attract high quality recruits. Also, under half of all the 
respondents agreed that the Academy applied precise selection criteria, and less than a 
third of them were convinced that KKMA rigorously tested and chose from among the 
best candidates available only. Again, less than half of them judged that the overall 
system was effective. Unsurprisingly, 40% of them said they were either dissatisfied or 
very dissatisfied, almost 35% were only somewhat satisfied, and just over a quarter 
only (26.3%) claimed to be satisfied or very satisfied with the current recruitment and 
selection system (Table 5-7). 
On the questions on the obstacles that block the effectiveness of recruitment and 
selection at KKMA, wdsta was ranked first as a major block to effectiveness 
by the 
vast majority of respondents, including two of the commanders interviewed, although 
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a third commander downplayed its effect. The lack of independence of the selection 
board in its deliberations was equally strongly emphasised by the majority of 
respondents, rating second in the extent of its negative effect on recruitment and 
selection. The excessively long selection procedure and the late announcement of 
acceptance results were rated the third and fourth most serious blocks respectively by a 
clear majority of respondents. The fifth obstacle was identified as an overemphasis on 
intellectual performance over other abilities and skills in the selection process. This 
was recognised to be the case by most respondents, but there was wide disagreement 
on the extent of its negative effect. 
Interestingly, in eight out of the eleven questions put to both cadets and teaching staff, 
the Mest used to detect differences between their mean scores found no statistically 
significant differences, indicating broad agreement among all respondents on most 
issues related to recruitment and selection. 
Finally, it is heartening to note that despite all the weaknesses identified so far, when 
the cadets were asked if they would still come to KKMA if they could rethink their 
decision, an overwhelming majority said yes. 
Chapter Six presents the data analysis for the second component, "Indoctrination". 
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Chapter Six 
Findings Related to Military Indoctrination 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the field study results connected with the component of military 
indoctrination. It consists of two major parts. The first half, based on an analysis of 
documentary evidence, describes the characteristics of military indoctrination at 
KY, MA, the setting in which it takes place, and how it is done from the newcomer 
stage to the final preparation year. The second half gives and interprets the statistical 
results of the survey and the input from the commanders on a number of issues 
considered. 
6.2 Military Indoctrination at KIKMA : Documents Analysis 
No comprehensive guide or manual for the indoctrination of cadets exists at KKMA, 
as far as the researcher knows. Desirable outcome goals and implementation 
instructions are patchy and scattered in a number of sources, some of which are 
classified. Three main references used to prepare this section can however be 
mentioned: KKMA Performance Guide (1999), Academy Education Guide (2001), and 
Graduate Report (2002). The brief overview that follows describes the indoctrination 
setting at KKMA, then how newcomer indoctrination is conducted and what its main 
purposes are. Finally, second and third year cadet indoctrination is outlined, together 
with the nature of discipline at the Academy. 
6.2.1 Indoctrination Setting 
At KKMA, cadets are grouped under a battalion structure of six companies. First year 
cadets belong to the Newcomer Company. The military indoctrination strategy for all 
cadets is planned at the Cadet Battalion Headquarters, which is also responsible for its 
implementation. The battalion command is in charge of and responsible for discipline 
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and order, inter-company relations, cadet morale, military ethos and teamwork, and 
leadership preparation. The Academy monitors and controls almost every aspect of 
cadet life and can be described as a "total institution" (Janowitz 1971: xx iii). Cadets 
are almost totally isolated from its external environment, and all aspects of life for 
them are conducted within its walls and under its single authority. Thus, cadets live, 
study, eat, and sleep inside the confines of the Academy. The authority that commands 
them is unambiguous, and the chain of command is clear to them, from the highest 
ranking to the lowest members of the Academy. All cadets are housed in residence 
halls and sleep in separate rooms. They wear military uniforms at all times and cannot 
leave the Academy without official permission. They are all exposed to a rigid system 
of military discipline throughout the day, and are subjected to numerous inspections of 
their rooms, uniforms, and equipment. It is not uncommon for them to participate in 
frequent drills and ceremonies, in addition to coursework. 
6.2.2 Newcomer Indoctrination 
The approach to newcomer indoctrination is marked by strict isolation from the rest of 
the Academy, particularly during Basic Military Training (BMT). Interactions with 
cadets of unequal status are restricted throughout officer preparation, but more so 
during early indoctrination. Violations of this rule lead to fixed penalties. The intention 
behind this approach is to protect newcomers from influences that might confuse them, 
and avoid distractions and interference with the indoctrination process. It maximises 
the focus on expected behaviour patterns, values, and attitudes. It also speeds up 
compliance and conformity. 
At KKMA, as in other military academies, indoctrination begins with BMT. Here, it 
takes place during the first 45 days, during which cadets are exposed to intense 
physical and mental conditioning designed to strip them of their civilian identities and 
ways of thinking and behaving, and replacing them with new ones that are compatible 
with military culture. In short, they learn to be good soldiers. The stated goals of BMT 
at KKMA are specified in Graduate Report (2002: 28) as follows: 
Physical preparation 
Introduction to military ethos and values 
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e Drill 
Light weapon handling 
Basic infantry skills 
Official pamphlets stress the importance of 'moulding' the newcomers into military 
soldiers. They describe BMT as a period of challenges physical, mental and 
psychological and the ultimate test of whether the new recruit can endure the pressure 
and is ready and willing to continue or not. At this point, 10 to 15% leave the 
Academy through their own choice, having failed the physical or mental test. BMT, 
therefore, acts as a further selection step. 
BMT is the basis on which much of subsequent officer preparation is built. Although 
pressure is a little reduced after BMT, as cadets begin to enjoy weekend leaves, 
training continues to be hard and intensive, with very little free time during week days. 
Almost all of their time is accounted for and all the day's activities are tightly 
scheduled, with one activity following another at a prearranged time and place. There 
are even compulsory unscheduled evening lectures, as part of the indoctrination 
process. 
Carefully selected and trained platoon sergeants play an important role in cadet 
indoctrination, using their skills and experience. Selected upperclassmen also take 
turns to practise their leadership skills by taking part in newcomer training and 
indoctrination. They are in turn closely watched and marked for their performance. 
Hazing, the excessive harassment and punishment of cadets, is officially "controlled", 
but newcomers in particular do not have an easy time at the Academy. 
6.2.3 Second and Third Year Cadet Indoctrination 
There are no prescribed indoctrination programmes as such here either. The Academy 
at this point expects cadets to have internalised the values and customs of the military 
to a sufficient degree, so rule violations are not tolerated and are dealt with severely. 
The process is now one of consolidation and progress. In short, all the indoctrination 
activities of the first year continue, but with relatively less intensity. Leadership 
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training is limited to third year cadets, after the all-important indoctrination process has 
been successfully imprinted. However, academy discipline continues to be rigid for all 
the cadets, to such a degree that they have to wait for the order to undress before going 
to sleep at night. Punishment and avoidance of punishment condition and shape 
behaviour throughout the Academy experience. The system recognises achievements 
and sanctions failure, but is predominantly mistake-oriented. 
In 1999, the Higher Council for Saudi Military Academies published a list of almost 
two hundred types of rule violations with their standardised corresponding sanctions 
applicable in all Saudi military academies. Their purpose is to regulate cadet behaviour 
in minute detail, from placing shoes or other items in the wrong place, incorrect 
standing or sitting position during assembly, prayer, or in the classroom, to absence 
without leave, the use of unauthorised medication, and lying or cheating. Nearly all 
rule violations lead to multiple sanctions, such as detention during normal weekend 
leave, chores or punishments during the mid-day heat, and deductions of marks from 
discipline grades, which count as part of their achievement records. Serious offences 
are punishable by expulsion from the Academy or demotion to a lower level of 
cadetship. 
6.3 Main Survey and Interview Findings 
The previous section covered "How is indoctrination done at KKMAT' What follows 
now considers "How well is it being done? " that is, the evaluation of the indoctrination 
programme through the perceptions of the research participants. 
6.3.1 Importance of Military Indoctrination 
Most officer preparation programmes regard indoctrination as a vital component. This 
is because every officer candidate must learn how to wear a unifonn, maintain 
equipment, and live under military discipline (Downes 1991: 104). The objective of 
indoctrination was previously described as a process during which recruits are 
transformed from their civilian identities into individuals who look, think, walk, talk, 
and act like soldiers (see Chapter Three Section 3.3). Rather than make assumptions, 
respondents were asked for their views on the importance of military 
indoctrination. 
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The results are shown in Table 6.1 below. 
Table 6-1 Respondents' perceptions of the importance of military indoctrination (Al-II. Q]). 
p 
Of no Of little Somewhat Important Very M SD SIG. L 
importance Importance Important % Important 
% % % % 
2 6 92 4.61 4.61 . 694 P=. O 10 
0 2.1 97.9 4.89 . 374 
(S) 
1.4 4.8 93.9 -] [! M F. 623 L---] 
As Table 6.1 shows, there is very strong support among the vast majority of both 
cadets and teaching staff for the idea that military indoctrination is important or very 
important, with a total percentage of 93.9% and a very high whole sample mean of 
(4.70). It is however worth noting that when the t-test was used to assess whether the 
two group means for cadets (4.61) and for teaching staff (4.89) differed significantly, it 
was found that the difference was significant at the 5% level (P= .0 10 (S)). Clearly, the 
difference is in emphasis, rather than indicating opposition, since both means are very 
high, with the teaching staff members viewing indoctrination as even more important 
than is acknowledged by the cadets. This recognition of the importance of 
indoctrination is in agreement with Ward's (1999: 62) finding that when cadets 
successfully complete an indoctrination programme, they begin to feel like 'Insiders' 
in their organisation. They tend to develop supportive attitudes towards indoctrination 
and to have personal values similar to those held by long-standing members of the 
military profession. On the importance of indoctrination, one of my interviewees (A2- 
C I) had this to say: "It is the heart of military preparation, the foundation upon which 
everything else depends, discipline, loyalty, teamwork, mission success, and so on. It 
is essential for military leadership because we are all soldiers to begin with, and 
naturally we must learn to conform and obey orders before we can start issuing them as 
leaders. "' 
6.3.2 Aspects of KKMA's Military Culture Environment 
A well-planned indoctrination programme leaves nothing to chance. It takes into 
account the fact that everything and everyone a cadet comes in contact with 
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(appearance of buildings, other officers, etc. ) during their fori-native period at the 
academy may be a potential influence on his perception of military culture, values and 
ideals. Awareness and control of such sources of influence, referred to as "agents of 
soci all sation/indoctrination" in Chapter Three (Figure 3.3 in particular) is a vital factor 
for effective indoctrination. In view of the importance of this factor, the survey 
participants were asked to rate K-KMA's level of awareness and control of these 
various sources of influence. Table 6.2 displays the results for this question. 
Table 6-2 Respondents' perceptions of KKMA's level of awareness and control of socialisation 
agents (Al-II. Q2-1). 
Very low Low Moderate High Very Mean SD SIG. L 
high 
0 % % % % 
6 14 20 
0 6.5 21.7 P=. 041 (S) 
4.1 H. 20.5 
As can be seen from Table 6.2,63.7% of all the respondents to the survey rated 
KKMA's level of awareness and control of all potential socialisation agents as high or 
very high, 20.5% as moderate, and 15.7% as low or very low. The whole sample mean 
is relatively high (3.63). The mean score for cadets is moderate (3.5 1), while the 
teaching staffs is higher (3.89). T-test applied to the two groups means revealed a 
statistically significant difference between the perceptions of the cadets and those of 
their teachers (P=. 041 (S)), with the latter tending to be less critical of KKMA than the 
foriner. This indicates that although the majority of respondents said that they believed 
that KKMA was in control of this issue, there was still a substantial proportion of them 
who believed that it could do better. 
A contributing factor to the effectiveness of an indoctrination programme 
is the way 
the institution is perceived by both its new and current members in terms of identity 
and reputation. Hence, the survey respondents were asked to indicate the extent to 
which they agreed that KKMA had a strong identity, a reputation, and a commitment 
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to excellence in terms of upholding military values and standards. Their reactions are 
shown in Table 6.3 below. 
Table 6-3 Reactions to whether KKMA has strong identity, reputation, and commitment to 
excellence (Al -I I. Q2-2). 
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Agree Strongly M SD SIG. L 
Disagree Agree Agree 
% % % % % 
2 3 14 43 38 
2.1 2.1 10.6 61.7 23.4 P=. 041 (S) 
2 2.7 12.9 3 3.3 
Remarkably, the combined results from Table 6.3 show that 82.3% of all the survey 
respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that KKMA was successful in projecting 
a strong identity, reputation, and commitment to excellence. The whole sample mean is 
high (4.08). The discrepancy between the mean scores for cadets (4.12) and teaching 
staff (4.02) proved to be statistically significant when the t-test was applied (P= . 041 
(S)), reflecting a tendency for cadets to hold their Academy in an even higher regard 
than teaching staff members did. This finding confirins the popularity of the Academy 
among young people in Saudi Arabia. 
On this issue, A2-C3 commented: "The Academy has a very high reputation to uphold, 
both in the eyes of the higher authorities and the general public. Everybody is aware of 
this here, which is why we are expected to do everything in our power to maintain high 
standards, as well as the reason why there is zero tolerance for slackness of any kind 
and at any level here. " 
6.3.3 Nature of Military Indoctrination at KKMA 
While all aspects of the Academy environment, appearance of buildings, artefacts, 
identity and reputation, etc. play a part in the indoctrination of cadets throughout their 
officer preparation, the heaviest dose of indoctrination is inculcated during basic 
military training (BMT), starting from day one at the Academy. The purpose behind 
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the next four questions related to this component in the questionnaire was to determine 
the research participants' perceptions and evaluations of certain aspects of 
indoctrination at K-KMA, including BMT. Table 6.4 summarises their responses to the 
four items in question. 
Table 6-4 Reactions to four aspects of indoctrination at KKMA (Al-II. Q3-Ito3-4) 
No Statement SD D SMA A SA C WS SIG. L 
% 
- 
% % % 
- 
% 1 
-M BMT is the most - - 2% 16.3 81.6 4.83 4.72 4.79 . 184 
1 shocking experience (NS) 
of a new cadet's life 
BMT. is an essential 0.7 0.7 1.4 13% 84.2 4.75 4.89 4.79 . 159 
2 part of cadets' 
D 
(NS) 
military preparation 
BMT. is harsh, 2.7 8.2 19.9 30.1 39 4.25 3.28 3.94 . 000 
3 brutal and negative (S) 
in some respects 
Indoctrination has 4.1 4.1 15.8 42.5 33.6 3.87 4.19 3.97 . 072 
4 flaws, but overall is (NS) 
LJ positive LI L- L- L- L-] L- L- L-J L 
SD= strongly disagree. D= disagree. SMA= somewhat agree. A= agree. SA 
strongly agree. 
Asked whether they thought BMT was the most shocking experience of a new cadet's 
life (No. 1), a massive 81.6% of all respondents strongly agreed, and 16.3% agreed that 
it was the case, leaving only 2% unsure. The whole sample mean is very high (4.79). 
The t-test applied to the mean scores for the two groups, cadets (4.83) and teaching 
staff (4.72) showed no statistically significant difference between them (P= . 184 
(NS)), 
indicating high consensus on this point. This finding is consistent with U'Ren's 
(1974: 18), Hayden's (2000: 3), and Downes' (1991: 104) observations that BMT is a 
particularly powerful and painful process, during which all recruits experience some 
degree of trauma and anxiety as they learn to live under military discipline. 
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A2-C3 explained: "BMT is very tough, but it cannot and must not be made easy. It Is 
there for good purposes, one of which is to find out who can take the pressure and who 
cannot. It is a test of suitability for a military career and a chance to discover 
weaknesses so that they can be corrected. Those who feel unable to take the heat and 
adapt to the new conditions here can leave, and they do, which is better for everyone. " 
Next, respondents were asked if BMT was nonetheless an essential part of cadets' 
military preparation (No. 2). A massive 84.2% of them strongly agreed, and 13% 
agreed that this was the case. The whole sample mean is very high (4.79), and the t-test 
found no statistically significant differences between the mean scores of cadets (4.75), 
and teaching staff members (4.89), resulting in (P= . 159 (NS)). This 
finding is in 
agreement with many military writers' convictions that BMT is a vital means of 
indoctrination, such as Ellis and Moore (1974: 72), Moss (1996: 9), Goggin (1998: 134), 
and Smith (199 8: 4). 
Following this, participants in this study were asked if they agreed that BMT tended to 
be harsh, brutal, and negative in some respects at KKMA (No. 3). Perhaps not 
surprisingly, over two thirds of all respondents agreed, while 11% disagreed or 
strongly disagreed with the proposition, and just under 20% who were uncertain. The 
whole sample mean obtained is relatively high (3.94). However, the t-test found a 
statistically significant difference between the two group scores, cadets (4.25) and 
teaching staff (3.28), with (P= . 000(S)). 
There are two possible interpretations for this 
result, either that teaching staff members underestimated the negative impact of some 
aspects of BMT, or that cadets had an exaggerated view of it. This is a much-debated 
issue in the literature. Writers such as Smith (1998: 1), strongly believe that BMT and 
indoctrination in general must not be made easy. Others, such as Williams (1995: 25) 
and Moss (1996: 12) disagree. 
Finally, the participants in this study were invited to state whether they were of the 
opinion that, although KKMA's indoctrination programme 
had some flaws, these were 
on the whole outweighed by its positive outcomes (No. 4). 
This resulted in well over 
three quarters of all respondents (76.1 %) agreeing or strongly agreeing with 
this view, 
with a relatively high overall mean score of (3.97). 
According to Hayden (2000: 8), this 
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type of attitude implies commitment and willingness to endure hardships and 
compliance with military discipline. However, as noted in the literature (Chapter 
Three), abuses do occur and some indoctrination systems may be unnecessarily harsh, 
which is why aspects of KKMA's indoctrination approach and methods were 
investigated. 
6.3.4 Indoctrination Approach and Methods 
This angle of indoctrination was explored through seven measures to establish whether 
in some respects KYMA's indoctrination was unduly harsh, outdated and 
counterproductive, or satisfactory (Tables 6.5 and 6.6). 
Table 6-5 Reactions to whether KKMA indoctrination is unduly harsh in four specific areas (A]- 
II. Q4-Ito4-4). 
No. Area VR R SH H VH VS I SIG. L 
In relation to . 003 
1 discipline in general - 1.4 27.9 44.9 25.9 4.03 3.55 3.87 (S) 
In relation to liberty . 000 
2 infractions - 4.8 30.2 35.6 29.5 4.11 3.08 3.78 (S) 
In enforcing rules and . 134 
3 regulations - 2.7 31.3 43.5 22.4 3.85 3.59 3.76 (NS) 
In relation to uniform . 563 
4 appearance and - 4.8 42.7 34.5 17.9 3.45 
E 
3.56 3.48 
E 
(NS) 
L_ j grooming standards L- L--j L- L--i L-j 
VR=very relaxed. R= relaxed. SH= somewhat harsh. H= harsh. VH= very harsh. 
A close look at Table 6.5 reveals that half or more of the respondents felt that the 
Academy was harsh or too harsh in all four areas considered. More specifically, in 
three out of four variables, approximately two thirds of them felt that KY'MA was 
harsh or too harsh with regard to rule and regulation enforcement, liberty infractions, 
and discipline in general, while in relation to uniforrn appearance and grooming 
standards, over half of the respondents felt that the Academy was harsh or very 
harsh. 
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Furthermore, roughly a third of all the respondents felt that the Academy was 
somewhat harsh in all cases (except uniform appearance and grooming where the 
proportion was higher), and a minority of under 5% thought that the Academy was in 
their view relaxed with regard to all four variables. 
Looking at the mean scores for the whole sample, first in ranking order among 
respondents' concerns in terms of harshness comes discipline in general, with a 
relatively high mean of (3.87), followed by liberty infractions (3.78), rules and 
regulations enforcement (3.76), and lastly uniform appearance and grooming standards 
(3.48). Interestingly, the Mest applied to the means showed statistically significant 
differences between the mean scores of cadets and teaching staff s mean scores in 
relation to discipline in general (P= . 003(S)) and liberty infractions (P= . 000(S)). The 
evidence so far is that indoctrination at KKMA is unduly harsh, with a tendency for the 
cadets to perceive it as slightly harsher than the Academy's teaching staff did. 
Subsequently, the respondents' overall assessments of KKMA's indoctrination system 
and methods were requested. Thus, they were asked if they thought some of these were 
outdated and counterproductive, if indoctrination ought to be less harsh, and the extent 
to which they were generally satisfied with the methods used to indoctrinate cadets at 
KKMA (Table 6.6). 
141 
Table 6-6 Respondents' assessment of some aspects of KKMA's indoctrination programme 
(Al-II. Q6-Ito6-3). 
No. Statement SD D SMA A SA C I TS L WS SIG. L 
% % % % % -3il r-M I 
Indoctrination 
I methods used 10.9 16.3 36.1 36.7 4.26 3.40 3.98 . 000(s) 
outdated and 
counter- 
productive 
Indoctrination 
2 system ought to 
10.4 22.2 20.1 25 22.2 3.53 2.65 3.26 . 000(s) 
be less harsh 
I am satisfied 
3 with current 
8.2 11.6 32.9 34.9 12.3 3.27 3.41 3.31 . 465 (NS) 
KY, MA 
indoctrination 
Beginning with whether some indoctrination methods used at K-KMA may be outdated 
and counterproductive (No. 1), Table 6.6 shows that only 10.9% of all respondents 
clearly disagreed with this suggestion. Combined percentages also indicate that over 
two thirds (72.8%) agreed or strongly agreed with the suggestion; the rest (16.3%) 
somewhat agreed with it. On the other hand, the whole sample mean score is relatively 
high (3.98). The t-test applied to the mean showed a statistically significant difference 
(P= . 000(S)) 
between the mean scores of cadets (4.26) and of teaching staff members 
(3.40), with the cadets expressing stronger reactions than their teachers. The reason for 
this may be that they are the ones who had recently been at the receiving end of 
indoctnnation. 
Since the researcher was to some extent expecting that KKMA would be judged as 
harsh in some respects, including BMT, the respondents were asked if the Academy 
would be moving in the right direction if it chose to reforin its current indoctrination 
system to become less harsh (No. 2). Surprisingly, no consensus emerged on this point, 
and less than half of the survey participants were favourable to the suggestion. 
The less 
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than clear-cut whole sample mean of (3-26) confirms the respondents' ambivalence on 
this issue. However, once again, the Mest used to detect significance between groups 
found a statistically significant difference between the mean scores of the cadets 
(3.53), and the teaching staff (2.65), with cadets tending to agree and teachers rather 
reluctant to agree that indoctrination be made less harsh. 
During the interviews, A2-C2 conceded that the level of harshness of KKMA's current 
indoctrination system often made him feel uncomfortable and unsure of its 
effectiveness. He said: I sometimes wonder if it wouldn't be better to focus on 
guiding and developing pride in the military profession, and effecting compliance less 
through fear of punishment and more through inner commitment, respect and 
enthusiasm for the leadership roles cadets are being prepared for. " He also added: "In 
my view, there is excessive emphasis on fault-finding and punishment. However, I am 
not saying that rules must be relaxed in such a way that would diminish the importance 
of respect for order, discipline, proper appearance and conduct. I just think that we are 
in danger of creating a permanent atmosphere of tension and anxiety, which is hardly 
ideal for the development of professionally competent and confident junior officers. " 
He then concluded his thought with the suggestion that harsh punishments ought to be 
reserved only for serious rule violations, not for petty matters of insignificant 
consequence. 
Finally, the survey participants were invited to give their concluding assessment of the 
indoctrination methods used at KKMA in terms of overall satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction (No. 3). As reactions have been mostly unfavourable on this issue so far, 
it was no surprise to find that the overall percentage of satisfaction was less than 50%, 
which is also reflected in the lukewarm whole sample mean of (3.3 1). No statistically 
significant difference between the mean scores of cadets (3.27) and teaching staff 
(3.41) was detected by the Mest (P= . 465 
(NS)), which indicates a similarity of views 
between them despite earlier differences. Lovell (1979: 96) and Forney (2000) also 
found widespread ambivalence among their research subjects on 
issues related to 
indoctrination. This does not mean that there are no problems, as discussed later in the 
section on difficulties and obstacles to effective indoctrination 
(Section 6.3.7). 
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6.3.5 Place of Traditional Military Values 
According to Jones (1998: 177), at a time when there appears to be a widening gap 
between the standards of conduct inside and outside the military academies, traditional 
military values such as courage, self-sacrifice, honour, duty, etc., are given special 
emphasis within any effective military establishment nowadays. Now more than ever, 
traditional military values are strongly promoted, not to keep past traditions only, but 
because of their strong link with "professionalism", and because they have survival 
value, as well as promoting consistency and preventing chaos. The transmission of 
traditional military values is therefore a vital part of indoctrination. As part of the 
evaluation of this component, the respondents were asked first for their perceptions of 
the importance of traditional military values to KKMA, then for their assessment of 
their importance from their own points of view (Table 6.7). 
Table 6-7 Respondents' perceptions of the importance of traditional military values 
I -I I. Q5-1,5-2). 
No Statement NI Li SMI I VI C TS WS SIG. 
% % % % % L 
Importance of 
1 traditional military 
0.7 4.1 2.7 33.3 
E52 
4.52 4.34 4.46 . 
203 
(NS) 
values to K. K. M. A. 
Importance of 
2 traditional military - 
0.7 11.6 38.1 49.7 4.27 4.57 4.3 
d. 
5 
(S) 
LJ values to myself LJ L1 Lj L-1 L-J L-1 L-j 
Nl=not important 
Vl=very important. 
LI= little important. SMI= somewhat important. I= important. 
Examination of Table 6.7 shows that the overwhelming majority of respondents to this 
survey (92.5%) estimated that traditional military values were either important or very 
important from KKMA's point of view, with a high whole sample mean of 
(4.46). On 
this occasion, the group mean for cadets (4.52) and that of the teaching staff members 
(4.34) did not result in a statistically significant difference at the usual 5% 
level (P= 
203 (NS)) when the t-test was applied. 
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Asked to comment on the importance of traditional military values, A2-C I said: "This 
is an institution of character development. As professional soldiers, we value 
obedience, loyalty, service to Allah, King, and Country, courage, patriotism, integrity, 
and the like. If you call these 'traditional values', then yes they are and always will be 
vital for us and for the Profession of Arms in general, I believe. " 
Turning to the respondents' perceptions of the importance of traditional military values 
from their personal viewpoints, here again a massive 87.8% of them felt that such 
values were important or very important. This is also reflected in the high whole 
sample mean of (4.36). Interestingly, however, a gap appeared between the group 
mean score of cadets (4.27) and that of the teaching staff members (4.57), confirmed as 
significant by the Mest (P= .0 15 (S)). It is possible that we 
have here a hint that 
traditional military values are not as important to cadets as they are to their teachers, 
although both groups rated them high in terms of importance. Comparing this finding 
with the earlier one also shows some difference between perceptions of the importance 
attached to traditional military values by KKMA and by members of staff and cadets, 
although again the gap is small. 
At this point, the focus switches from the consideration of mainly general perceptions 
of KKMA's indoctrination strategy, its nature, approaches and methods, and value 
orientations to more specific evaluations of the Academy's level of success in 
inculcating certain military abilities, skills, and attitudes, which are all part of 
indoctrination. 
6.3.6 Evaluation of KKMA's Indoctrination Programme Outcomes 
In this section, a list of fifteen indoctrination outcomes drawn from the literature was 
presented for evaluation by the participants in this survey. This is not a comprehensive 
list, but a reasonably varied one covering some important areas of military 
indoctrination. Its purpose was to judge how well KKMA was succeeding in achieving 
some of its ma*or goals of indoctrination. Table 6.8 presents the 
findings from the 
replies to those questions. 
145 
Table 6-8 Perceptions of some aspects of KKMA's indoctrination performance 
(Al-II. Q7-Ito7-15). 
Statement VP P RW W VW C TS WS SIG 
% % % % 
-- 
% mI m: 1 E: 1mI L 
* 269 1 Soldiering skills 17 
] 
49.7 29.9 4.11 3.95 4.06 (N S) 
000 
Survival in combat 1.4 25.9 4.22 4.01 (S) 
136 
3 Feeling proud of being 2.1 7.5 17.1 38.4 34.9 4.05 3.78 3.96 (N S) 
a member of a 
professional institution 
. 
114 
4 Respect and affection 1.4 8.9 17.8 34.2 37.7 4.07 3.78 3.97 (N S) 
for KKMA. 
096 
5 Group cohesion and 0.7 7.5 27.9 38.8 25.2 3.89 3.61 3.80 (N S) 
loyalty 
. 
311 
6 Commitment to 4.1 5.5 28.1 34.9 27.4 3.82 3.63 3.76 (N S) 
fundamental military 
values, e. g. duty, 
honour 
. 
160 
7 Care and presentation 2.8 5.5 33.8 31% 26.9 3.81 3.56 3.73 (N S) 
of self and military 
equipment 
001, 
8 Sense of pnde in 4.1 9.7 26.2 39.3 20.7 3.77 3.30 3.62 (S) 
belonging to a unique 
profession 
Leadership skills . 
705 
(N S) 
Military courtesy and . 
343 
10 etiquette inside and 6.2 13.7 29.5 34.2 16.4 3.47 3.28 3.41 (N S) 
outside the academy 
coordination . 
549 
2.7 3.30 (NS) 
. 
607 
12 Working against dead 4.1 17 34 34.7 10.2 3.27 3.36 3.29 (NS) 
-lines 
1 
. 
592 
13 Making rapid 5.4 23.1 38.1 22.4 10.9 3.07 3.17 3.10 (N S) 
jecisions under stress , 785 
Physical hardness 13.7 36.3 13 3.05 3.10 3.06 (NS) 
. 
298 
Mental hardness 11.6 22.6 41.1 17.1 7.5 2.80 3.00 2.86 (N S) 
VP= very poorly. P= poorly. RW= reasonably well. W=well. VW=verywell. 
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Close study of Table 6.8 shows that it is possible to see that the respondents' 
perceptions of KKMAs indoctrination performance fall into three categories: where 
the Academy does well; where it does reasonably well; and where it does less well, 
judging by whole sample mean score results in particular. Starting with where the 
Academy appears to be doing well, four items (Nos. 1,2,3,4) with the highest mean 
scores on the list make up this category. It includes "'Soldiering skills" (4.06), 
"Survival in combat" (4.01), "Feeling proud of being a member of a professional 
institution" (3.96), and "Respect and affection for KKMA" (3.97). Well over two 
thirds of the respondents rated each of these areas as well or very well taught by 
KKMA. Their mean scores are the highest on the list. 
All except one, "Survival in combat" (No. 2), were the object of consensus among both 
cadets and teaching staff, since Mests applied to their group mean scores produced no 
statistically significant differences. Cadets' confidence in KKMA's teaching of 
"Survival in combat", as reflected in their mean score (4.22) as opposed to (3.57) by 
their teachers, with (P= . 000 (S)) is a sign of a positive attitude. It is worth noting that 
this group of items shows an emphasis on soldiering and respect and pride in 
belonging to a much-respected Academy. Leadership skills, which are the primary 
focus of Sandhurst's indoctrination programme (RMAS Prospectus 2002), for 
example, are not included in this category. 
The second category, where, according to the survey respondents generally, the 
Academy does reasonably well, consists of six items (Nos. 5,6,7,8,9,10). These are, 
beginning with the highest whole sample mean score, "Group cohesion and loyalty" 
(3.80), "Commitment to fundamental military values" (3.76), "Care and presentation 
of self' (3.73), "Sense of pride in belonging to a unique profession" (3.62), 
"Leadership skills" (3.47), and "Military courtesy and etiquette" (3.41). Here, from 
50.6% to 64% of all participants in the survey thought that KKMA performed well or 
very well in teaching these skills and values. All except one (No. 8), "Sense of pride in 
belonging to a unique profession" were the object of consensus among both cadets and 
teaching staff, since t-tests applied to the group means yielded no statistically 
significant differences. Once again, the cadets' confidence in KKMA's ability to 
develop a sense of pride in becoming full members of the officer corps on graduation 
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was reflected in their higher mean score (3.77) as compared with that of their teachers 
(3.30), with (P= .0 11 (S)). This may be another sign of a positive self-image, a very 
short period away from graduation day. Note here that "Leadership skills" is In fifth 
position in this group of six items in this category. Also, the majority of the other items 
could be linked to" soldiering" rather than "officer skills" as such. 
The third category, where according to the survey participants on the whole, the 
Academy does less well in terms of outcome perforinance, comprises five items 
(Nos. 11,12,13,14,15). These are, starting with the highest whole sample mean score 
in this group, "Effort co-ordination" (3.30), "Working against deadlines" (3.29), 
"Making rapid decisions under stress" (3.10), Physical hardness" (3.06), and " Mental 
hardness" (2.86). These are still clearly critical areas of military indoctrination, 
particularly in officer preparation. All the variables in the group were rated by under 
half of all respondents as well or very well taught at KKMA. More respondents also 
thought that these areas were poorly or very poorly taught at the Academy, up to 
34.2% for "Mental hardness" for example. What is more, consensus was obtained 
among cadets and teaching staff on all these variables of the third category, since t- 
tests detected no statistically significant differences between their mean scores. These 
five variables can be considered as important leadership ingredients (rapid decision- 
making under mental and physical stress, coordination efforts, and meeting deadlines). 
The main message from the three variable categories just discussed is that KKMA 
cadets seem to be better prepared for soldiering than for the leadership challenges 
ahead of them. Achieving the desired outcomes of indoctrination is not an easy task, 
especially when there are many obstacles to overcome, such as the ones discussed 
next. 
6.3.7 Perceptions of Blocks to Effective Indoctrination 
Everyone knows that military indoctrination is a unique and challenging experience 
fraught with difficulties that could reduce its effectiveness. 
Success often depends on 
control of the negative influence of certain variables that may 
hinder this process 
(Forney: 2000). Measurement of this influence through the perceptions of participants 
in this research is the object of this final section. 
Table 6.9 presents the assessment 
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results for ten main familiar obstacles to successful indoctrination. 
Table 6-9 Perceptions of obstacles to effective indoctrination at KKMA. (Al-II. Q8-Ito8-10). 
No. N S RA QA C TS WS SIG. 
Statement 
% % 
% 
% GD 
% L 
Poor selection at point -1 - - I . 792 of entry into KKMA. - 
L5. 
12.9 25.2 565 4.29 
[4.3 
2 (N S) 
Difficulty balancing 
. 000 2 indoctrination with 3.4 5.5 13 24.7 53.4 4.47 3.59 4.19 (S) 
academics 
Overemphasis on 1 . 000 3 conformity and 6.8 3.4 2.2 23.8 53.7 4.47 3.44 4.14 (S) 
obedience at expense 
I of creativity 
Too much to do and . 001 4 not enough time to do 2.1 6.8 16.4 34.2 40.4 4.23 3.63 4.04 (S) 
it 
Unwillingness to . 000 5 change outmoded 8.2 8.2 12.2 28.6 42.9 4.29 3.06 3.89 (S) 
values and traditions 
6 
Cheating incidents 
and breaches of 
Academy rules 
System is out of date 
8.2 7.5 19.7 28.6 36.1 3.97 3.34 3.76 
. 004 
(S) 
. 000 
3.4 (S) 
Excessive . 000 8 punishments and 6.8 12.2 22.4 27.9 30.6 4.14 2.55 3.63 (S) 
abuses 
Cadet's ambivalence . 000 
9 about harsh 7.6 13.9 30.6 27.8 20.1 3.64 2.84 3.38 (S) 
indoctrination 
Indoctrination unduly . 
572 
10 left in the hands of 12. 27.2 22.4 23.8 13.6 3.02 2.89 2.97 (N S) 
senior cadets 
9 
-----Jj 
N=none S=some. RA= reasonable amount. QA = quite a lot. UD = great cleal. 
Close inspection of Table 6.9 shows that from the respondents' perceptions, it is 
possible to separate two groups of obstacles to effective indoctrination at KKMA: 
"major obstacles", and "minor obstacles". Major obstacles are those whose whole 
sample means fall within the scale value 4 or above ; these were assessed as having 
"Quite a lot" of negative impact on indoctrination. Minor obstacles are those whose 
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whole sample means fall within the scale value plus or minus 3; these were thought to 
have relatively less negative effect on indoctrination. Major obstacles include six 
variables (Nos. 1- 6): "Poor selection at point of entry into KKMA" (4.32), "Difficulty 
balancing indoctrination with academics" (4.19), "Overemphasis on conformity and 
obedience at expense of creativity" (4.14), "Too much to do and not enough time to do 
it" (4.04), "Unwillingness to change outmoded values and traditions"(3.89), and 
"Cheating incidents and breaches of Academy rules" (3.76). 
A very high proportion of the respondents (from 64% to 81.7%) rated these six 
obstacles as having a substantial negative impact on indoctrination at KKMA. Their 
mean scores ranged from (4.32) to (3.76). Consensus was obtained on what was rated 
as the most serious of all obstacles, "Poor selection", shown by the result of the Mest 
applied to the group mean scores of cadets (4.34) and teaching staff s (4.29), with (P= 
. 792 (NS)). This strongly confirms the statement in the literature that individuals who 
are unsuitable for military life make indoctrination very difficult because they lack the 
necessary qualities to fit in. They are time-wasters and a constant distraction. The other 
five variables in the major obstacles group were all given greater emphasis for their 
negative effects by the cadets than by their teachers. This is shown by the statistically 
significant differences found between the two group mean scores obtained for each 
variable. Perhaps the cadets' perceptions were somewhat inflated because their 
memories of their frustrations with their own indoctrination experience and their 
'experiments' with new cadets were still fresh. Their more mature teachers also 
probably tended to view things as less dramatic generally. 
As for the nature of such obstacles, apart from the one relating to selection, two of 
them seem to be connected to time management and balancing priorities (Nos. 3,4) 
"Difficulty balancing indoctrination with academics" and "Too much to do and not 
enough time to do it", both difficult in a three year course where other academies have 
four years. Another two obstacles (Nos. 5,6) "Unwilling to change outmoded values 
and traditions" and "Overemphasis on conformity and obedience at expense of 
creativity" could be seen as connected to change and the ability to adapt to the needs of 
the modem world, which calls for more emphasis on creativity and elimination of 
outmoded values and traditions. The last obstacle, in order of importance in this group, 
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concerns cheating incidents. This is obviously a serious problem in any institution, but 
the low emphasis on it here suggests that it may not be so common in KKMA. 
Relatively minor obstacles to effective indoctrination at KKMA comprise four 
variables (Nos. 7,8,9,10). Beginning with the one with the most negative effect within 
this group, they are: "System is out of date" (3.64), "Excessively harsh punishments 
and abuses"(3.63), "Cadets' ambivalence about harsh indoctrination" (3.38), and 
"Indoctrination unduly left in the hands of senior cadets" (2.97). The first three 
variables were somewhat underemphasized by teaching staff members in comparison 
with cadets' views. This was evident because the Mest used to assess differences 
between the two group mean scores for each variable produced statistically significant 
differences, all (P=. 000 (S)). The fourth variable, considered to be the least serious of 
all obstacles to successful indoctrination, "Indoctrination unduly left in the hands of 
senior cadets", was the object of consensus (P=. 572 (NS)). It could be that vested 
interests led to this result, or simply resistance to abandon a tradition. The other three 
minor obstacles are related to the issue of harshness and arguably the outdated nature 
of the indoctrination system, both very familiar themes in the evaluation of military 
indoctrination processes for many years. 
The commanders interviewed for this research shared many of the concerns expressed 
by the survey respondents, particularly regarding the negative impact of poor selection, 
crammed programmes, and competing and sometimes conflicting demands on cadets. 
However, even more pressing in their views are three other issues. The first is that the 
Academy is clearly oversubscribed, stretching resources beyond capacity when space 
and staff numbers are limited. The second problem is the decline in recruit quality due 
to the national educational system in general, which puts more pressure on staff to 
raise standards. And finally, attention was also drawn to the fact that it was regrettable 
to see that much effort was devoted to producing a very detailed standardised 
punishment system, when it could have been more usefully concentrated on designing 
a wel I -thought-out and structured indoctrination guide or manual 
for instruction. 
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6.4 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter consists of two broad parts. In the first half, the main features of cadets' 
indoctrination experience were described, beginning with the setting in which it was 
conducted and how the process was implemented from the newcomer stage to the later 
stages of indoctrination at KKMA. 
Documents analysis revealed the absence of a clearly defined and structured 
indoctrination strategy, and that evidence of how it was to be conducted was piecemeal 
and scattered in a number of sources, none detailed or comprehensive. In practice, 
however, cadet indoctrination at KKMA appears to be much the same as in other 
military academies elsewhere, starting with intense BMT and generally aiming to 
transform the civilian recruit into a soldier committed to the culture and values of the 
Military. It then continues in the second and third years with slightly less intensity but 
with no less rigidity, if not more. Discipline at the Academy was described as harsh 
and predominantly mistake-oriented. There was also a sense that almost every aspect 
of cadet life was regulated, and that any departure from expected behaviour was not 
tolerated in an effort to produce uniformity. True leadership training in indoctrination 
was noted to be limited since it was mainly reserved for selected upperclassmen. 
The second half of this chapter presented a detailed analysis of both survey and 
interview findings related to indoctrination. Issues examined included participants' 
perceptions of the importance of indoctrination, which was confirmed as vital by 
almost all who took part in this study. Equally, a large majority of respondents were of 
the view that KKMA was in control of all potential agents of socialisation, and an even 
larger majority believed that the Academy was successful in projecting a strong 
identity, reputation, and commitment to excellence. One commander attributed this to 
KKMA's efforts and determination to adopt a zero tolerance of slackness. 
Subsequently, key aspects of military indoctrination at KKMA were assessed through 
the views of the research participants. Thus, well over two thirds of them indicated that 
they felt that BMT was the most shocking experience of a new cadet's life, but that 
nonetheless it was an essential part of military preparation. A similar proportion of 
respondents also agreed that BMT tended to be harsh, 
brutal, and negative in some 
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respects at KKMA. Despite this, the same proportion of respondents were of the 
opinion that overall, KKMA indoctrination programme outcomes were more positive 
than negative. 
Further scrutiny of the characteristics of KKMA's indoctrination system showed that a 
large majority of respondents consistently judged that the Academy was rather harsh 
with regard to rule and regulation enforcement, liberty infractions, and discipline in 
general. 
The respondents' overall assessment of KKMA's indoctrination system and methods 
showed again that over two thirds of them believed that some indoctrination methods 
used were outdated and counterproductive. Surprisingly, less than half of them agreed 
that the system ought to be relaxed, reflecting a familiar ambivalence on the issue 
noted in other military academies elsewhere in the world. Less than half of them, 
however, stated that they were satisfied with the status quo. During the interviews 
conducted for this research, one commander admitted that he often felt uncomfortable 
with the level of harshness of the current indoctrination system and its mistake- 
oriented disciplinary regime. 
The focus then moved to the evaluation of KKMA's indoctrination performance, as 
viewed by the survey participants. The Academy was judged by well over two thirds 
of the respondents to be generally doing well in terms of inculcating soldiering skills, 
survival in combat , instilling pride 
in belonging to a professional institution, and 
respect and affection for KKMA. It was rated by more than half of all the survey 
respondents as doing reasonably well in developing group cohesion, commitment to 
fundamental military values, care and presentation of self, sense of pride in belonging 
to a unique profession, leadership skills, and military courtesy and etiquette. Finally, 
the Academy was thought to be doing less well in areas such as developing effort 
coordination, working against deadlines, making rapid decisions under stress, and 
physical and mental hardness. One salient finding here is that cadets seem to be better 
prepared for soldiering skills than leadership. 
The last but one section of this chapter gave an assessment of the obstacles to effective 
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indoctrination at KKMA. The analysis pointed to the presence of 'major' and relatively 
4minor' obstacles. Under major obstacles fell poor selection, overemphasis of 
conformity and obedience at the expense of creativity, unwillingness to change 
outmoded values and traditions, and cheating incidents and breaches of Academy 
rules. Relatively minor obstacles included the perception that the whole system was 
out of date, the excessively harsh punishments and abuses, ambivalence about the 
harshness of indoctrination, and lastly the claim that indoctrination was often unduly 
left in the hands of senior cadets. The three commanders interviewed for this research 
shared some of the above concerns. In addition, they felt that things were made worse 
because the Academy was oversubscribed beyond capacity, because of poor recruit 
quality, and due to the absence of a specific, structured indoctrination programme. 
Finally, it is to be noted with interest that out of forty-one questions asked on 
indoctrination to both cadets and teaching staff members, the Mest used to detect 
differences between the two group scores found no statistically significant differences 
in twenty-two cases, and discrepancies in nineteen cases. However, the differences 
were in all cases a matter of emphasis rather than substance. In other words, the two 
groups did not generally hold opposite views, only stronger or weaker views than one 
another in certain cases. 
The next chapter will present the field study results for the third component, 
"Vocational Programme". 
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Chapter Seven 
Findings Related to KKMA's Vocational Programme 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the field study results and data analysis connected with KKMA's 
vocational programme. The first half, based on an analysis of documentary evidence, 
describes the elements of the vocational programme at KKMA and the distribution of 
course subjects throughout the three years of officer preparation. The second half gives 
and interprets the statistical results of the survey and the input from the commanders 
interviewed on a number of vocational programme issues considered. 
7.2 Vocational Programme at KKMA: Aims and Structure 
According to KKMA's General Programme Outline (2001: 2), the vocational 
programme aims to provide cadets with the necessary skills and crafts that will enable 
them to lead an infantry platoon on graduation from the Academy. The vocational 
programme (military-specific programme) particularly covers tactical subjects focused 
on the squadron and the platoon The programme however does not underestimate the 
importance of widening the cadets' knowledge and understanding of general military 
subjects such as Foundations of Military Organization, Military Management, Military 
Regulations, Intelligence, Fire Support, Engineering, Military History and Military 
Geography. The vocational programme represents two thirds of the whole KKMA 
curriculum. In total, the programme consists of 1456 hours: 1114 hours of theory and 
342 practice hours. The programme consists of 26 subjects besides field training. 
These 26 subjects are divided over a period of 3 years, each year consisting of two 
semesters. 
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Table 7.1 below shows the distribution of military specific course subjects offered at 
KKMA. 
Table 7-1 Distribution of vocational programme at KKMA Source: KKMA's General 
Programme Outline (2001: 1). 
Area of Total Hours 
Vocational 
Programme 
Course Subject Theory Practice 
Drill 208 
Shooting 60 
Basic Military 
General health and 
first aid 
20 
Skills Map reading 95 20 
Weapons 108 
Jield skills 33 22 
(670 hours) Signal 46 3 
Battle technique 34 21 
Fire support 28 
_Light 
infantry tactics 85 20 
Military 
Mechanized infantry 
tactics 
56 12 
Knowledge Field engineering 38 
Logistical support 22 
Military patrols 28 34 
(406 hours) Nuclear biological 
&chemical war 
22 
Military symbols 23 
Intelligence 14 
Military geography 24 
Military history 26 
Leadership Military leadership 21 
(77 hours) Staff missions 30 
Military management 27 
Management Military regulations 18 
(8 8 hours) 
Organization of 
military units 
43 
Communication 
Skills 
(25 hours) 
Military instructor 
training course 
25 
MOOTW 
(40 hours) 
Internal security 40 
- Field Training 
15 0 hours) 
Field exercises 150 
Total 27 1114 1 31L_J 
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7.2.1 First Year Programme 
The first year vocational programme at K-KMA consists of two semesters totalling 519 
teaching hours. The first semester comprises 250 hours: 220 theory and 30 practice. 
During this semester, training concentrates on basic military skills. The second 
semester consists of 269 hours: 187 theory and 82 practice. In addition to the basic 
military skills, cadets are introduced to battle skills, shooting with live ammunition and 
basic military organisation. Table 7.2 below shows the distri I of subjects taught 
in the first year with their specific details. 
Table 7-2 First year vocational programme at KKMA 
Area of Semesterl Semester2 Total 
Vocational 
Programme 
Course 
subject 
Theory Practice Theory Practice hours 
Drill 44 44 88 
B i ilit Weapons 70 13 83 as cm a.., Shooting 18 18 
skills General health 
and first aid 
20 20 
(453 hours) Field skills 33 22 55 
Map reading 33 8 44 85_ 
Signals 20 26 3 49 
Battle 
technique 
34 21 55 
Management 
(26 hours) 
Organization 
of military 
units 
26 26 
Field training 
(40 hours) 
Basic military 
skills exercise 
40 40 
Totals 10 220 30 187 82 519 
7.2.2 Second Year Programme 
The second year vocational programme at KKMA consists of two semesters totalling 
454 teaching hours. The first semester comprises 204 hours: 164 theory and 40 hours 
practice. During this semester, training in basic military skills continues but the 
emphasis is on military knowledge, both tactical and technical. Moreover, cadets are 
introduced to the principles of organization of military units at the end of the semester. 
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Further live ammunition shooting practice is also provided. The second semester 
comprises 250 hours: 146 theory and 104 practice. In addition to military knowledge 
and military management, cadets are instructed on nuclear, chemical and biological 
war. By the end of the semester, the fist tactical exercise is conducted to put into 
practice what they have learned. Table 7.3 below presents the details of all the 
vocational programme subjects taught in the second year of officer preparation. 
Table 7-3 Second year vocational programme at KKMA 
Area of Semesterl Semester2 Total 
vocational 
programme 
Course subject Theory Practice Theory Practice Hours 
Basic military Drill 30 30 60 
kill Weapons 25 25 s s 
(121 hours) Shooting 24 24 
Map reading 6 6 12 
Intelligence 14 14 
Military patrols 28 34 62 
Military Field engineering 14 2 38 
knowledge Light infantry 
Tactics 
49 10 36 10 105 
(264 hours) Nuclear & 
chemical and 
biological war 
22 22 
Military symbol. 23 23 
Management 
(9 hours) 
Organization of 
Military units 
3 6 9 
Field training 
(60 hours) 
First tactical 
Exercise 
- 
60 60 
Total 12 164 40 146 104 454 
7.2.3 Third Year Programme 
The third year vocational programme at KKMA consists of two semesters totaling 493 
teaching hours. The first semester comprises 325 hours: 235 theory and 90 hours 
practice. During this semester, military knowledge classes continue and training in 
MOOTW is offered. By the end of this semester, cadets take part in practical military 
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exercises to implement what they have learned in class. Shooting with live ammunition 
continues and concludes with a final assessment. The second semester comprises 168 
hours: 162 theory and 6 practice. Leadership training (military leadership, military 
history, staff missions) are introduced here together with communication skills and 
instructor training. Table 7.4 below shows the details of all the vocational subjects 
taught in the third year of officer preparation. 
Table 7-4 Third year vocational programme at KKMA 
Area of Semesterl Semester2 Total 
vocational Course Theory Practice Theory Practice Hours 
programme subject 
Drill 30 30 60 
Basic military Shooting 18 18 
skills. 
Map reading 12 6 18 
(96 hours) 
Fire support 28 28 
Mechanized 56 12 68 
infantry tactics 
Military Logistical 22 22 
knowledge support 
Military 24 24 
(142 hours) geography 
Staff missions 30 30 
Military 26 26 
Leadership history 
(77 hours) Military 21 21 
leadership 
Organization 8 8 
of military 
Management units 
Military 27 27 
(5 3 hours) management 
Military 18 18 
regulations 
Communication Instructor 25 25 
skills training 
(25 hours) 
MOOTW internal 40 40 
(40 hours) security 
Field training Second tactical 60 60 
(60 hours) exercise 
fotal 16 235 90 162 6 4 
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7.3 Main Survey and Interview Findings 
The previous section covered "How is the vocational programme done at KKMAT' in 
theory. What follows now considers "How well is it being done? " that is, the 
evaluation of the vocational education programme through the perceptions of the 
research participants. This is done by examining first to what extent the vocational 
programme is perceived as important for officership. Second, perceptions of the 
adequacy of the contents of the elements of the vocational programme are assessed, 
that is basic military skills, military knowledge, and leadership. Third, evaluations of 
management and communication skills and other skills related to military operations 
other than war (MOOTW) are looked at. Fourth, the overall balance of the vocational 
programme in terms of theory and practice and the suitability of the leaming 
environment at K-KMA are considered. Finally, the respondents' overall satisfaction 
with the vocational programme in general is assessed. 
7.3.1 Importance of vocational education for officer preparation 
High standards of vocational expertise are essential for effective perforinance in 
military missions, hence the need to train and educate new members of the profession 
in the theory and practice of the management and implementation of battle in all its 
technical and scientific aspects. Before tapping the respondents' views on the 
vocational programme offered at KKMA, they were first asked to rate the programme 
in terms of overall importance. The results are shown in Table7.5 below. 
Table 7-5 Respondents' perceptions of the importance of the vocational programme (AI-Ill. QI) 
Of no 
importance 
Of little 
importance 
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very 
Important 
M S. D SIG. L 
C 6 13 81 4.75 . 
557 P=. 
TS 2.1 10.6 87.2 4.85 . 
415 217 
Wý] 4=8 4.8 83 4.78 . 517 
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As Table 7.5 shows, there is strong support among the vast majority of both cadets and 
teaching staff that vocational education is important or very important, with a total 
percentage of 95.5% and a high whole sample mean of (4.78). The t-test applied to the 
mean scores for the two groups, cadets (4.75) and teaching staff (4.85) showed no 
statistically significant difference between them (P=. 217(NS)), indicating a strong 
consensus on this point. This is further supported by interview statements made by the 
interviewed Commanders at KKMA who agreed that vocational education was not 
only central to the Academy, but also essential for the task of developing leadership. 
Once the respondents' perceptions on the importance of the vocational programme had 
been tapped, their attentions was directed towards the evaluation of the specific 
elements and aspects of KKMA's vocational programme. 
7.3.2 Assessment of Elements of KKMA's Vocational Programme 
KKMA's vocational programme for the preparation of officers essentially consists of 
three elements: basic military skills, military knowledge, and leadership (Yardley 
1987: 184; Schwarzkopf, in Palmer 1992: 9). Each of these areas is assessed in turn 
next. 
7.3.2.1 Basic Military Skills 
Basic military training has been and always will be an essential part of the preparation 
of all officers (Yardley 1987: 109). This is because the officer is first and foremost a 
soldier and a warrior (Kelley 1996: 104). It includes infantry training, perfecting 
shooting skills, and drill. The following table summarises the respondents' reactions to 
a number of statements on KKMA's basic military skills. 
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Table 7-6 Respondents' assessments of KKMA's effectiveness in basic militarv skills 
(A]-fil. Q2-1 to 2-3) 
No. Statement SD D SMA A S. A C TS I WS SIG. ' 
% % % %. 
.% 
M rM L 
KKMA has a high 
standard in military 2.7 2 10.9 36.1 48.3 4.26 4.23 4.25 . 875 
drill and parades (NS) 
KKMA has a high 
2 standard in infantry - 3.4 21.8 42.9 32 4.00 4.10 4.03 . 467 
training (NS) 
KKMA has a high 
3 standard in shooting 4.8 10.9 27.9 33.3 23.1 3.52 3.74 3.59 
skills L- L- L- L-J 
First, the combined results from Table7.6 show that 84.4% of all survey respondents 
either agreed or strongly agreed that KKMA's vocational programme provides a high 
standard in military drill and parades (No. 1). The whole sample mean is a high (4.25) 
rating first in all basic skills. The t-test applied to the mean scores for the two groups, 
cadets (4.26) and teaching staff (4.23), showed no statistically significant difference 
between them (P= . 875 (NS)), indicating a strong consensus on this point. This result 
indicates that KKMA attaches a great deal of importance to military drill and parades. 
This is further supported by documentary evidence that shows that the Academy 
allocates 208 hours to this aspect of officer preparation. 
Next, the respondents were asked if KKMA provided a high standard in infantry 
training (No. 2). 74.9% of the survey respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that 
this was the case. The whole samples mean was high (4.03), rating infantry training as 
second in order of emphasis as viewed by the respondents. This reflects the importance 
that KKMA attaches to infantry training in officer preparation. The t-test found no 
statistically significant differences between the mean scores of cadets (4.00), and 
teaching staff members (4.23), resulting in (P=. 467 (NS)). 
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Finally, the participants in the study were asked if KKMA provided a high standard in 
military shooting (No. 3). 56.4% of the participants agreed or strongly agreed that this 
was the case, whereas 27.9% of them somewhat agreed, which suggests that almost a 
third of them had some reservations on the subject. This is further confirmed by the 
moderate to high whole sample mean score of (3.59). When the t-test was conducted, 
no statistically significant differences between the mean scores of the cadets (3.52) and 
the teaching staff group (3.74) were found, (P=. 25 1 (NS)). These results indicate that 
training in shooting ranked lowest among all basic military skills at KKMA. 
Overall it appears that KKMA provides high-quality basic military skills, i. e. drills and 
parades, infantry skills and shooting. This is consistent with Janjua (1994: 82), who 
compared the training systems of six military academies, including West Point, 
Sandhurst, and those of North Korea, Japan, Turkey, and Pakistan, and found that they 
offered high quality training in basic military skills in their officer preparation. 
However, RMC (2001: 37), Yardley (1987: 109), and Janjua (1994: 85) also reported 
military academies' tendency to pay disproportionate attention to military drill and 
parades, and conflicting views on their usefulness. 
7.3.2.2 Military Knowledge 
This is essentially concerned with the technical and tactical aspects of military 
expertise, both in theory and practice. Here, cadets are trained and educated in 
understanding and using the technological "tools of the trade". Tactical skills involve 
knowledge of how men fight with maximum energy and commitment. The objective of 
the tactical aspect is to master the skill of combining technical skills with people and 
ideas and applying them to fight and win (ALDH 2001: 39-43). The survey 
respondents were asked for their views on both technical and tactical aspects of 
KY, MA's vocational programme. The results are shown below in Table7.7. 
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Table 7-7 Respondents' assessments of KKMA's effectiveness in basic military skills 
(Al. lll. Q2-4 and 2-5). 
SD D SMA A SA C TS NN'S SIGT 
Statement % % % % % M M M 
KKMA offers high 
level of tactical 
mi itary expertise 
4.8 6.1 23.8 38.1 27.2 3.74 3.82 3.76 
. 
636 
(NS) 
KKMA offers high 
level of technical 
inj itary expertise 
16.3 19 29.9 21.1 13.6 2.96 2.97 2.96 
. 
934 
(N S) 
Examination of Table 7.7 shows that almost two thirds of all the respondents (65.3%) 
agreed or strongly agreed that KKMA offered a high level of tactical military expertise 
with a relatively high whole sample mean of (3.76). When the t-test was applied 
between the group mean for cadets (3.74) and that of the teaching staff group (3.82), it 
did not result in a statistically significant difference at the usual 5% level (P= . 636 
(NS)). Considering the amount of time allocated for this element of the vocational 
programme at KKMA, it is not surprIsing that there was full agreement between 
teaching staff and cadets in its evaluation. 
When the respondents were asked if the Academy offered a high level of technical 
military expertise, there was no overwhelming agreement between them. Only a third 
of them agreed or strongly agreed (34.7%), another third preferred to sit on the fence 
(29.9% somewhat agreed), and the last third disagreed or strongly disagreed (3 5.3 1 
This is also reflected in the low to moderate mean of the whole sample (2.96). 
However, no statistically significant differences appeared between the group mean 
score of the cadets (2.96) and that of the teaching staff group (2.97). The t-test 
confinned the consensus between the two groups (P= . 934 
(NS)). Comparing this 
finding with the earlier one reveals that the vocational programme at KKMA offers a 
lower standard of technical training and knowledge than that provided for tactical 
training. A military academy that is aspiring to professionalism ideally requires a 
balance between the provision of technical and tactical knowledge. 
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Providing cadets with basic military skills and military knowledge alone is not enough 
for officership. Officers require leadership training in order to lead their men and win 
wars. RMC (2001: 45) states that leadership training must be central to everything that 
cadets do at the military academy. Yardley (1987: 197) also maintains that , in the 
British Military Academy of Sandhurst, everything is taught through the medium of 
leadership, both theory and practice, with a strong emphasis on relevance to ensure that 
everything the cadets do has a useful purpose. The next section interprets the 
respondents' assessment of the quality of the leadership programme at KKMA in 
relation to three relevant aspects: theory, process and implementation, and outcome. 
7.3.2.3 Leadership 
All the military academies reviewed for this important portion of the vocational 
component of officer preparation recognise the vital importance of leadership skills. 
However, not all of them provide the structures, the resources, and the necessary 
programmes to ensure that the objective of producing capable and effective leaders can 
be achieved. Many seem to expect leadership to simply emerge, while others, such as 
West Point (USA) and Annapolis (USA), for example, see their missions as producers 
of the 'best leaders in the world' (Thomas 2000: 14). These academies, as we have 
noted, have a separate department for leadership development. Palmer (1992: 6) rightly 
'(sees that the academies' very reason for being revolves around leadership", therefore, 
it is essential for all military academies to have a serious leadership programme, both 
theoretical and practical. Respondents' perceptions of the theoretical aspect of 
leadership training at KKMA are shown in Table 7.8. below: 
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Table 7-8 Respondents' assessment of the theoretical aspect of leadership at KKMA 
(A]-ill. Q3-1 and 3-2). 
Statement SID D SMA A SA C 1 TS 
.: 
WS F V sic. 
% % % % % M M - M L 
KKMA leadership 
preparation provides 2.7 58.5 29.3 6.1 2.7 2.28 2.89 2.47 
. 000 
adequate knowledge& (S) 
skIlls 
KKMA leadership 
training draws from 4.8 61.2 30.6 2 
.7 2.21 2.56 2.39 . 001 
modem scientific theones (S) 
and sound analysis of 
[] 
histoncal examples 
I L- L- L- L- 
Beginning with whether KKMA offers adequate knowledge and skills to produce 
capable military leaders, Table 7.8 shows that only 8.8% of all respondents clearly 
agreed or strongly agreed that this was the case. The combined percentages on the 
other hand indicate that almost two thirds disagreed or strongly disagreed with the 
statement that KKMA provided adequate leadership preparation for cadets; the rest 
(29.3%) somewhat agreed with the statement. The whole sample mean score was 
relatively low (2.47). The t-test applied to the mean showed a statistically significant 
difference (P= . 000(S)) 
between the mean scores of cadets (2.28) and that of teaching 
staff members (2.89), with cadets expressing more criticisms than their teachers. The 
reason for this may be that they were the ones who had recently been at the receiving 
end of leadership training at KKMA. 
The respondents then were asked if the Academy provided a leadership programme 
that was drawn from modem scientific theories and sound analysis of historical 
examples of leadership. Surprisingly, the vast majority of the respondents (65.4%) 
either disagreed or strongly disagreed that this was the case. This was also confin-ned 
by the relatively low whole sample mean of (2.39). However, once again, the t-test 
used to detect significance (P= . 001(S)) 
between goups found a statistically significant 
difference between the mean scores of cadets (2.21), and the teaching staff (2.56), with 
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cadets tending to be more critical of the programme than their instructors. 
The implications of these findings can be considered as serious for KKMA. As Taylor 
(1977: 9) states, leadership is admittedly not an easy subject to teach. Yet, new officers 
would fail in their missions if they did not possess adequate knowledge and skills for 
effective leadership. And since experience is not enough, leadership can and must be 
taught, drawing on modem scientific theories and from sound analysis of historical 
examples of successful and unsuccessful leadership. 
Next, the respondents were asked for their assessment of the practical aspect of the 
leadership programme at KKMA. Table 7.9 shows the results of their perceptions on 
this issue. 
Table 7-9 Respondents' assessment of practical aspects of leadership at KKMA 
(Al-III. Q3-3 to 3-6) 
No. Statement SD D SMA A SA WS SIG. 
% % % % % Fýil L 
KKMA tends to . 
074 
1 overemphasize 9.6 15.1 18.5 29.5 27.4 3.63 3.21 3.50 (NS) 
authontanan methods of 
leadership based on fear 
and obedience 
KKMA offers cadets . 002 
2 ample opportunities to 7.5 63.9 23.8 1.4 2 2.13 2.52 2.3 2 (S) 
hold command positions 
[ 
L 
in various activities 
All officers in contact with . 
146 
3 cadets provide good role 9.7 16.6 30.3 24.8 18.6 3.16 3.47 3.26 (N S) 
model of leadership at 
KKMA 
KKMA provides 002 
4 adequate practical 9.5 62.6 23.8 2.7 .7 
2.10 2.4 7 2.29 (S) 
L-1 experimentation I I 
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Asked whether the Academy tended to overemphasize authoritarian methods of 
leadership based on fear and unquestioning obedience (No-1), over half of the 
respondents (56.9%) agreed or strongly agreed, and 18.5% somewhat agreed that it 
was the case, leaving 24.7% in disagreement with the statement. The whole sample 
mean is moderate to high (3.50). The Mest applied to the mean scores for the two 
groups, cadets (3.63) and teaching staff (3.21), showed no statistically significant 
difference between them (P= . 074 (NS)), indicating high consensus on this point. This 
finding is in contradiction with Atkine (2000: 20), who believes that military academies 
that aim at developing cadets who will be tomorrow's leaders, ought not to use 
outdated, purely authoritarian methods of leadership, based on fear and unquestioned 
obedience from followers because they are inappropriate and counterproductive in 
modem times. 
Next, the respondents were asked if KKMA's leadership preparation programme 
offered cadets ample opportunities to hold command positions in a variety of activities 
(No. 2). A massive 70.8% of them disagreed or strongly disagreed. This is further 
confirmed by the relatively low whole sample mean (2.32). The t-test found 
statistically significant differences between the mean scores of cadets (2.13) and 
teaching staff members (2.52), resulting in (P= . 002 
(S)). This finding is inconsistent 
with many military writers such as Junjua (1994: 74); Dodd (1978: 52); RMC (2001: 
17), who believe that in most military academies in the world cadets are strongly 
encouraged to serve in positions of cadet leadership and to seek responsibility in a 
variety of activities, including sports and extra-curricular activities. For example, most 
make use of the practice of having upperclassmen. They are also offered opportunities 
to hold command positions during summer military training, military and exercises and 
during field training with operational troops. 
Following this, the participants in this study were asked if they agreed that all the 
officers cadets came in contact with provided good role models of leadership 
(No. 3). 
No consensus was found among the respondents surveyed on this issue. Thus, 
43.4% 
agreed or strongly agreed, 30.3% somewhat agreed, and 26.3% disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with the statement. The whole sample mean obtained was moderate (3.26). 
However, the Mest found no statistically significant difference between the two group 
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scores, cadets (3.16) and teaching staff (3.47), with (P= .1 46(NS)). 
During the interviews, Commander A2-C3 admitted that not all officers at KKMA 
provided good role models of leadership. This is inconsistent with research that 
emphasises that leadership development is facilitated by providing exemplary role 
models, because cadets also learn leadership behaviour through observation and 
interaction with officers they come in contact with (RMC 2001: 8; Atkine 2000: 22; 
Gamett 2001: ii; McCoy 1996: 29; Ulman 1990: 29; Thomas 2000: 8). 
Finally, the participants in this study were asked if KIK-MA's leadership programme 
provided adequate practical experimentation with regard to different leadership 
approaches (No. 4). Almost three quarters of all respondents (72.1 %) disagreed or 
strongly disagreed that this was the case. The low overall mean score of (2.29) rules 
out any doubt about the weakness of the programme in this respect. Although the t-test 
found a statistically significant difference between the two group scores, cadets (2.10) 
and teaching staff (2.47) with (P= . 002(S)), both, however, saw it as a weak 
programme. This finding contrasts with the view of (Coska 1985: 2). Subsequently, the 
respondents were asked for their assessment of the quality of the outcomes of the 
leadership programme at KYMA. Their perceptions are shown in Table 7.10 below: 
Table 7-10 Respondents' assessment of KKMA's leadership programme outcome 
(Al-III. Q3-7,8). 
Statement SD D SMA A S. A Lc 1 1 TS WS SIG. 
L 
KKMA cadets feel 
confident and can 8.8 52.4 30.6 6.1 1.4 2.15 2.89 2.38 . 000 
organize and lead men (S) 
dunng times of war and 
peace 
KKMA produces leaders . 001 
who are capable of critical 11.6 50.3 34 2 .7 
2.15 2.58 2.37 (S) 
and creative thinking I I I I IJ 1 U I I 
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First, the survey participants were asked if KKMA's leadership programme produced 
leaders who were confident, and able to organise and lead men in times of both war 
and peace. Following their negative assessment of both the theoretical and practical 
aspects of the leadership programme so far, it was no surprise to find that two thirds 
(65.9%) disagreed or strongly disagreed that KKMA achieved this goal. This is also 
reflected in the relatively low whole sample mean of (2.38). There was however, a 
statistically significant difference between the mean scores of cadets (2.15) and 
teaching staff (2.89), detected by the t-test (P= . 000 (S)), with cadets expressing lower 
confidence in the leadership programme outcome than their teachers. This finding is 
inconsistent with Dodd (1978: 54) and Keller (2001: 17), who state that every cadet 
must learn how to organise confidently and completely and lead men in times of both 
war and peace before graduation. 
Next, the survey participants were asked if KKMA's leadership programme produced 
leaders who were capable of thinking critically and creatively, and who could act 
independently in accordance with the intent of their superiors. Almost two thirds of all 
the respondents (61.9%) disagreed or strongly disagreed that KKMA achieved this 
goal, with a relatively low whole sample mean of (2.37). The Mest indicated a 
difference between the cadets' mean (2.15) and that of the teaching staff (2.58). This 
difference was in emphasis rather than indication opposition since both means were 
relatively low. This finding is inconsistent with the views of military writers such as 
Garnett (2001: vi) and Konig (2001: 5), who maintain that the modem leader must be 
taught not what to think but how to think. In Educating Army Leaders for the 21" 
Century, Dudevoir (2000: 4) stresses that leadership development programmes must 
aim to produce leaders who are capable of thinking critically and creatively, and who 
can act independently in accordance with the intent of their superiors, rather than siting 
and waiting for orders. 
When this issue was raised in the interviews with the KKMA commanders, A2-C I 
admitted: "As a theory creative leadership is okay, but problems arise in 
implementation. The large number of cadets at the Academy does not pen-nit us to 
provide sufficient opportunities for leadership practice and learning its art. We are 
however going to establish a new department for leadership in the Academy soon and, 
170 
hopefully, this will enhance leadership training and creativity in this field" 
On the other hand, A2-C3 pinpointed a number of reasons for the weaknesses of 
KKMA's leadership programme. He considered that lack of planning and 
implementation control were major reasons for its ineffectiveness. KKMA's crowded 
3-year programme does not allow sufficient opportunities to put theory into practice 
and refine it in terms of creativity through experimentation. In contrast, A2-C2 offered 
a different view: "We need to bear in mind that the cadet is going to be a platoon 
leader. I think that the current programme is suitable. Also it is important to remember 
that officer education does not end at the Academy". 
7.3.3 New Elements of Expertise 
Vocational military programmes nowadays include new spheres of expertise, 
particularly management, communication skills, and various other skills related to 
military operations other than war (MOOTW). This section covers the respondents' 
perceptions of the adequacy of KKMA's education and training provision with regard 
to management, communications, and MOOTW. 
7.3.4 Management 
The preparation of professional military officers nowadays includes equipping them 
with at least the basic principles of administration and management so that they can 
contribute to running the affairs of the Military, in times of both peace and war. First 
the respondents were asked for their views on how important it is for cadets to be 
equipped with at least the basic principles of administration and management. Their 
answers are displayed in Table 7.11 below: 
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Table 7-11 Importance of basic principles of administration and management for cadets 
(Al-Ill . Q4). 
[ý: S: 
Of no Of little Somewhat Important Very M S. D SIG 
importance importance important important L 
% % % % % 
3 6 15 30 46 4.10 1.05 I P- 
2.1 4.3 
.3 34 55.3 4.36 
_ 
. 
919 . 
148 
2.7 5.4 J I 11.6 
1 
31.3 49 1.02 
(NS) 
As Table 7.11 shows, there is strong support among the vast majority of both cadets 
and teaching staff for the idea that basic principles of administration and management 
are important or very important, with a total percentage of 80.3% and a high whole 
sample mean of (4.18). When the t-test was used to assess whether the two group 
means, for cadets (4.10) and for teaching staff (4.36) differed significantly, it was 
found that there was no significant difference at the 5% level (P= . 148 (NS)). Clearly, 
both recognised the importance of administration and management. This recognition is 
in agreement with the views of Yardley (1987: 118) and Cvrcek (1991: 145). 
Questioned on this point, A2-C I said "Administration and management skills are not 
just important, they are essential, 95 while A2-C2 said "They are essential; that is why 
we teach military management and personnel management, as well as basic 
organisational management. " 
Next, the respondents were asked for their assessment of the adequacy of 
administration and management skills as provided by KKMA. Table 7.12 summarises 
their views. 
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Table 7-12 Respondents' assessment of administration and management skills at KKNIA 
(Al-I II. Q5). 
Very Poor Reasonably Good Very Mean S. D SIG. L 
poor good good 
0 % % % % 
7 19 46 24 4 2.99 
. 937 
6.4 10.6 57.4 21.3 4.3 3.06 
. 869 
P=. 649 
, 
Fw-s-1 6.8 ] [= [-49.7 I m = = =I 
(N S) 
-1 
As can be seen from the above Table, only (27.2%) of all respondents thought that the 
academy provided good or very good administration and management skills as part of 
its vocational programme. On the other side of the scale, (23.1%) thought that it was 
poor or very poor. Just under half (49.7%) thought that the Academy was doing 
reasonably well in this respect. The moderate sample mean score of (3.01) confirmed 
that the Academy needs to give more attention to its teaching of administration and 
management skills. Consensus between the two groups of respondents was evident 
when the Mest was used to detect differences between the means for the cadets (2.99) 
and for the teaching staff (3.06), no significant difference was found at the 5% level 
(P= . 649 (NS)). This indicates that both cadets and teaching staff were 
in agreement on 
this issue. 
All three commanders interviewed also confirmed these results. A2-C I stated: "The 
reasons why I am not totally satisfied with the quality of administration and 
management skills provided at KKMA is because we don't have a separate department 
for teaching these subjects. Fortunately, we are going to have one soon". 
A2-C2 added, "KKMA's basic administration and management programmes are 
sound, theoretically. However, due to time limitations and cadet numbers, we are 
unable to offer sufficient knowledge and practice in this regard". A2-C3 expressed his 
dissatisfaction by saying: "We are currently not giving our cadets the opportunity to 
practise how to manage their time, their troops, their organisation and their resources. 
You can only do so much in three years". 
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Whether in the role of manager or leader, the officer needs good communication skills 
to interact at all levels. The assessment of this programme aspect is discussed next. 
7.3.5 Communication Skills 
Developing good communication skills is an essential part of the preparation of the 
modem military officer. This is not new; the Military has always been aware of the 
importance of good communication for combat effectiveness and for survival. Thus, 
the respondents were asked how well communication skills were taught at KKMA. 
Their answers are summarized in Table 7.13 below. 
Table 7-13 Respondents' assessment of communication skills at KKMA 
(Al-III. Q6). 
Very Poor Reasonably Good Very m S. D SIG. L 
poor good good 
10 ON % I% I% I I I 
24.2 28.3 6.1 
10.6 38.3 P=. 882 
[! 9 19.9 ] = I 31.5 j [= 1 4.1 [= []E I 
(N S) 
I 
Table 7.13 shows that almost half of respondents (48.7%) thought that the Academy 
provided poor or very poor communication skills in its vocational programme. Only 
one fifth of them (19.9%) thought that this aspect was good or very good. Finally, a 
third (31.5%) thought that it was reasonably good. The low to moderate whole sample 
mean score of (2.55) confirmed the weaknesses of communication skills training at 
KKMA. When the t-test was used to assess whether the two group means, for cadets 
(2.54) and for teaching staff (2.57) differed significantly, it was found that there was 
no significant difference at the 5% level (P= . 882 
(NS)). This agreement between the 
two groups indicates that communication skills training at KKMA needs to be 
improved. This finding is inconsistent with Downey (1977: 177), who says that good 
communication enables intentions and plans to be well understood, encouragement and 
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genuine concern for individuals to be conveyed, and morale to be lifted. It is also 
inconsistent with Yardley (1987: 114), who says that Sandhurst (UK) recognizes the 
importance of good communication and has for some years now had a separate 
communications department which is responsible for the development of cadets' 
communication skills, particularly training in face-to-face interviewing, briefings, 
presentations etc. 
Confirming the finding of the questionnaire, all three commanders interviewed agreed 
that the Academy was not doing well in its provision of communication skills. They 
attributed this to the lack of time, shortage of equipment, and lack of specialist 
instructors in this field. 
7.3.3.3 MOOTW Training 
The Military are no longer limited to fighting conventional wars against conventional 
enemies. They are frequently expected to conduct military operations other than war 
(MOOTW), such as pursuing terrorists and drug war lords, providing humanitarian 
relief, containing regional conflicts, peace keeping/making etc. All military academies 
see it as their duty to equip future officers with the appropriate knowledge and skills to 
cope with this new mix of roles and commitments. Respondent were asked if KKMA's 
vocational programme adequately equipped aspiring officers with these roles. Their 
views are summarised in table 7.14 below: 
Table 7-14 Respondents' perception of the quality of MOOTW training at KKMA 
(Al-I I. Q7). 
c 
TS 
ws 
Very Poor Reasonably Good Very Mean S. D SIG. L 
poor good good 
% % % % % 
36 17 26 13 8 2.40 1.31 P=. 710 
27.7 23.4 40.4 [-6-. 4-] l 2.1 
33.3 19 30.6 10.9 .1 
2.3 7 1.22 
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As can be seen from Table 7.14,52.3% of all respondents surveyed rated KKMA's 
quality of MOOTW training as poor or very poor, 30.6% as reasonably good, and only 
17% as good or very good. The whole sample mean was relatively low (2.37). The t- 
test was used to assess whether the two group means for cadets (2.40) and for teaching 
staff (2.37) differed significantly. It was found that there was no significant difference 
at the 5% level (P= . 710 (NS)). This agreement between the respondents indicates that 
the academy must reconsider its programme to ensure that it remains updated with 
current concepts of MOOTW training. Kelley (1996: 107) maintains that professional 
military education and training must give officers of the future the confidence they 
need to perform in new operating environments. 
Questioned on this point, A2-C I stated: "We train for security during protests and the 
road safety. We sometimes participate in security during Haj (annual pilgrimage to 
Mecca) and we also train our cadets in how to fight in buildings and cities". A2-C2 
added: "Our programme considers training for war against smuggling. We practise 
some of our exercises in difficult topography and in difficult seasons such as summer 
and winter ". A2-C3 supported the survey findings: "We are doing well in security 
training but I also think that there is a need for MOOTW training at KKMA, 
particularly training for relief and humanitarian operations". 
7.3.6 Balance Between Theory and Practice and the Learning 
Environment 
An effective vocational programme must strike the right balance between theory and 
practice. It must encourage experimentation, provide constant feedback and reflection 
and build cadets' confidence in their growing theoretical and practical expertise in all 
aspects of this component. It also needs an encouraging learning environment. Failing 
to provide a learning climate that aims for and demonstrates commitment to high 
standards of expertise will inevitably lead to a professional development that falls short 
of ever achieving excellence. The respondents were asked first to assess to what extent 
KKMA offered an adequate balance between theory and practice in its vocational 
programme (military skills, knowledge, leadership, management, communication 
skills, and MOOTW). Table 7.15 displays the results 
for this question. 
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Table 7-15 Respondents' perceptions on whether KKMA's vocational programme is balanced 
(A1-III. Q8). 
Not Poorly Reasonably Balanced Well m S. D SIG. L 
balanced balanced balanced balanced 
at all 
6 12 42 28 12 3.28 1 1.02 P=. 713 
1 10.6 J Eý ý44.7- 44.7 3.34 (N S) 
4.1 11.6 I 42 9 
__] 
33.3 L- I 8.2 L 
.9 
ý41 
Close examination of Table 7.15 shows that overall, there was no overwhelming 
agreement among the respondents that K-KMA offered an adequately balanced 
vocational programme. Indeed, under half of them in total (41.5%) perceived it as 
balanced or well balanced. Almost the same proportion (42.9%) perceived it as 
reasonably balanced, the rest (15.7%) perceived it as poorly balanced or not balanced 
at all. The moderate overall mean for the whole sample (3.29) removes doubts about 
the dominance of scepticism towards the effectiveness of KKMA in offering an 
adequately balanced vocational programme. A final look at Table 7.15 reveals that the 
t-test detected no statistically significant differences between the means for the two 
groups, cadets and teaching staff with regard to this issue (P= . 713 (NS)). These results 
can only be seen as a call for KKMA to strike the right balance in its vocational 
programme. 
A2-C3 had this to say about the issue of balance in KKMA's vocational programme: 
"There is too much theory and too little practice. There are some theoretical subjects 
beyond the cadets' tactical level. We could reduce the theoretical aspects in favour of 
more time spent on the practical aspects of leadership for example. In order to meet the 
challenges of the 21" century, I think we need to improve the balance of our vocational 
programme and we also need to improve our field and training provisions". 
Next, the respondents were asked to what extent they thought that the leaming 
environment at KKMA was conducive to the development of a 
high level of 
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professional military expertise in its future leaders. The results are displayed In Table 
7.16 below. 
Table 7-16 Respondents' perceptions of the learning environment at KKMA 
(Al . III. Q9). 
Not A little Reasonably Very Mean S. D SIG. L 
helpful helpful helpful Helpful helpful 
at a 
4 41 25 10 P=. 319 
1 2.1 1 1 14.9 1 136.2 -ý 1 6.4 1 (NS) 
Ltl l 3.4 18.4 1 1 39.5 1 = 1 8.8 1 [n 
As can be seen from Table 7.16,38.7% of all the respondents believed that the 
learning environment at K-KMA was helpful or very helpful, 21.8% as a little helpful 
or not helpful at all, and 39.5% as reasonably helpful. This is also reflected in the 
lukewarm whole sample mean of (3.22). Furthennore, a statistically significant 
difference between the mean scores of cadets (3.17) and teaching staff (3.34) was 
detected by the t-test (P=. 319 (NS)). Subsequently, the respondents' overall 
assessment of KKMA's vocational programme was requested. Thus, they were asked 
to indicate the extent to which they were generally satisfied with the vocational 
programme at KKMA. Table 7.17 gives the results of their responses 
Table 7-17 Respondents' overall satisfaction with KKMA's vocational programme 
(A1-1II. Q1O). 
c 
TS 
ws 
Very 
dissatisfied 
% 
Dissatisfied 
% 
Somewhat 
Satisfied 
% 
Satisfied 
% 
Very 
satisfied 
% 
Mean S. D 
L 
SIG. L 
8 13 37 33 9 3. 1.05 P=. 350 
2.1 8.5 8 44.7 1 38.3 1 6.4 3.38 . 822 
(NS) 
jr 6-1 11.6 F 3-9. ; 4.7 8.2 3.27 1 . 983 
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Asked to give their concluding assessment of the vocational programme at KKMA in 
terms of overall satisfaction or dissatisfaction, 42.9% of the respondents stated that 
they were either satisfied or very satisfied, 39.5% sat on the fence (somewhat 
satisfied), 17.7% were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. As reactions were 
generally moderate on this issue so far, it was no surprise to find that the overall mean 
was lukewarm (3-27). No statistically significant difference between the mean scores 
of cadets (3.22) and teaching staff (3.38) was detected by the Mest (P= . 350 (NS)), 
which indicates a similarity of views between them. 
Speaking about the vocational programme as a whole, A2-C I stated: I believe our 
vocational programme is essentially sound. However, we do need to review it more 
often and update it to keep up with the advances in military weapons and technology". 
A2-C2 also expressed his support for the vocational programme in these terms: "I am 
satisfied that KKMA's vocational programme is well-balanced and covers all the 
requirements for new officers". However, A2-C3 expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
vocational programme for both qualitative and quantitative reasons: "Some subjects 
are beyond the cadets' level of understanding and should be taught at a higher level 
and not at the Academy. We also need to review our programmes and make them more 
relevant. More importantly, we need to redress the balance between theory and 
practice for all military subjects, particularly leadership training. " 
7.4 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter consists of two broad parts. In the first half, the main outline of the 
cadets' vocational programme was described, beginning with the aims and structure of 
the vocational programme, how it was conducted and how the subjects were 
distributed throughout the three years officer preparation at KKMA. 
Documents analysis revealed that KKMA provides a wide variety of subjects in its 
vocational programme, which represents two thirds of its whole curriculum. However, 
the Academy seems to concentrate on basic military skills, devoting almost half of its 
vocational programme to them (670 hours). The Academy also pays great attention to 
military knowledge, allocating 406 hours to it, while 
leadership is allocated only 77 
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hours. Management and communication skills are allocated 88 and 25 hours 
respectively. Regarding MOOTW subjects, the Academy only teaches internal 
security (40 hours). Over the three officer preparation years, the theory versus practice 
proportion is 1114 hours/ 342 hours, an enormous imbalance in favour of theory. 
The second part of this chapter presented a detailed analysis of both survey and 
interview findings related to the vocational programme. The presentation began with 
an examination of the respondents' views on the importance of the vocational 
programme to officership and found that 95% of both cadets and teaching staff 
members agreed on the importance of this programme to any military academy. (Table 
7.5). The commanders interviewed concluded that vocational education was not only 
central to the main mission of the Academy, but was also essential for developing 
leadership roles. 
Next, a general assessment of the elements of KKMA's vocational programme 
including basic military skills, military knowledge and leadership was conducted. 
Starting with the basic military skills at KKMA, the results showed that a large 
majority of respondents consistently judged that the Academy provided a high 
standard in all military skills, that is drill and parades, infantry training, and shooting. 
This was not surprising due to the large number of hours devoted to basic military 
skills (670 hours). 
Following this, an assessment of military knowledge at KKMA was elicited. It showed 
that almost two thirds of all respondents (65.3%) agreed that KKMA offered a high 
level of tactical military expertise, but when the respondents were asked if the 
Academy provided a high level of technical military expertise, there was no 
overwhelming agreement between them. (Table 7.7). This indicates the need for a 
balanced programme both tactically and technically. 
The most salient findings in this chapter were that the majority of respondents who 
took part in this study believed that KKMA was not providing adequate knowledge 
and skills to produce capable military leaders, particularly with regard to the 
leadership 
programme which, was not deemed to be sufficiently drawn 
from modem scientific 
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theories and sound analysis of historical examples of leadership. The respondents' 
assessment of the practical aspect of leadership at KKMA also showed that the 
programme overemphasised authoritarian methods of leadership based on fear and 
unquestioning obedience and did not offer cadets ample opportunities to hold 
command positions in a variety of activities. Critically, no overwhelming agreement 
was obtained among the respondents on whether all the officers cadets came in contact 
with provided good role models of leadership. Moreover, when they were asked if the 
programme provided adequate practical experimentation opportunities with regard to 
different leadership approaches, almost three quarters (72.1 %) said no. (Table 7.9). 
Again, the respondents' views on the outcome of the leadership programme at KKMA 
showed that they thought that it did not produce leaders who were confident and able 
to organise and lead men in times of both war and peace. Nor did they think that it 
produced leaders capable of thinking critically and creatively, and who could act 
independently in accordance with the intent of their superiors. All three commanders 
interviewed admitted that KKMA's leadership programme did not provide cadets with 
sufficient opportunity to practise leadership and learn its art due to the large number of 
cadets enrolled each year, the lack of a separate department for leadership training and 
the tight three-year preparation programme. 
Subsequently, new elements of expertise including management, communication 
skills, and MOOTW were assessed for their adequacy at KKMA. All participants 
agreed on the importance of management courses and their value in equipping them 
with at least the basic principles of administration and management operations. 
However, they thought that this was not well provided at KKMA. All three 
commanders interviewed also thought that the Academy needed to update its 
management courses both theoretically and practically. Moreover, almost half of all 
respondents (48.7%) thought that the Academy's provision of communication skills 
was poor or very poor. All three commanders interviewed also agreed that the 
Academy was not doing well in communication skills training. Another significant 
finding was that 52.3% of all respondents surveyed rated KKMA's MOOTW training 
as poor or very poor ,a view supported 
by A2-C3, who thought that there was a need 
for more training on MOOTW, particularly training 
for relief and humanitarian 
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operations. (Tables 7.13,14,15). 
On the balance between theory and practice in KKMA's vocational programme, no 
overwhelming agreement was found. However, A2-C3 pointed out that there was too 
much theory and too little practice and that there were some theoretical subjects 
beyond the cadets' tactical level. Furthermore the respondents believed that the 
learning environment at KKMA was not conducive to the development of a high level 
of professional military expertise in its future leaders. 
The respondents' concluding assessment of the vocational programme at KKMA in 
terms of overall satisfaction or dissatisfaction showed generally moderate levels of 
satisfaction. Two commanders expressed satisfaction with it, while the third expressed 
his dissatisfaction. 
Finally, it is to be noted with interest that out of 19 questions on the vocational 
programme put to both cadets and teaching staff members, the t-test used to detect 
differences between the two group scores found no statistically significant differences 
in 15 cases, and discrepancies in 4 cases only. However, the differences were in all 
cases a matter of emphasis, rather than substance. In other words, the two groups did 
not generally hold opposite views, only stronger or weaker views than one another in 
certain cases. 
The following chapter will present and analyse the field study results for the fourth 
component, "Liberal education". 
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Chapter Eight 
Findings Related to KKMA's Liberal Education 
programme 
8.1 Introduction 
The present chapter presents and interprets the findings regarding the liberal education 
programme. The first half of this chapter, based on the analysis of documentary 
evidence, outlines the aims and structure of the liberal education programme at KKMA 
and the distribution of the subjects throughout the three years. The second half gives 
and interprets the quantitative and qualitative results of the survey and the input from 
the interviewed commanders interviewed on a number of issues relevant to the 
discussion. 
8.2 Liberal Education Programme at KKMA: Aims and Structure 
KKMA's liberal education programme aims to provide cadets with a broad range of 
knowledge of the human and natural sciences in order to broaden their minds and 
enable them to interact with both the military and civilian communities in the future 
(KKMA Guide 1999: 38). The programme is not intended to specialise the cadets in 
any particular field; it is intended to extend their knowledge and give them foundation 
knowledge in the sciences (General Programme Outline 2000: 1). KKMA's liberal 
education programme consists of 16 subjects, totalling 857 course hours distributed 
over three years. The Academy offers this programme in two civilian departments. The 
first is the Human Sciences Department, which states its mission as follows: "to 
strengthen cadets' religious and intellectual capacities through a programme of natural 
sciences and teachings of Islam". The programme aims to connect them with their 
world geographically, legally, administratively and economically. In addition, it gives 
the cadets a sound knowledge of history. The department also teaches English 
language because of its importance to the officer of the 21st century (Academy 
Education Guide 2001: 12). It is responsible for teaching 10 subjects, which are listed 
in Table 8.1 below. The second department is the Sciences Department, which is 
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responsible for providing cadets with the foundations of a variety of science subjects 
such as mathematics, computer studies, geology, biology, chemistry, and physics. 
Table 8.1 below shows the distribution of the liberal education course subjects at 
KKMA. 
Table 8-1 Distribution of Liberal Education programme modules at KKMA 
Area of liberal 
education 
programme 
Subjects Total hours 
Holy Qur'dn 70 
H m i 
Islamic studies 72 u an sc ences Arabic language 33 
English 80 
(517 hours) History 38 
Geography 37 
International law 27 
Public administration 54 
Psychology 54 
Economics 26 
Chemistry 81 
O h i Mathematics 
81 
t er sc ences Physics 81 
Geology 28 
(340 hours) Biology 28 
Computer studies 41 
Total 16 857 
8.2.1 First Year Programme 
In the first year the liberal education programme mainly covers human science 
subjects, such as Qur'dn, Islamic studies, Arabic language, History, Geography and 
English. In addition to these subjects, Mathematics is introduced in the second 
semester. Bearing in mind that it is during the first year that most of the indoctrination 
programme is implemented, for this reason the liberal education programme is 
deliberately not very substantial. Table 8.2 below displays the liberal education 
subjects that are taught in the first preparation year at KKMA. 
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Table 8-2 First-year liberal education programme at KKMA 
Area of 
liberal 
education 
Subjects Semester I Semester 2 Total 
Qur'dn 20 20 
Islamic studies 20 26 46 
Human English 26 26 
sciences r Arabic Language 20 13 33 
(160 hours) i st History II II 
Geography 11 13 24 
Other sciences 
(39 hours) Mathematics 39 39 
Total 7 82 117 199-1 
8.2.2 Second Year Programme 
This is the year where cadets take most subjects of liberal education, with nine subjects 
totaling 377 hours. Science subjects receive more attention here with 232 hours in 
subjects such as Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry and Geology. Table 8.3 below gives 
the details of all the liberal education subjects taught in the second year. 
Table 8-3 Second-year liberal education programme at KKMA 
Area of 
liberal 
education 
Subjects Semester I Semester 2 Total 
Qur'dn 24 24 
Intemational law 14 13 27 
Human English 28 26 54 
sciences History 14 13 27 
(145 hours) Geography 13 13 
Other sciences Mathematics 42 42 
(232 hours) Physics 42 39 81 
Chemistry 42 39 81 
Geology 28 28 
Total 9 210 167 377 
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8.2.3 Third-Year Programme 
During this year, seven liberal education subjects are taught, five of them in the human 
sciences and the other two in other sciences. Also, during this year public 
Administration, Economics and Psychology are introduced to cadets because they go 
in parallel with leadership education and training. In addition, Computer Studies are 
also offered during this year. Table 8.4 below gives details of all the liberal education 
subjects taught in the third year. 
Table 8-4 Third-year liberal education programme at KKMA 
Area of 
liberal 
education 
Subjects Semester 1 Semester 2 Total 
Qur'dn 26 26 
Islamic study 26 26 
Human Economics 26 26 
sciences 
(186 hours) 
Public 
Administration 
28 26 54 
Psychology 28 26 54 
Other sciences Biology 28 26 54 
(95 hours) Computer Studies 28 13 41 
Total 7 112 169 281 
8.3 Main Survey and Interview Findings 
The previous section covered "How is the liberal education programme done at 
KKMAT'. What follows now relates "How well is it being done? ", that is the 
evaluation of the liberal education programme through the perceptions of the 
participants. 
8.3.1 Importance of Liberal Education for Cadets 
Apart from the need for a solid grounding in professional military knowledge and 
skills, most academy officer preparation programmes in the world recognise the 
importance and value of liberal education in the overall professional 
development of 
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aspiring officers. Most military educators see it as a requirement and a necessi and 
consider that it plays an increasingly vital role in equipping current and future leaders 
with the knowledge and attitudes they need to meet the challenges of the modem world 
and have a successful military career. The respondents were asked for their views on 
the importance of liberal education at KKMA. The results are shown in Table 8.5 
below. 
Table 8-5 Respondents' perceptions of the importance of liberal education 
(AI-IV. Ql) 
Of no Of little Somewhat Important Very M S. D SIG. 
importance importance important important L 
%J 0/ I 0 % % % 
15.2 36.4 17.2 11.1 20.2 2.48 1.37 P=. 
005 
2.1 19.1 27.7 27.7 23.4 3.51 (S) 
IS] 11 30.8 20.5 16.4 21.2 
As Table 8.5 shows, 51.6% of the cadets see liberal education as of little or no 
importance with a relatively low mean of (2.48), whereas 5 1.1% of their teachers see 
it as important or very important with a relatively high mean of (3.5 1). When the t-test 
was used to assess whether the two group means, for cadets and for teaching staff 
differed significantly, it was found that the difference was significant at the 5% level 
(P= 
. 005 
(S)). This is consistent with Harris's (1991: 4) argument that many cadets are 
surprised at the number of general education classes they must take in order to 
graduate. They wonder why they have to take subjects that have apparently no link 
with their chosen professional career. Subjects such as history, literature, philosophy, 
music, art, etc. are generally not perceived as being directly helpful in training them for 
the military profession. 
However, the three Commanders interviewed for this research took the opposite view. 
A2-C I stated: "Liberal education is important because it is complementary to the 
preparation of the officer". A2-C2 added: "It is important because it provides cadets 
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with general knowledge and improves their intellectual abilities". A2-C3 shared 
similar views but with the proviso that some attention must be paid to the issue of 
relevance in the choice of subjects and their delivery. 
8.3.2 Assessment of Five Key Features of Liberal Education at KKMA 
The purpose behind the next five questions related to this component in the 
questionnaire was to determine the participants' perceptions and evaluations of general 
features of liberal education at KKMA. Table 8.6 summarises the results for the five 
items in question. 
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Table 8-6 Respondents' perceptions of five key features of KKMA's liberal education 
(Al-IV. Q2-lto2-5). 
No. Statement SD D SMA A SA C TS F SIG. L 
% % % % % MI M 
KK-N4A offers a broad 
coverage of branches of 6.8 15.6 29.3 36.7 11.6 3.21 3.51 3.30 . 117 
knowledge (NS) 
Offers a rich variety of 
2 interesting and valuable 
E12 
2 
E6.5 
30.6 23.1 9.5 2.95 2.95 2.95 . 971 
(NS) 
courses 
Overall contents of 
3 general education 23.8 19 32 % 19 6.1 2.58 2.78 2.64 . 334 
(NS) 
programme is 
equivalent to university 
courses 
Offers a good 
4 understanding of 29.5 18.5 28.8 15.8 7.5 2.36 2.89 2.53 . 018 
(S) 
current technology and 
its impact 
Offers a solid 
5 foundation in computer 35.4 21.1 17.7 
12.9 12.9 2.21 
E 
3.02 2.46 . 001 
(S) L-j literacy L-J LJ L-J L- L-J L-J L- l 
Asked whether KKMA's liberal education programme offered a broad coverage of the 
major branches of learning (No. 1), 48.3% agreed or strongly agreed, and 29.3% 
somewhat agreed, leaving only 22.4% strongly disagreeing or disagreeing. The whole 
sample mean was lukewarm (3.30), which means that there was uncertainty among the 
respondents on this issue. The absence of a statistically significant difference between 
cadets and teaching staff members (P = . 117 
(NS)) also indicates that both groups of 
respondents had some reservations about the programme. 
Next, the respondents were asked if KKMA offered a rich variety of Interesting and 
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valuable courses in its liberal education programme (No. 2). Almost a third of them 
(32.6%) strongly agreed or agreed, the other third (30.6%) were uncertain and 36.7% 
disagreed or strongly disagreed. The whole sample mean is a low to moderate (2.95). 
Interestingly, all means were identical, which means that there was full consensus 
among the participants on this question. This finding indicates that there is still room 
for improvement for KKMA to introduce a rich variety of interesting and valuable 
courses in its liberal programme as been emphasised by many writers in military 
literature such as Simons: (1965: 8-18), Shafer and Putnam (1998: 169), Dudevoir 
(2000: 14), and Snider (1985: 4). 
Following this, the participants in this study were asked if KKMA offered a liberal 
education programme that was equivalent to civilian programmes of the same level in 
terms of standards (No. 3). Perhaps not surprisingly, almost half of all respondents 
strongly disagreed or disagreed (42.8%), as opposed to 25.1 % who strongly agreed or 
agreed with the proposition, leaving just over a third of them (32%) uncertain. The 
whole sample mean obtained was a low to moderate (2.64). The t-test found no 
statistically significant difference between the two groups on this occasion (P= . 334 
(NS)). This indicates that both staff members and cadets think that the Academy needs 
to raise the level of its liberal education programme in order to bring it to a university 
standard. 
Next, the participants in this study were asked if KKMA offered a liberal education 
programme that gave cadets a good understanding of current technology and its impact 
(No. 4). Almost half of all the survey participants (48%) strongly disagreed or 
disagreed and at the opposite end of the scale, just 23.3% strongly agreed or agreed 
with the statement leaving almost a third of them (28.8%) uncertain (somewhat 
agreed). The whole sample mean obtained was also low (2.53). The t-test, however, 
found a statistically significant difference between the two group scores, cadets (2.36) 
and teaching staff (2.89), with (P= . 
018(S)). Clearly the difference is in emphasis 
rather than indicating opposition. This indicates that both staff members and cadets 
agree that KKMA needs to give more attention to current technology subjects and their 
impact in its liberal education programme. 
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Finally, the participants in this study were invited to state whether KKMA offered a 
solid foundation in computer literacy in its liberal education programme (No. 5). The 
majority of all respondents (56.5%) strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement, 
while 17.7% were uncertain (somewhat ageed), and a quarter of them (25.8%) 
strongly agreed or agreed that this was the case. The whole sample mean obtained was 
a relatively low (2.46). The t-test used to assess the difference between cadets' and 
teaching staff s means scores (2.21) and (3.02) respectively revealed a significant 
difference (P= . 001(S)), with cadets seeing the need for improvement even more than 
their teachers. This is further confirmed by A2-C3, who stressed that the Academy 
needed to allocate more hours to information technology in its liberal education 
programme in order to meet the challenges of the 21st century. A2-C3 added that the 
nature of battle was changing and computers were playing an increasingly vital role in 
military affairs, hence the need for greater mastery of IT skills. 
8.3.3 Liberal Education Programme Effectiveness in Teaching Reasoning 
Skills and Intellectual Habits 
Part of liberal education is to offer cadets tuition in reasoning skills and healthy 
intellectual habits. These, it was argued in the literature survey, are vital elements in 
the preparation of young officers; they enable them to make sound judgements, 
sharpen their vision and think for themselves when required to make decisions as 
leaders. The opinions and views of the respondents are summarized in Table 8.7 
below. 
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Table 8-7 Perceptions of effectiveness of KKMA liberal education programme in eight selected 
areas (Al-IV. Q3-Ito3-8). 
No. Statement SD SMA A SA C TS WS SIG. 
% % % M M M L 
KKMA's liberal 
I education 4.8 13.6 38.1% 30.6 12.9 3.33 3.34 3.33 . 954 
programme teaches (NS) 
cadets how to think 
for themselves and 
form their own 
measured judgments 
How to follow 
2 structured scientific 2.7 17.8 38.4% 32.2 8.9 3.27 3.25 3.26 . 918 
procedure and arrive (N S) 
at sensible 
conclusions 
How to think clearly 
3 and logically, how 5.4 16.3 36.1 34.7 7.5 3.25 3.17 3.22 . 651 
to organize (NS) 
thoughts, and how 
to distinguish 
between the 
important and the 
trivial 
How to reason 
4 critically, unafraid 11 17.1 33.6 26.7 11.6 3.07 3.19 3.10 . 558 
of expressing (NS) 
I disagreement 
-J 
i I I 
Good . 936 
5 communication 9.5 20.4 33.3 
E1 
24.5 12.2 3.09 3.10 3.09 (NS) 
skills in speech and 
I writing 1 1 L1 11 1 1 
Appropriateness of 
6 objective and 5.5 23.3 37 25.3 8.9 3.09 3.08 3.08 . 975 
subjective (N S) 
evaluation 
7 
Insights into human 
nature and 9.6 17.1 36.3 28.8 8.2 3.05 3.17 3.08 . 534 
[ 
motivation 
ýýN S) 
Broaden cadets' 
8 min sand develop 11.6 15 38.1 26.5 8.8 3.00 3.19 3.06 . 332 
intellectual curiosity_ 
_ 
(S) 
A close examination of Table 8.7 shows that when the respondents to the survey were 
asked whether they were taught to think for themselves and form their own measured 
judgments (No. 1), 43.5% strongly agreed or agreed, while 38.1% somewhat agreed, 
leaving only 18.4% strongly disagreeing or disagreeing with this statement. The whole 
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sample mean was moderate (3.33), which means that both cadets and staff were 
uncertain about the effectiveness of the liberal education programme in instilling these 
skills. 
When the respondents were asked whether they were taught to follow structured 
scientific procedures and arrive at sensible conclusions (No. 2), more than a third of 
them (4 1.1 %) strongly agreed or agreed, 3 8.4% somewhat agreed and 2 0.5 % di sagreed 
or strongly disagreed. The whole sample means is a moderate 3.26, indicating 
respondents' uncertainty on KKMA's effectiveness on this subject. 
Following this, the participants in this study were asked if KKMA offered a liberal 
education programme which allowed cadets to think, organise thoughts, and 
distinguish between the important and the trivial (No. 3). Again, 42.2% of the 
respondents strongly agreed or agreed, 36.1%, strongly disagreed or disagreed, and 
21.7% were unsure. The whole sample mean obtained was also moderate (3.22). The 
results show consistent uncertainty about the effectiveness of the liberal education 
programme in teaching reasoning skills. 
Next, the participants were asked if KKMA offered a liberal education programme that 
taught cadets how to reason critically and be unafraid of expressing disagreement 
(No. 4). More than a third of all survey respondents (38.3%) either strongly agreed or 
agreed, a third (33.6%) somewhat agreed and under a third (28.1%) strongly disagreed 
or disagreed with the statement. The whole sample mean was again moderate (3.10) 
which reflects reservations on KKMA's performance in this regard. 
Continuing the investigation, the participants were asked to give their views on 
whether KKMA offered good communication skills in speech and writing in its liberal 
education programme (No. 5). Here again, a third of all respondents (36.7%) strongly 
agreed or agreed with the statement, a third (33.3%) were uncertain (somewhat 
agreed), and just under a third of them (29.9%) strongly disagreed or disagreed. The 
moderate whole sample mean obtained (3.09) once again indicates that there was 
uncertainty among the survey respondents about KKMA's effectiveness in delivering 
these skills in its liberal education programme. 
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The survey participants were then asked whether KKMA taught them the 
appropriateness of objective and subjective evaluations (No. 6). Again, 34.2% strongly 
agreed or agreed, 37% were uncertain, and 28.8% strongly disagreed or disagreed that 
KKMA taught them such skills. The moderate whole sample mean value (3.08) 
indicates uncertainty about the effectiveness of KKMA's liberal education programme 
in this respect, too. 
When the survey participants were asked if KKMA taught them insights into human 
nature and motivation (No. 7), a third of them (37.0 %) strongly agreed or agreed, 
another third of them (36.3%) were uncertain (somewhat agreed) and the remaining 
26.7% strongly disagreed or disagreed. The mean for the whole sample was once again 
moderate (3.08). 
Finally, the survey participants were asked to give their views on whether KKMA's 
liberal education programme helped broaden cadets' minds and encouraged their 
intellectual curiosity (No. 8). Here, the results show that more respondents were 
uncertain (38.1%) than strongly agreed or agreed (35.3%), leaving 26.6% of them 
strongly disagreeing or disagreeing. The whole sample mean was also a lukewarm 
(3.06). 
Interestingly, for all the variables just analysed, responses were the object of consensus 
among cadets and teaching staff members, since the Mest applied to their group mean 
scores produced no statistically significant differences. 
8.3.4 Perceptions of Effectiveness of KKMA's Liberal Education 
Programme in Instilling Moral-ethical Principles, Wisdom and 
Self-knowledge 
A good officer preparation programme, according to Vitas (1999: 7) encourages value 
fori-nation and strengthens qualities of integrity, discipline, honour, duty, justice and 
the like, instilled by patient and sensitive teachers. Almost all of these qualities can be 
acquired as a result, or even be the subject, of liberal arts classes. 
Continuing the 
evaluation of KKMA's liberal education programme, the survey participants were next 
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questioned on the extent to which KY. -MA's general education progarnme was used as 
a vehicle to emphasise attitudes, values, and other character traits. 
The results are presented in Table 8.8. 
Table 8-8 Perceptions' of extent to which KKMA's liberal education programme stimulates eight 
character traits (Al-VI. Q4-lto4-8). 
No. Statement SD D SMA A SA CI TS WS II SIG. 
% % % % % - L 
KKMA's liberal 
I education programme 5.4 7.5 28.6 42.2 16.3 3.49 3.72 3.56 . 200 
emphasises the moral (NS) 
ethical aspect and 
implications of 
behaviour 
Prepares and motivates 
2 cadets' for future 4.8 11.6 26 43.2 14.4 3.44 3.63 3.50 . 291 
I I 
learning 
I (NS) 
Inculcates respect for 
3 the views and rights of 4.8 12.2 29.9 35.4 17.7 3.47 3.53 3.48 . 744 
ot ers to erance and (N S) 
sensitivity 
Enhances their sense 
4 of responsibility to 4.8 10.3 32.4 35.9 16.6 3.47 3.52 3.48 . 801 
society L (NS) 
Improves 
5 understanding of 6.8 13 30.1 39.7 10.3 3.26 3.48 3.33 . 225 
peop e and the world (NS) 
they live in 
Develops integrity, 
6 honesty and good 7.5 16.3 27.2 33.3 15.6 3.23 3.55 3.33 . 112 
citizenship I I 
(NS) 
Raises awareness of 
7 one's own strength and 8.8 17.7 26.5 31.3 15.6 3.26 3.29 3.27 . 
857 
weakness I I 
(N S) 
8 Develops wisdom 9.7 16.6 30.3 30.3 13.1 3.17 3.27 3.20 . 
618 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
(S) 
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As shown in Table 8.8, more than half of both cadets and teaching staff members 
strongly agreed or agreed that KKMA used liberal education to emphasise the moral- 
ethical aspect and implications of behaviour (No. 1), with a total percentage of 58.5%, 
leaving only 28.6% on the fence and 12.9% strongly disagreeing or disagreeing that 
this was the case. The whole sample mean proved to be relatively high (3.56), 
indicating a positive consensus on this issue. 
Questioned on the extent to which the Academy prepared and motivated cadets for 
future learning (No. 2), 57.6% of all survey respondents either strongly agreed or 
agreed that KKMA did this. The whole sample mean was also moderate (3.50). 
Next, the respondents' views on the extent to which KKMA inculcated respect for the 
opinions, rights, tolerance and sensitivity to others were sought (No. 3). Here 5 3.1 % of 
them agreed or strongly agreed that it did, whereas 29.9% of them somewhat agreed, 
leaving 17.0% disagreeing or strongly disagreeing. The whole sample mean was 
moderate (3.48). 
The respondents were then questioned on the extent to which KKMA's liberal 
education programme enhanced their sense of responsibility towards society (No. 4). 
Here 52.5% of all respondents strongly agreed or agreed, 32.4% were unsure, and 
15.1 % strongly disagreed or disagreed that this was the case. The whole sample mean 
score, however, remained relatively high (3.48). 
KKMA can take some comfort in the fact that the clear majority of its recently 
educated and trained officers tended to believe that its liberal education programme 
enhanced their sense of responsibility towards society, rather than allowing them to 
become mere trained killers (Vitas 1999: 49; Dingham 1998: 157) (No. 5). However, 
some explanations are needed to account for the opinions of those who took a different 
view, an issue that will be returned to in the discussion chapter. 
Pursuing further questions in this area, the survey participants were asked about the 
extent to which KKMA's liberal education programme improved their understanding 
of people and the world they lived in (No-6). On this, 50.0% of them strongly agreed 
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or agreed, 30.1% were uncertain and 19.8% disagreed or strongly disagreed that it did 
so. The whole sample mean score was a moderate 3.33. 
In a world of diverse cultures, alliances, lethal weapons, and considerable 
environmental uncertainty, one would expect newly qualified officers to be confident 
of their knowledge of the world so that they are capable of meaningful action 
(Dingham 1998: ibid). This does not appear to be the case for all surveyed KKMA 
cadets. Moreover, the participants were asked if the Academy's liberal education 
programme helped them develop integrity, honesty and good citizenship. Less than 
half of the respondents (48.9%) strongly agreed or agreed that this occurred, 27.2% 
were uncertain, and 23.8% strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement. The 
whole sample mean was moderate (3.33). 
The last but one question assessed the extent to which KKMA's liberal education 
programme helped raise cadets' awareness of their own strengths and weaknesses 
(No. 7). Here again less than half of all respondents (46.9%) replied affirmatively, 
while 53% of them strongly disagreed or disagreed that it had this effect. The whole 
sample mean declined to (3.27). 
Finally, the survey participants were asked if the liberal education programme helped 
them develop wisdom (No. 8). 43.4% of all respondents strongly agreed or agreed, 
30.3% were uncertain and 26.3% strongly disagreed or disagreed. The whole sample 
mean was a moderate 3.20. 
Interestingly, seven out of the eight variables in this area were the object of consensus 
among cadets and teaching staff, since the t-tests applied to their group mean scores 
revealed no statistically significant differences. 
8.3.5 Issues of Balance, Choice, Relevance, and Skills Transferability 
Among the most debated issues at all levels by cadets, teaching staff, commanders and 
military educationalists today are those of disciplines balance, the element of choice in 
major and minor subjects, content relevance to military needs, and skills transferability 
in the teaching of liberal education. These issues are immensely important because of 
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their impacts on course content, motivation to learn, and career prospects. The research 
participants were questioned on all four issues, beginning with course content balance. 
8.3.5.1 Balance Between Humanities Courses and Natural Sciences 
Asked for their views on the extent to which the general education programme offered 
at KKMA provided a balance of courses in the humanities and the social sciences on 
the one hand, and other natural and theoretical scientific disciplines on the other hand, 
the respondents produced the following results shown in Table 8.9 below. 
Table 8-9 Balance between Humanities and Social Science courses and Natural Sciences 
(Al-VI. Q5). 
Not Poorly Reasonably Balanced Well m S. D SIG. L 
balanced balanced balanced balanced 
at a 
% % % % % 
15 I FII 36 30 8 E1.15 P=. 178 
.3] 
14 -] F--K5 43.5 :] F-45.7 (NS) 
j L 
I -Wý1 1 11.6 I F 9-1-1 1 38.4 = 1 34.9 J 1 5.5 1 = ET1 
A close examination of Table 8.9 shows that, overall, there is no overwhelming 
agreement among the respondents that KKMA provides a balance of courses from the 
humanities and the social sciences on the one hand, and other natural and theoretical 
scientific disciplines on the other hand, although more of them agreed than disagreed 
on this question. The overall sample mean was a moderate (3.13). Indeed, less than 
half of them in total (40.4%) said that it was balanced or well balanced, over a third 
(38.4%) said that it was reasonably balanced, and 21.2% of them said that it was 
poorly balanced or not balanced at all. The t-test used to assess the difference between 
cadets' and teaching staffs means scores (3.05) and (3.30) respectively, revealed no 
statistically significant difference (P= .1 
78(NS)). The lukewarm mean, together with 
the 21.2% who said that it was not balanced and the number of hours allocated to each 
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of them (517 Human Sciences, 340 Natural Sciences) in Table 8.1 confirin that 
KKMA needs to strike the right balance between human science subjects and natural 
science subjects in its liberal education programme. 
8.3.5.2 Military Relevance 
Next, the respondents to this study were asked to assess the extent to which they felt 
that military relevance was emphasised in all subjects taught at KKMA. Table 8.10 
summaries the results of their answers. 
Table 8-10 Respondents' perceptions of military relevance in course contents 
(Al-VI. Q6). 
Of no Of little Important Very Extremely M S. D SIG. 
importance importance important important L 
%9 % % 1 % 1 % 
C 8 7 26 26 33 3.69 L22 P-. 
TS 6.5 19.6 45.7 28.3 3.95 . 
868 187 
9 
[ýS:: 5.5 6.8 24 32.2 31.5 [= . 13 ] F1 (N S) 
The results in Table 8.10 show that 63.7% of all respondents to the survey rated 
military relevance as very important or extremely important, 24% as somewhat 
important, and 12.3% as of little or no importance at all. The whole sample mean is 
moderate to high (3.77). This indicates that the vast majority of the respondents 
insisted on military relevance in all subjects taught at KKMA. This is inconsistent with 
(RMC Report 2001: 36) and Downes (1998: 142; 1991: 136). It is however consistent 
with military academy policy in the UK, where the curriculum for educating and 
training officers is strictly limited to military relevant subjects and activities, which is 
why courses are on the whole comparatively shorter and vocationally based (RMAS 
2002 Prospectus). Similarly, subjects offered by the Swiss Military College for 
preparing military officers also show insistence on relevance since most of their 
liberal 
education courses are qualified as "military", such as military sociology, military 
psychology, etc., all taught by senior military officers (Kach 
1999: 32). 
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The commanders interviewed for this study shared the same view as the survey 
respondents. In this respect, A2-CI said: "I think there must be relevance to military 
needs. The liberal programme should serve the main aim of the Academy". A2-C2 
added: "We should concentrate on the subjects that are applicable to the military 
context and those that serve the main mission of the Academy". A2-C3 expressed 
much the same general view on relevance, urging that "We should always remember 
that our mission is to prepare leaders who are capable of leading men in both peace 
and war". 
8.3.5.3 Element of Choice 
The best military academies in the world, such as West Point, offer cadets the 
opportunity to major in liberal arts, social science subjects, or in other sciences and 
technology subjects. This is absent at KKMA but both cadets and staff at the Academy 
often voice the need for it. In view of this, the survey participants were questioned on 
the extent to which they felt it was important to introduce an element of choice in the 
curriculum to allow aspiring officers the chance to specialize in their subjects of choice 
if they so wished. Table 8.11 gives the results for this question. 
Table 8-11 Respondents' perceptions of the element of choice in liberal education (AI. VI. Q7). 
Of no Of little Somewhat Important Very M S. D SIG. L 
importance importance important important 
% % % % % 
9 5 17 25 44 P=. 004 
1.7 8.7 23.9 19.6 26.1 (s) 
ffH 
-1 
3 6.2 19.2 23.3 38.4 3.67 1 1.37 
As can be seen in Table 8.11,61.7% of all respondents to the survey rated the 
introduction of the element of choice in the curriculum as important or very important, 
19.2% somewhat important, and 19.2% as of little or no importance. 
The whole 
sample mean is relatively high (3.67). When the t-test was applied 
to both groups' 
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means, cadets (3-90), and the teaching staff (3.19), It yielded a statistically s1gn1ficant 
difference between them (P = . 004 (S)). The figures show a positive consensus among 
cadets and training staff on the element of choice in liberal education, with cadets 
tending to be more in favour of it than the training staff members of KKMA. 
In the interviews with the three high-ranking commanders at KKMA on the need to 
introduce an element of choice, it transpired that they had mixed views on the issue. 
However, they were all in agreement that offering choice would require greater 
resources, more staff, and ideally a fourth academic year. 
8.3.5.4 Transferable Skills 
Transferable skills are those that are valuable in both military and civilian occupations. 
The following two sub-sections are related to "how important transferable skills are to 
officers" and "how well they are offered at KKMA". 
Importance of Transferable Skills 
Respondents were asked first for their views on the importance of transferable skills. 
The results of their views are shown in Table 8.12 below. 
Table 8-12 Respondents' perceptions of the importance of transferable skills 
(Al-VI. Q8-1). 
Of no Of little Somewhat Important Very M S. D Sig. 
importance Importance Important important L 
3 2 15 17 63 P=. 081 
- - 
4.3 28.3 67.4 4.63 (N S) 
2.1 1.4 64.4 F 4.43 Pfl 
The figures in Table 8.12 show that there is an overwhelming consensus of 84.9% 
among cadets and training staff that transferable skills are important or very important, 
with a very high overall mean of (4.43). This is consistent with 
Harris's (1991: 3), and 
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Kenney (1996: 5 8) views on this issue. 
How Well are Transferable Skills Taught at KKMA 
Next, the respondents were asked how well transferable skills were offered at KYMA. 
Their responses are shown in Table 8.13 below. 
Table 8-13 Respondents' assessment of how well transferable skills are taught at KKMA 
(Al-VI. Q8-2). 
Very Poor Reasonably Good Very m S. D SIG. L 
poor good good 
0 % % % % 
16 27 F-2 7 1.27 P-. 232 
1 4.3 ] 34.8 1 (N S) 
EtI l 12.3 j 26.7 1 1 29.5 --] 
= L= [= LTI 
L 
The combined percentages from Table 8.13 indicate that the respondents' views were 
almost evenly split on how well KKMA taught transferable skills to cadets. However, 
the familiar tendency for teaching staff members to express less severe opinions was in 
evidence in these results, too, with comparable proportions rating KKMA's 
perfonnance as reasonably good (34.8%), good or very good (34%), and as poor or 
very poor (30.4%). On the other hand, the cadets notably rated KKMA's performance 
on this matter as poor or very poor (43%), reasonably good (27%), and good or very 
good (30%). The mean for the whole sample was unsurprisingly low to moderate 
(2.93). Bearing in mind the perceptions of the importance of transferable skills 
expressed by the respondents, this finding indicates that the Academy needs to 
improve the delivery of such fundamental skills. It suggests that the time has perhaps 
come to consider reviewing and updating the way transferable skills are taught in its 
liberal education programme. 
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8.3.6 Intellectual Versus Occupational Orientations 
As military academies continue to evolve towards a greater liberalisation of their 
curricula and closer integration with civilian higher education, many traditionalist 
voices are expressing concern that such institutions are in danger of weakening their 
dedication to the distinct mission of the military profession, that of fort-ning warriors 
rather than sophisticated intellectuals. The aim behind the next five selected statements 
is to determine the research participants' perceptions of the orientation of the liberal 
education programme at KKMA. Table 8.14 surnmarises the ratings on those issues. 
Table 8-14 Respondents' attitude towards the orientation of liberal education 
(Al-VI. Q9-1 to 9-5). 
No. Statement SD D SMA A SA TS WS SIG. 
% % % % % L 
The large volume of 
I liberal education 6.9 12.4 27.6 27.6 25.5 3.61 3.32 3.52 . 175 
weakens military (NS) 
mission focus 1 1 1 1 
KKMA should not 
2 align itself with 6.8 19.9 19.2 26.7 27.4 3.46 3.52 3.47 . 786 
civilian academic (NS) 
institutions and focus 
more on military 
sciences and 
technology t1 1 
KKMA should focus 
3 on producing 9 20.7 17.9 22.1 30.3 3.60 3.08 3.44 . 030 
employable military 
(S) 
specialists rather than 
generalists 
Excessive liberalisation 
4 of cuMculum has 5.5 18.6 28.3 24.1 23.4 3.55 3.10 3.41 . 035 
negative effects on (S) 
military standards and 
values 
KKMA should 
5 concentrate on martial 
values rather than on 
9 26.2 16.6 29 19.3 
N 
3.44 2.77 
M 
3.23 . 004 
(S) 
intellectual and 
__] _occupational 
pursuits ý 
L 
-1 
L- L- 
, I 
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Table 8.14 shows that reactions to the statement that too much general education in 
KKMA's officer preparation programme could threaten its fundamental dedication to 
its specific military mission (No. 1) resulted in 53.1% of respondents agreeing or 
strongly agreeing with it, 27.6% somewhat agreed with it, and 19.3% disagreed or 
strongly disagreed with it. The whole sample mean was a moderate to high (3.52). The 
t-test used to detect significance between the two group means found none between 
cadets and teaching staff members. This finding is consistent with Thomas' (2000: 50) 
view that some military academies may have incorporated an excessive intellectual 
focus into their programmes. 
Since the main objection of the opponents of the introduction of a wide liberal 
education programme in military officer preparation programmes concerns its close 
integration with civilian higher education, the research asked the participants in this 
study for their reactions on whether KKMA should not align itself with civilian 
academic institutions and focus more on military sciences and technology instead 
(No. 3). The combined percentages indicate that 54.1% of the participants strongly 
agreed or agreed with the statement that the KKMA should distance itself from civilian 
curricula, while 26.7% strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement, leaving 
19.2% who felt undecided on the issue. The whole sample mean was a moderate 
(3.47). This finding shows that the majority of survey participants opposed any strong 
association of military academies with civilian institutions. It is also consistent with 
Smith's (1996: 1-10) criticism that the academies are becoming "mini-liberal arts 
universities instead of the military technical institutions of yore". 
Continuing this theme, the participants in this study were asked for their opinions on 
whether KKMA should focus on producing employable military specialists rather than 
generalists (No. 4). Not surprisingly, attitudes remained stable. Thus, 52.4% strongly 
agreed or agreed, 17.9% were undecided and 29.7% strongly disagreed or disagreed on 
the issue. The whole sample mean was also moderate (3.44), and when the Mest was 
applied to both mean scores, cadets (3.60) and teaching staff (3.08) it showed that there 
was a statistically significant difference between the two groups (P = . 030 
(S)). Clearly 
the difference was one of emphasis rather than indicating opposing views. This 
indicates that both training staff members and cadets agreed on the need 
for KKMA to 
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focus on military requirements rather than on identifying with civilian occupations. 
This finding strengthens the case for Thomas' (2000: 50) and Smith's (1996: 7) 
recommendations that the military should not lose their focus on military subjects 
Predictably, the survey participants) reactions to the statement that excessive 
liberalisation of the curriculum has a negative effect on military standards and values 
produced 47.5% who strongly agreed or agreed with it, 28.3% undecided, and 24.1% 
who strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement. The whole sample mean was 
moderate (3.41). The t-test showed that there was a statistically significant difference 
between the two group mean scores for cadets (3.55) and teaching staff members 
(3.10) (P = . 03 5 (S)). This finding is consistent with Smith (1996: 10) for example, who 
blames falling military standards and values on what he perceives to be the excessive 
liberalisation of the curriculum, which he claims has had counter-productive 
repercussions on many aspects of officer preparation. 
To conclude on this issue, the survey participants were asked for their opinion on 
whether KKMA should concentrate on military values rather than on intellectual and 
occupational pursuits (No. 5). 48.3% strongly agreed or agreed, 16.6% were undecided 
and for the first time the number of those who strongly disagreed or disagreed with the 
statement increased to more than a third (35.2%), with a lower whole sample mean 
than for the other variables on the list (3.23). There was also a statistically significant 
difference between the mean scores of cadets (3.44) and teaching staff (2.77) produced 
by the Mest (P = . 004 
(S)), with cadets tending to agree, and teachers rather reluctant 
to agree with the statement. 
Despite the earlier differences between the two groups, the results indicate more 
similarity of views on the issue than differences. This finding therefore remains 
consistent with Thomas (2000), who calls for a return to more basic military values 
and less emphasis on intellectual and occupational pursuits that 
have allegedly 
precipitated much of the erosion of the uniqueness of the military profession. 
A2-C I had this to say about this topic: I think there is an excessive load of liberal 
education subjects in our academy which distracts cadets 
from military subjects". A2- 
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C2 also stated that in his view there was too much emphasis on general education with 
adverse effects on military subjects. A2-C3 agreed, suggesting a reduction in the 
liberal education programme and more focus just on teaching infon-nation technology 
and languages, which are more relevant to the Academy's mission in the 21't century. 
8.3.7 The Academy Environment 
If liberal education is to flourish, it must be offered in an appropriate environrnent. 
Opinions are divided among educationalists on whether a regimented military 
environment can be compatible with free liberal educational instruction. Some experts 
suggest that it is more effective and cheaper to seek it outside military institutions. 
Others see dangers in such a proposition and argue that the military environment is in 
fact ideal for liberal education because it is free from distractions. Consequently, the 
participants in this survey were asked for their opinions on the extent to which 
KKMA's environment provided a first-class, unrestrained instruction in liberal 
education. The results of their views are summarized in Table 8.15 below. 
Table 8-15 Respondents' perceptions of the adequacy of KKMA's environment for liberal 
education (Al-VI. Q]0-1,2). 
Statement SD D SMA A SA TS WS SIG. 
L 
KKMA provides first 
class environment for 6.8 19.2 39 24.7 10.3 3.10 3.17 3.12 . 696 
unrestrained liberal 
(NS) 
education 
KKMA makes 
adequate provision for 17.1 26.7 33.6 16.4 6.2 2.68 
2.67 2.67 . 976 
time for thought, 
(NS) 
reading, research and 
analysis 
A close examination of Table 8.15 shows that more than a third 
(39%) of the survey 
participants questioned on the extent to which they agreed that 
KKMA provided a 
suitable liberal education environment somewhat agreed that this was the case, 
35% 
agreed or strongly agreed and only 26% disagreed or strongly 
disagreed that this was 
the case. The whole sample mean obtained was moderate 
(3.12). No statistically 
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significant difference between the mean scores of cadets (3.10) and teaching staff 
members (3.17) was detected by the t-test (P= . 696 (NS), which indicates a similarity 
of views. 
Next, the respondents were asked about the extent to which they agreed that KYMA 
made adequate provision for time for thought, reading, research and analysis. 
Unsurprisingly, 43.8% of them disagreed or strongly disagreed that such provisions 
existed at KKMA. Only 22.6% agreed or strongly agreed that such conditions existed, 
even less than those who were not certain (33.6%). This is also reflected in the low to 
moderate whole sample mean of (2.67). Again, the t-test found no statistically 
significant difference between the mean scores of cadets (2.68) and the teaching staff 
members (2.67) with (P = . 976 (NS)). This is a sign that the learning environment at 
KKMA should be re-examined for its suitability for liberal education. 
8.3.8 Perceptions of Overall Satisfaction with KKMA's Liberal Education 
Programme 
Having completed the assessment of the various aspects and elements of KKMA's 
liberal education programme, the participants in this research were subsequently 
requested to rate their overall satisfaction with this component of officer preparation. 
Table 8.16 surnmarises the results of their reactions. 
Table 8-16 Respondents' levels of satisfaction with KKMA's liberal education programme 
(Al-VI. Ql 1). 
Very Dissatisfied Somewhat Satisfied Very M S. D SIG. L 
dissatisfied satisfied satisfied 
L% % % % L% L 
23 L 24 29 15 9 P=. 139 
4.3 28.3 I 39.1 26.1 2.2 I 2.93 1 . 904 (NS) 
It] 17.1 
- 
-- 25.3 32.2 
11 
18.5 1- - F 6.8 2.72 1.15 T 
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The combined percentages show that 42.4% of all respondents were dissatisfied or 
very dissatisfied, a third of them (32.2%) were uncertain, and only 25.3% were 
satisfied or very satisfied with KKMA's liberal education programme. The mean for 
the whole sample was relatively low to moderate (2.72). The t-test used to assess the 
difference between the mean scores of cadets (2.63) and teaching staff members (2.93) 
revealed no statistically significant difference (P = . 120). This indicates agreement 
among a large proportion of the respondents that they were not entirely satisfied with 
KKMA's liberal education programme. This result is further confirmed by A2-C2, 
who expressed this view: "I am not satisfied because it is more than what is needed 
and it goes beyond our cadets' capacities. We also suffer because of the increasing 
number of cadets who do not pass exams due to their level of difficulty. It is a real 
distraction from the military-specific programme, as it forces cadets to devote their 
efforts to liberal education in order to pass exams. Sharing this view, A2-C3 criticised 
the liberal education programme in these terms: "I am not satisfied with the liberal 
education programme because I think it is excessive in volume and most of it has no 
relevance at all to military needs. " 
8.3.9 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has consisted of two broad parts. In the first half, the main outline of 
KKMA's liberal education programme was described, starting with its aims and 
structure, how it was conducted, and how the subjects were distributed over the three- 
year officer preparation at KKMA. 
Documents analysis revealed that KKMA provided a wide variety of subjects in its 
liberal education programme, which represents a third of the whole curriculum. 
However, the Academy seems to concentrate on human sciences, for which it allocates 
two thirds of the liberal education programme (517 hours), whereas it assigns only 340 
teaching hours to the natural sciences (see Table 8.1). 
The second part of this chapter presented a detailed analysis of both survey and 
interview findings related to the liberal education programme. The presentation began 
with an examination of the respondents' views on the importance of the liberal 
education programme to officership and found that there was a wide difference 
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between cadets and teaching staff members regarding this issue, with cadets 
underestimating the importance of the liberal education programme, whereas their 
teachers considered it essential to officer preparation. The commanders interviewed for 
this study described it almost as important as military-specific subjects, as long as 
sufficient effort was made to link it to the needs of the Military. 
Next, the participants' perceptions and evaluations of certain features of the liberal 
education programme at KKMA were assessed. The respondents had some 
reservations when asked whether KKMA's liberal education programme offered a 
broad coverage of the major branches of learning and a rich variety of interesting and 
valuable courses. Their views indicated that there was room for improvement. Both 
staff members and cadets thought that the Academy needed to raise the level of its 
liberal education programme in order for it to attain levels similar to university 
standards. They also agreed that KKMA needed to improve its teaching of information 
technology subjects. This view was further confirmed in the interviews with the 
commanders, who stressed that the Academy needed to allocate more hours to 
information technology in order to meet the challenges of the 21 st century. 
Examination of the participants' views of how well KKMA's liberal education 
programme taught cadets reasoning skills and good intellectual habits, showed that the 
overall mean was moderate for all variables with no statistically significant differences 
between the research participants, which means that both cadets and teaching staff 
were uncertain about KKMA's effectiveness in teaching such skills. 
Subsequently, perceptions of the effectiveness of the moral aspects of the programme 
(attitudes, values, and character traits) were assessed. The Academy was found to be 
effective in both emphasising its moral-ethical aspect and its implications for 
behaviour and preparing and motivating cadets for future learning. The overall means 
for other related aspects were moderate with no statistically significant differences 
between research participants. 
Following that, issues of programme balance, choice, relevance, and skills 
transferability were assessed. It was found that there was a need for KKMA to strike 
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the right balance between human sciences and natural sciences in its liberal education 
programme. On the relevance issue, nearly a majority of respondents saw military 
relevance as important or very important. The commanders interviewed during this 
study shared these views. Positive consensus was evident among cadets and training 
staff on the element of choice in the liberal education programme, with the cadets 
tending to be more in favour of it than the training staff. All the commanders however 
saw it as necessary, but they believed also that the Academy to extend the length of its 
officer preparation programme to four years in order to meet such requirements. As for 
the teaching of transferable skills at KKMA, the majority of responses considered it 
important or very important. However, the research participants indicated that the 
Academy needed to improve the way it delivered such fundamental skills. 
On the intellectual versus occupational orientation issue, the respondents believed that 
the large volume of the general education programme tended to weaken KKMA's 
mission, and that it should not align itself too closely with civilian academic 
institutions. Instead, it should concentrate on military sciences and technology. They 
stressed that the Academy should focus more on producing employable military 
specialists rather than generalists. Not surprisingly, the participants also largely agreed 
that excessive liberalisation of the curriculum had negative effects on military 
standards and values leading to falling military standards. Moreover, the three 
commanders interviewed for this study thought that there was an excessive load of 
liberal education subjects in the Academy. They were rather more in favour of 
reducing the liberal education programme and concentrating on teaching information 
technology and languages in order not to deviate from the Academy's mission. 
Regarding the educational environment at KKMA the research participants believed 
that the military environment did not particularly restrain cadets from getting a first- 
class liberal education. However, the Academy did not make adequate provision for 
time for thought, reading, research, and analysis. 
The respondents' concluding assessment of the liberal education programme at KKMA 
in terms of overall satisfaction or dissatisfaction showed agreement among a large 
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proportion of respondents that they were not quite satisfied. This result was further 
confirmed by the three commanders interviewed as they expressed their dissatisfaction 
with the liberal education programme in terms of quantity and quality. 
Finally, it is to be noted with interest that out of the 35 questions asked on the liberal 
education programme put to both cadets and teaching staff members, the t-test used to 
detect differences between the two group scores found no statistically significant 
differences in 28 cases, and discrepancies in 7 cases. However, the differences were in 
most cases a matter of emphasis rather than substance. In other words, the two groups 
did not generally hold opposite views, only stronger or weaker views than one another 
on the various issues explored. 
The fifth component, "Physical fitness programme" will be discussed in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter Nine 
Findings Related to KKMA's Physical Fitness Programme 
9.1 Introduction 
The present chapter reports the field study results connected with the component of 
physical fitness at KKMA. The first half, based on the analysis of documentary 
evidence, describes KKMA's physical fitness programme, the types of training 
exercises, the extra-curricular sports activities and the types of tests used to ensure 
cadets' fitness at the Academy. The second half describes and interprets the statistical 
results of the survey and the views of three military commanders interviewed on the 
Academy's physical fitness programme for cadets. 
9.2 Physical Fitness Programme at KKMA: Aims and Approaches 
According to the KKMA General Training Plan and Programme Schedule 2002, 
Sports Wing Pamphlet 2002, the Sports Wing is responsible for planning and 
preparing the cadets' physical fitness programme. The Sports Wing states its 
programme aims as follows: 
Developing cadets' physical fitness; 
Training cadets to master movement skills through various physical activities 
Training cadets to master how to coach and organise physical fitness activities 
and organise sports competitions 
* Providing cadets with skills that enable them to use their weapons and 
equipment effectively with the minimum amount of effort 
0 Creating and encouraging fair competition among cadets through various sports 
activities 
Providing cadets with theoretical knowledge of health and sports 
Preparing and coordinating the physical fitness programme with other 
academic programmes 
9 Evaluating and monitoring cadets' physical fitness and participation 
in sports 
competitions 
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* Providing physiotherapy treatment for injured cadets and staff members. 
In order to implement these objectives the programme uses two approaches that 
complement one another. The first one is the programmed and evaluated approach 
where cadets are prepared through four types of physical activity. These are: body 
exercises, endurance exercises, fighting spirit exercises and swimming. The second 
approach is the extra-curricular activities approach, where cadets participate in various 
kinds of sports and activities and are encouraged to take part in competitions. 
9.2.1 Programmed Activities 
Table 9.1 below summarises KKMA's programmed approach to cadets' physical 
fitness in detail. 
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Table 9-1 KKMA's programmed approach to physical fitness 
Physical Activity Types of Exercise Purpose Frequency 
I- Body exercises 
Muscular Jogging, sit-ups, push-ups To strengthen the Every 
fitness muscles morning 
Strength Rifle exercise, climbing wood According to 
exercises poles, pulling and pushing, a gradual plan 
climbing, pull-ups, exercise and 
in difficult environment programme 
(climbing mountains, step throughout 
climbing) the year. 
Skills Sprinting runs, flexibility, 
exercises military sport skills 
2-Endurance Cross-country, challenges of Conducted in all 5 times a year 
exercises military obstacles, long kinds of weather and 
endurance, marches (day and terrain conditions to 2 times a year 
night), and athletic sports. strengthen cadets' 
endurance 
3-Fighting spirit Judo, engagement, karate, To build cadets' self- 
exercises wrestling confidence, 
determination and 
courage 
4- Swimming All types of swimming To be able to rescue, 
and face all kinds of 
water obstacles 
9.2.2 Extra-curricular Sports Activities 
Besides scheduled exercise the Sports Wing of the Academy provides cadets with the 
following extra curricular sports activities; 
a- Football, volleyball, handball, basketball, tennis, squash. 
b- Recreational competition activities, such as short runs, group running, and 
water sports. 
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9.2.3 Sports Competitions 
There are two types of competition at KKMA. First, there are Internal competitions, 
such as platoon and company competitions. In order to increase the competitive spirit 
among cadets at all levels, the Sports Wing offers prizes for winners. The Sports Wing 
also offers medals for those who excel physically and morally in physical fitness, 
competitions, cross-country, long marches (day and night), rope pulling, karate, 
wresting, football, volleyball, tennis, squash, swimming, and athletic championships 
(throwing the javelin, long jump, high jump etc). 
The second type of competition is the external competition, which is held with other 
military institutions and involve different kinds of sports and championships such as: 
participation in both the Military Academies League and the National Guard League, 
in order to familiarise cadets with sports competitions and increase their confidence 
and competitive spirit. 
9.2.4 Physical Fitness Tests 
There are two types of physical fitness tests: 
I- Endurance test (cross country running). This type of scheduled test is 
conducted five times a year. Each run is 7200 metres. It is intended to 
evaluate cadet fitness levels, physical ability, and to help those who are 
not doing well by giving them extra training. A maximum of 10 credits 
is attached to all five cross-country runs. 
2- Physical fitness test. This is conducted each year at the end of the 
second semester. It includes push-up tests, sit-up tests, and running 
3200 metres in the same day. Physical fitness tests are allocated a 
maximum of 90 points, 30 for each of the tests. 
Physical fitness activities are given the same importance as other subjects at KKMA, 
such as vocational education, liberal education etc. Cadets who fail this part of the 
syllabus are given the opportunity to retake the tests. If they fail again, they cannot 
continue into the next year. 
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9.3 Main Survey and Interview Findings 
The previous section dealt with "How the military physical fitness programme at 
KKMA is done" in theory. In the following sections, we look at it through the views 
and attitudes of cadets and training staff in terms of "How well it is done". The 
analysis begins by examining first to what extent is KKMA)s physical fitness 
programme important both to participants and to the Academy; second, by 
investigating the structure and balance of the programme; third, by assessing its 
characteristics; fourth, by determining what are the main obstacles facing KKMA's 
physical fitness programme; fifth, by assessing the respondents' overall satisfaction 
with the programme in general and finally, the cadets' satisfaction with their own level 
of physical fitness is measured. 
9.3.1 Perceptions of Importance of Physical Fitness 
Most instructors supervising physical fitness programmes worldwide agree that it is 
vital to keep soldiers fit and well to face difficulties when they occur. They believe 
physical strength, flexibility, and endurance serve the purpose of hardening men upon 
whom the safety of the nation may rely. They also believe that many sporting activities 
are related to war pressures scenes (Sandhurst Diary 2001: 1-5; RMC Prospectus 
2001: 1). Physical fitness is also a valuable asset to all soldiers. It gives them energy, 
raises their productivity and alertness, and increases their stamina, power and 
confidence (Field Manual 1992: iii). In short, physical fitness is crucial for cadets' 
health and military readiness. The following two sub-sections look at the research 
participants' perceptions of the importance of the physical fitness programme both to 
KKMA and to themselves. 
9.3.1.1 Respondents' Perceptions of Importance of Physical Fitness Programme 
to KMAA 
As explained in the literature review chapters, all military academies pay sIgnificant 
attention to their physical fitness programmes, stressing its link with military readiness 
(USMA; Sandhurst Diary 2001: 1-5; RMC Prospectus 200 1: 1; RMAB Prospectus 
2001: 1). In view of this, the participants were asked for their views on how much 
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importance is offici I 'ally attached to the physical fitness programme by KKMA. The 
results are shown in Table 9.2 below. 
Table 9-2 Perceptions of importance of physical fitness programme to KKMA 
(A1-V. Q1). 
Of no Of little Somewhat Important Very M S. D SIG. L 
importance importance important important 
3 20 34 1 25 1 18 3.35 71 1.08 : 6fl P=. 882 
2.2 13.3 40 - 33.3 I E 11.1 (NS) 
L 
WS 
-J 
I 2.8 :] 1 17.9 3-5.9 27.6 15.9 - M E1 : 0ý3 
Looking at Table 9.2, one can see that under half of all respondents (43.5%) believe 
that the Academy views physical fitness as important or very important, giving rise to 
a moderate whole sample mean of (3.35). When the t-test was used to assess whether 
the two group means, for cadets (3.35) and teaching staff (3.37) differed significantly, 
it was found that there was no difference (P= . 882 (NS)). Bearing in mind the 
moderate whole sample mean obtained, it is a matter of concern that over one fifth of 
all respondents (20.7%) thought that physical fitness is given little or no importance by 
the Academy. This result is not totally surprising. Commander A2-C3 had this to say 
on this issue: "Admittedly, this is an area where improvements could be made. Ideally, 
the physical fitness programme should be given the same importance as other aspects 
of officer preparation. " 
9.3.1.2 Respondents' Own Perceptions of Importance of Physical Fitness 
The literature on the importance of physical fitness for soldiers is unanimous that it is 
an essential element in their preparation. As future professional fighters they must be 
100% fit to be able to cope with the challenges of difficult and hostile situations. As 
the Field Manual (1992: iii) states, for the individual cadet, or soldier, physical fitness 
is vital because it ensures that he has the energy, alertness, stamina, power, and 
confidence to fight and win. These may be obvious facts. However, there are those 
217 
who hold the view that modem warfare techniques and technology make physical 
fitness inessential, which may be why they are relaxed about it. To see if this is an 
emerging trend among the research participants, they were asked to rate its importance 
to them as members of the SANG. The results are shown in Table 9.3 below 
Table 9-3 Respondents' perceptions of importance of physical fitness 
(A]-V. Q2). 
Of no Of little Somewhat Important Very M S. D Sig. 
importance importance important important L 
% % % % 0/ 0 
2 3 16 78 4.67 . 766 P 
- 4.4 11.1 84.4 4.80 . 504 . 
300 
1.4 . 7= 
ý 3.4 14.5 80 J E. 71 [ýý (N S) 
As Table 9.3 shows. ) there is strong support among the vast majority of both cadets and 
teaching staff members for the idea that physical fitness is important or very important, 
with a total percentage of 80% and a very high whole sample mean of (4.71). The t-test 
showed no significant difference (P= . 300 (NS)) 
between the cadets' mean (4.67) and 
that of the teaching staff (4.80), which means that they were in agreement on the 
importance of physical fitness. This strong recognition of the importance of physical 
fitness by both cadets and teaching staff shows that there is a gap between the 
importance it is given officially, and the importance it ought to be given from the 
research participants' viewpoint. All three commanders interviewed also expressed 
unequivocal views on the importance of physical fitness for KKMA cadets. All three 
of them equally stressed the link between physical fitness and mission success. 
Commander A2-C2 added, "An officer needs physical fitness as much as his mental 
hardness and intellect" 
9.3.2 Structure and Balance of Physical Fitness Programme 
As Harig (2001: 4), Gindhart (1999: 12) and Watney (1989: 15) emphasise, a complete 
physical fitness programme must include training and observance supported 
by 
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policies defining what physical fitness is and how to achieve its goals. In addition, 
guidelines for a development programme to improve and maintain physical fitness, it 
is important to have certain basic physical training principles such as regulanity, 
progression, variety and choice, challenge etc. In order to assess to what extent such 
requirements exist within KKMA's physical fitness programme, participants were 
asked for their views on its level of structure and balance. The results are summarised 
in Table 9.4 below. 
Table 9-4 Respondents' perceptions on whether KKMA's physical fitness programme is well 
structured and balanced 
(Al-V. Q3). 
Not Poorly Reasonably Balanced Well M S. D sic. 
balanced balanced balanced balanced L 
at all 
% % % L- % L% 
10 17 36 26 11 P=. 916 
8.9 ] I F--F7. -8 ] 1 35.6 1 6.7 -1 
.0 . 
OT6 -] (NS) 
Ew-fl-i i 9.7 1 1 17.2 1 1 35.9 1 127.6 ] 9.7 [T: I = i 
Close examination of Table 9.4 shows that overall there is no overwhelming agreement 
among the respondents that KKMA offers a well-structured and balanced physical 
fitness programme. Indeed, only a third of them in total, approximately (37.3%), 
perceive it as balanced or well balanced. Almost the same proportion (35.9%) perceive 
it as reasonably balanced, implying that they may have some reservations on the 
subject. The rest (26.9%) perceive it as poorly balanced or not balanced at all. The 
lukewarrn mean for the whole sample (3.10) casts doubts about the effectiveness of 
KKMA in offering a well-structured and balanced physical fitness programme. A final 
look at Table 9.4 reveals that the t-test detected no statistically significant differences 
between the means for the two groups, cadets and teaching staff, regarding this issue 
(P=. 916 (NS». 
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9.3.3 Features of KKMA's Physical Fitness Programme 
In addition to the above, a list of eleven physical fitness features drawn from the 
literature was presented to the participants to evaluate KKMA's physical fitness 
programme in this survey. It is not a comprehensive list, but it covers some important 
areas of the cadets' physical fitness programme. Its purpose is to evaluate how well 
KKMA is succeeding in achieving some of its major physical fitness programme 
goals. The findings for these questions are displayed in Table 9.5. 
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Table 9-5 Perceptions of eleven performance features of KKMA's physical fitness programme 
(A] -V. Q4-1 to4-11) 
No. Statement SD D SMA A SA C T. S WS I SIG. L 
% % % % % F -M 
KKMA provides 
I professional 6.3 12.5 18.1 40.3 22.9 3.63 3.56 3.61 . 768 (NS) 
instructors 
Includes a wide 
2 variety of sports in 4.2 11.1 26.4 43.8 14.6 3.51 3.57 3.53 . 731 (NS) 
its physical fitness 
programme. 
Encourages liking 
3 for sports and 6.2 14.5 29.7 35.9 13.8 3.32 3.46 3.36 . 453 (NS) 
outdoor activities 
Impro es the F 
4 cadets' skills 9.9 737 (NS) 
Makes sure that all 1 
5 cadets participate in 1.8 13.9 33.3 27.8 13.2 3.17 3.15 3.16 . 940 (NS) 
at least one 
competitive sport 
Provides a basic 
6 knowledge of a 16.8 13.3 27.3 26.6 16.1 3.12 3.11 3.11 . 975 (NS) 
wide variety of 
sports 
Allocates enough 
7 time for physical 10.6 24.6 24.6 26.1 14.1 3.12 3.00 3.08 . 577 (NS) 
training 
Allows choice in 
8 physical fitness 16.9 21.1 17.6 26.8 17.6 3.11 2.9 7 3.0 7 .588 
(N S) 
activities 
Integrates well 
9 other physical 13.1 21.4 28.3 28.3 9 
2.84 3.31 2.98 . 025(S) 
activities in its 
physical fitness 
programme (e. g. 
obstacle drills, 
endurance marches 
etc. ) 
Ensures that cadets 
10 are never allowed to 24.1 15.9 
20 19.3 20.7 2.96 2.97 2.96 947 (NS) 
be physically unfit 
- Teaches cadets to 
II coach others to be 23.1 
25.9 20.3 22.4 8.4 2.65 2.70 2.67 . 837 (NS) 
able to train their 
troops in the future 
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Inspection of the whole sample mean score results in Table 9.5 sho"'ing the 
respondents' perceptions of KKMA's physical fitness programme performance 
indicates that they could be classified into three categories. The first category, covering 
where the Academy appears to be doing well, consists of two items with the highest 
mean scores on the list (Nos. 1,2). It includes "KKMA provides professional 
instructors" (3.61) and "Includes a wide variety of sports in its physical fitness 
programme" (3.53). More than half of the respondents (58.4%) rated each of these 
areas positively. 
These results show that there is consensus among cadets and teaching staff members, 
since Mests applied to their group mean scores produced no significant difference (P = 
. 768 (NS) and P= . 731 (NS)) respectively. In this respect, KKMA fares well compared 
with the physical fitness programmes of the best military academies in the world 
(RMAS Prospectus 2002; USMA Prospectus 2002). 
The second category, where the Academy according to the survey respondents appears 
to be doing reasonably well, consists of six items with the second highest whole 
sample mean scores on the list (Nos. 3,4,5,6,7,8). These are: "Encourages liking for 
sports and outdoor activities" (3.36), "Improves the cadets' skills" (3.26), "Makes sure 
that all cadets participate in at least one competitive sport" (3.16), "Provides basic 
knowledge of a wide variety of sports" (3.11), "Allocates enough time for physical 
training" (3.08), and finally "Allows choice in physical fitness activities" (3.07). 
The results show that there is consensus among both cadets and teaching staff 
members, since t-tests applied to their group mean scores produced no statistically 
significant differences in relation to the six items in this category. Overall, almost half 
of the participants in the survey, with an average of 43.75%, agree or strongly agree 
that KKMA's physical fitness programme requires better implementation policies with 
regard to the physical fitness programme. 
Finally, the third performance category consisting of three items with lower whole 
sample mean scores (Nos. 9,10,11) comprises: "Integrates well other physical 
activities in its physical fitness programme (e. g. obstacle drills, endurance marches 
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etc. )" (2.98), "ensures that cadets are never allowed to be physically unfit" (2.96) and 
"teaches cadets to coach others to be able to train their troops in the future" (2.67). 
Clearly, the low to moderate mean scores for the items in this category are an 
indication of the presence of shortcomings. They are serious because they are strategic- 
The combined percentages reveal that well over a third of all respondents (almost half 
in the case of the third item) do not believe that KKMA integrates well other physical 
activities in its physical fitness programme, nor does it ensure that cadets are never 
allowed to be physically unfit. Worst of all perhaps is the fact that they do not think 
that the Academy teaches cadets to coach others so that they can train own soldiers in 
the future. Ideally, cadets are not only expected to achieve a high standard of physical 
fitness, but they are also expected to learn how to organise and conduct physical and 
recreational training. 
All items in the third category except one, "Integrates well other physical activities in 
its physical fitness programme (e. g. obstacle drills, endurance marches etc. )", were the 
object of consensus among both cadets and teaching staff members, since t-tests 
applied to their group mean scores produced no statistically significant differences. 
9.3.4 Obstacles Facing KKMA's Physical Fitness Programme 
KKMA's physical fitness programme has its strengths and weaknesses, as the survey 
results for this component of officer preparation programme have shown so far. It also 
faces a number of obstacles that hinder the achievement of its goals. These range from 
attitudinal, motivational, and cultural obstacles, to those that are due to the nature of its 
content, variety, infrastructure, diet, medical care, and others. Survey participants were 
asked to rate 15 items identified during the pilot study. The results of their views are 
summarised in Table 9.6 below 
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Table 9-6 Respondents assessment of obstacles facing KKMA's physical fitness programme(Al- 
V-Q5-1 to 5-15). 
Statement N S RA QA GD C TS Pfl WS SIG. No. % % % % % L 
Lack of awareness of 
1 physical fitness 1.4 2.9 12.9 39.3 43.6 4.23 4.13 4.20 !0 . 520 
-benefits 
among cadets (NS) 
Lack of adequate 
2 access to physical .7 6.2 15.9 33.8 43.4 4.35 
1 
3.64 4.13 . 000 fitness facilities (S) 
Fitness activities are - 
3 not designed in a way 2.1 5.6 16.8 30.8 44.8 4.30 3.65 4.10 . 000 
that makes them (S) 
attractiv and 
enjoyable 
Lack of sports . 381 
infrastructure 4.2 (N S) 
Cadets not willing to 
5 put in necessary effort 2.8 4.9 19 31 42.3 4.07 4.00 4.04 . 705 (N S) 
L ck of a fitness- . 268 friendly environment 1.4 
Poor medical care . 140 3.4 3.82 (N S) I 
Unsuitable diet . 113 4.8 3.97 (NS) 
The feeling that 
9 physical fitness 2.1 8.4 21.7 32.2 35.7 4.10 3.46 3.90 . 001 
sessions are a burden to (S) 
be endured 
Lack of variety in . 308 
10 physical fitness 1.4 9.7 18.8 37.5 32.6 3.96 3.77 3.90 (N S) 
programme 
The use of additional . 000 
exercises as a form of 5.6 6.3 23.1 25.9 39.2 4.17 3.18 3.86 (S) 
punishment. 
Hot climate is not 
12 suitable for vigorous 3.5 8.3 30.6 25 32.6 3.87 3.47 3.75 . 049 
fitness exercises 
(S) 
Sports instructors are 
13 not good role models 6.3 11.8 22.9 29.9 29.2 3.75 3.38 3.63 
093 
of fitness themselves 
(N S) 
The Academy is not 
14 seriously committed to 10.6 13.5 22 28.4 25.5 3.57 3.15 
3.44 . 076 
physical training and 
(N S) 
education 
Our culture does not - 
15 encourage physical 10.4 16.7 24.3 27.8 
20.8 3.30 
[3.36 [3.31 
. 782 (N S) 
11 fitness 
N= none. S= some. RA = reasonable amount. QA = quite a lot. (ju = great cieai 
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A close look at the whole sample mean score results of cadets and training staff shown 
in Table 9.6 suggests that the respondents' perceptions of KKMA's physical fitness 
programme performance could be grouped into three categories: The first category 
(Nos. 1,2,3,4,5,6,7) could be described as "major obstacles". Major obstacles are 
those whose whole sample means fall within the scale value 4 or above. These were 
assessed as having 'Quite a lot' of negative impact on the physical fitness programme. 
Seven items with the highest mean scores on the list form this category. They comprise 
"Lack of awareness of the benefits of physical fitness among cadets" (4.20), "Lack of 
adequate access to physical fitness facilities" (4-13), "Fitness activities are not 
designed in a way that makes them attractive and enjoyable" (4.10), "Lack of sports 
infrastructure" (4.09), "Cadets are not willing to put in the necessary effort" (4.04), 
"Lack of fitness-friendly environment" (4.02), and "Poor medical care" (4.0 1). 
A very high proportion of respondents, that is from 71.5 % to 82.9% rated these seven 
obstacles as having a substantial negative impact on the physical fitness programme at 
KKMA. Their mean scores range from (4.20) to (4.01). Consensus was obtained on all 
items except "Lack of adequate access to physical fitness facilities" (P= . 000(S)), and 
"Fitness activities are not designed in a way that makes them attractive and en oyable" 
(P=. OOO(S)). They were given greater emphasis for their negative effects by the cadets 
than by their teachers. This is shown by the statistically significant differences found 
between the two group mean scores obtained for each variable. Perhaps the cadets' 
perceptions were somewhat inflated because their memories of and frustrations with 
their own physical fitness experiences were still fresh. 
The second group of items (Nos. 8,9,10,11,12,13) represent 'minor obstacles'. Minor 
obstacles are those whose whole sample means fall within the scale value 3.5 or above. 
These were rated as having minor negative impacts on the physical fitness programme. 
Six items with the second highest mean scores on the list form this category. They 
include "Unsuitable diet" (3.97), "The feeling that physical fitness sessions are a 
burden to be endured" (3.90), "Lack of variety in the physical fitness programme" 
(3-90), (. The use of additional exercises as a form of punishment" (3.86), "Hot climate 
is not suitable for vigorous fitness exercises" (3.75), "Sports instructors are not good 
role models of fitness themselves" (3.63). 
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Statistically significant differences were found between the cadets' and teaching staff s 
scores when Mests were conducted on three variables: "The feeling that physical 
fitness sessions are a burden to endured" (P=. 001 (S)), "The use of additional exercises 
as a form of punishment" (P = . 000 (S)) and "Hot climate is not suitable for vigorous 
fitness exercises" (P =. 049 (S)). The variables in this category were to some extent 
underemphasized by teaching staff members in comparison with the cadets' views. In 
terms of both views, the differences seem to converge towards the negative, rating 
those variables as the second variables in this category, which are hindering the 
success of KKMA's physical fitness programme. Consensus was obtained on the other 
three variables. 
The third category consists of two items with the lowest whole sample mean scores on 
the list (Nos. 14,15). "The Academy is not seriously committed to physical training and 
education" (3.44), and "Our culture does not encourage physical fitness" (3.3 1). The t- 
test used to assess differences between the two group mean scores for each variable 
showed no significant differences. The scores were P=. 076 (NS) for the first variable, 
and P= . 782 (NS) for the second. The three Commanders interviewed for this research 
shared many of the concerns expressed by the survey respondents about the negative 
impacts of certain obstacles. For example, they emphasised the massive number of 
cadets, lack of training facilities, not enough instructors, and the lack of coordination 
between the physical fitness programme and the nutrition programme. 
9.3.5 Overall Satisfaction with KKMA's Physical Fitness Programme 
In the previous sections of this chapter, the research participants' views on various 
aspects of KKMA's physical fitness programme were described. In this section, the 
research participants' measurements of their satisfaction levels with KKMA's physical 
fitness Programme are presented. Table 9.7 is a summary of their ratings: 
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Table 9-7 Overall satisfaction with KKMA's physical fitness programme 
(Al-V. Q6). 
Very Dissatisfied Somewhat Satisfied Very M S. D SIG. L 
dissatisfied satisfied satisfied 
% % % % % 
C 10 15 37 21 17 3.20 1.18 P=. 350 
TS 8.9 F 13.3 1 2 8.9 j 40 8.9 3.26 (NS) 
WS 9.7 J E -14.5 34.5 14.5 T 1-5 ] L 
Table 9.7 shows that 41.4% of the cadets and teaching staff members stated that they 
were generally satisfied or very satisfied with KKMA's physical fitness programme, 
while 34.5% were somewhat satisfied, and 24.2% dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. The 
whole sample mean is a moderate 3.22, with 3.20 for cadets and 3.26 for teaching staff 
members. The mean scores for both cadets and training staff showed no statistically 
significant differences when the Mest was applied (P = . 350 (NS)). 
9.3.6 Perceptions of Cadets' Level of Physical Fitness 
The final question in the evaluation of KKMA's physical fitness programme aimed to 
elicit the cadets' assessment of their own levels of physical fitness. Bearing in mind 
that they were upperclassmen about to graduate, their views could be taken as a 
measure of the success or failure of the whole physical fitness programme in terins of 
outcome. The results of their views are summarised in Table 9.8 below. 
Table 9-8 Cadets' assessment of their physical fitness level (AI-V. Q7) 
Very Poor Reasonably Good Very m S. D SIG. 
poor good good L 
% % % % % L 
c6 13 39 31 11 3.28 1.02 P=. 008 
I 
(S) 
227 
Table 9.8 shows that when percentages are combined, only 42% of all the soon to be 
military officers joining the ranks of the prestigious SANG rated their physical fitness 
as good or very good at the completion of KKMA's physical fitness programme. A 
similar proportion of the cadets (39%) rated their fitness state as reasonably good. The 
remaining 19%, in contrast, described it as poor or very poor. The whole sample mean 
is a moderate (3.28, P= . 008(S)). Overall, these results are by no means disastrous, but 
they are disappointing if the aim is to achieve high levels of fitness and confidence for 
all young officers about to become leaders of platoons. 
9.4 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has been presented in two broad parts. The first one outlined the main 
objectives of KKMA's physical fitness programme, described its two implementation 
approaches and contents, and highlighted the role of competition and the types of tests 
used to ensure fitness among cadets. 
Documents analysis revealed that KKMA had two approaches that complemented one 
another. The first one is the programmed and evaluated approach, where cadets are 
prepared through four types of physical activities. These are: body exercises, 
endurance exercises, fighting spirit-enhancing exercises and swimming. The second 
approach concerns extra-curricular activities, where cadets participate in a variety of 
sports and are encouraged to take part in competitions. In order to increase the 
competitive spirit among cadets, the Academy has also two types of competition, 
internal and external; the former between cadet platoons and companies and the latter 
with other military institutions. In theory, the physical fitness programme is given the 
same importance as other components of the officer preparation programme. Cadets 
need to pass the physical fitness test in order to continue into the next year. 
The second part of this chapter presented a detailed analysis of both survey and 
interview findings related to KKMA's physical fitness programme. The presentation 
began with the analysis of the research participants' perceptions of the official position 
of the Academy towards the cadets' physical fitness programme. Surprisingly, under 
half of them, including one interviewed commander, recognised that KKMA did not 
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pay sufficient attention to this programme component. One in five cadets went as far as 
to say that the Academy gave little or no importance to it. In contrast, the respondents' 
personal views on the importance of the programme was recognised by 94.5% of both 
cadets and teaching staff members. (Table 9.3). Regarding the question of whether 
KKMA offered a well-structured and balanced physical fitness programme, opinions 
were split, with under 40% of the participants responding affirmatively, and just over a 
quarter of them rating it as poor or very poor. 
Measured against eleven performance criteria (Table 9.5), KKMA's physical fitness 
programme appeared to fare well in two respects: "Provides Professional instructors" 
and "Includes a wide variety of sports in its physical fitness programme". The survey 
respondents also rated KKMA as doing reasonably well in six other variables. These 
are: "Encourages liking for sports and outdoor activities", "Improves the cadets' 
skills", "Makes sure that all cadets participate in at least one competitive sport", 
"Provides a basic knowledge of a wide variety of sports", "Allocates enough time for 
physical training", and "Allows choice in physical fitness activities". However, the 
Academy fared less well in terms of programme outcome particularly with regard to 
three items: "Integrates well other physical activities in its physical fitness programme 
(e. g. obstacle drills, endurance marches etc. )", "Ensures that cadets are never allowed 
to be physically unfit" and "Teaches cadets to coach others to be able to train their 
troops in the future". 
On the question of obstacles that block the effectiveness of the physical fitness 
programme at KKMA (Table 9.6), the research participants emphasised that there were 
seven 'major obstacles' that had a serious negative impact: "Lack of awareness of the 
benefits of physical fitness among cadets", "Lack of adequate access to physical fitness 
facilities", "Fitness activities are not designed in a way that makes them attractive and 
enjoyable V), "Lack of sports infrastructure", "Cadets are not willing to put in the 
necessary effort") , '. 'Lack of a 
fitness friendly environment" and "Poor medical care". 
According to the survey results, the Academy also appears to face 'minor obstacles', 
with a minor negative impact on the physical fitness programme: 
"Unsuitable food", 
"The feeling that physical fitness sessions are a burden to endured", "Lack of variety in 
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the physical fitness programme", "The use of additional exercises as a form of 
punishment", "Hot climate is not suitable for vigorous fitness exercises" and "Sports 
instructors are not good role models of fitness themselves". The remaining two items 
identified as having the least negative impact are: "The Academy is not seriously 
committed to physical training and education" and "Our culture does not encourage 
physical fitness". All three commanders interviewed admitted that there were many 
obstacles that reduced the effectiveness of the physical fitness programme at KKMA, 
emphasising particularly four variables: "the large number of cadets", "the lack of 
training facilities", "not enough instructors", and "the lack of co-ordination between 
the physical programme and nutrition". 
The respondents' concluding assessment of the physical fitness programme at KKMA 
in terms of overall satisfaction or dissatisfaction showed that on average they were 
somewhat satisfied, with an overall moderate mean (3.22). All three commanders 
interviewed, however, expressed some reservations due to the lack of facilities, the 
large number of cadets and the lack of coordination. When the cadets were asked to 
rate their physical fitness level and say to what extent the programme was beneficial to 
them, ratings were moderate with a mean score of (3.28) (Table 9.8). This is an 
indication of the need to improve KKMA's physical fitness programme in order to 
raise the fitness level of the future leaders of the Saudi National Guard. 
Finally, it is worth noting that out of the thirty one questions asked on the physical 
fitness programme put to both cadets and teaching staff members, the Mests used to 
detect differences between the two group scores found no statistically significant 
differences in twenty four cases and discrepancies in seven cases. However, the 
differences were in all cases a matter of emphasis rather than substance. In other 
words, the two groups did not generally hold opposite views, only stronger or weaker 
views than one another in certain cases. 
The final chapter will summarize the main findings, draw a number of conclusions, 
and consider the implications of this study. 
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Chapter Ten 
Main findings and Implications 
10.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Two of this thesis, a research model designed to elucidate the exploration 
and evaluation of KKMA's junior officer preparation programme was developed and a 
number of research questions were proposed. These were investigated using a multiple 
method approach involving survey, interview, and documentary research. The results 
were presented in Chapters 5,6,7,8 and 9. This chapter sums up and discusses the 
main findings, draws conclusions based upon them, and considers their implication. 
The chapter summarizes the major findings derived from the data for each of the five 
officer preparation programme components, as well as the main blocks to their 
effectiveness. These are then examined for their significance and implications. 
Following this, each relevant research question is answered. Finally, the general 
research implications, limitations and contributions are considered, and the study ends 
with suggestions for future research. 
For ease of reference, both the research model and research questions are reproduced 
below. 
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Selection 
Liberal 
Education 
Physical 
Fitness 
10.2 Research Questions 
RQI How effective is KKMA's recruitment and selection system? 
RQ2 How effective is KKMA's indoctrination programme? 
RQ3 How effective is KKMA's vocational programme? 
RQ4 How effective is KKMA's liberal education programme? 
RQ5 How effective is KKMA's physical fitness programme? 
RQ6 What obstacles , if any, impede the effective preparation of 
junior 
Vocational 
Training 
Indoctnnation 
officers at KKMA? 
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10.3 Major Findings 
10.3.1 Recruitment and Selection 
Analysis of the data on the recruitment and selection of Class 1999 revealed several 
significant findings. Among the most important of these were the following: 
1. Just over a quarter of all Class 1999 survey respondents (26.3%) said they were 
generally satisfied or very satisfied with KKMA's recruitment and selection 
system. 
2. Less than a fifth of all respondents (19.5%) judged it to be effective. 
3. KKMA's recruitment and selection procedures were deemed inefficient in their 
implementation and imprecise in reaching and selecting the best possible 
candidates for cadetship. 
4. The cadets' motivations for joining KKMA were found to be evenly balanced 
between institutional and occupational measures. 
Clearly, the very low level of satisfaction with KKMA's recruitment and selection 
system is a matter of concern. The findings indicate that although a majority of 
respondents (63.1 %) acknowledged that the Academy paid a fair amount of attention 
to its recruitment and selection methods, nevertheless almost three quarters of them 
either expressed dissatisfaction or were neutral in their reactions to them. 
Consistent with this, a mere 19.5% of the respondents judged KKMA's recruitment and 
selection system to be effective, while the rest mostly thought that it was ineffective 
(46.5%) or were unsure (34%). More than half of all the respondents were 
unconvinced that KKMA rigorously tested and chose only the best candidates for 
cadetship. They blamed the ineffectiveness of the system largely on the unreliable 
methods used, as well as poor implementation of the Academy's selection criteria. 
Part of the explanation for KKMA's ineffective and unsatisfactory recruitment and 
selection system may be found in the evidence gathered by this 
investigation. It shom"s 
that the Academy primarily relies on passive methods of recruitment, that 
is mainly on 
the personal initiatives of interested candidates, rather than seeking and reaching 
them 
233 
actively. Indeed, the results indicate that over 70% of class 1999 first got to know 
about the Academy either through personal inquiry, or from friends and relatives who 
were current members of the Academy. The literature review conducted for this 
research reveals that in our increasingly competitive world, the most effective 
recruitment and selection methods are those that are proactive. Only such methods can 
reliably maximise the chances of identifying and recruiting the highest possible 
proportion of top quality candidates for officership (Mosley et al., 1996: 3 01). 
Comments made in the interviews with the commanders who took part in this study 
suggest that they misunderstood the purpose of proactive approaches to recruitment 
and selection. Their concern was that if these were to be adopted by KKMA, the 
already oversubscribed Academy would be flooded with even more than the average 
10,000 applicants processed annually. Proactive techniques are not primarily intended 
to increase numbers but to focus on and target candidates with the best potentials to 
make good leaders in the prestigious organisation of SANG. As for the fear of being 
flooded with applicants, it is surprising that in the age of computers this is an issue at 
all. Regardless of how many apply, surely a simple database could be devised and used 
to sort candidates who fulfil certain criteria of excellence from those who do not and 
numbers could, in theory, be reduced to a manageable selected few of the very best 
individuals to groom for officershiP each year. 
Again, in the interviews for this research, all three commanders readily agreed that 
there was much room for improvement with regard to the whole process of recruitment 
and selection, including the instruments used, monitoring, and final decision-making 
on the suitability of candidates. The commanders stressed that their selection criteria 
were sound, but that the weakness lay in their implementation. This research confirms 
that KKMA's selection criteria are comparable to those of other military academies in 
the world, as evidenced in the literature. The system is, however, undermined by a 
number of obstacles, the most serious of which is the insidious and seemingly 
insoluble cultural phenomenon of wdsta, or nepotism (see Section 10.3.6 in this 
chapter). 
The loud and clear message that emerges from the research findings is that KKMA's 
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recruitment and selection system is defective in its implementation. On the positive 
side, if Mosks and Wood's (1988: 30) enlightened premise that there is no harm in new 
military recruits being driven by both institutional and occupational motives is to be 
given credence, then the Academy can take comfort in the finding that Class 1999 
proved to be neither idealistic nor attracted to an officer career in SANG purely for 
occupational reasons. 
At this point, it is appropriate to answer the first research question, which asks: 
RQ I: How effective is KKMA's recruitment and selection system? 
The findings and conclusions derived from the data on the recruitment and selection of 
Class 1999 force the judgement that it was unsystematic and ineffective in its 
implementation. Class 1999 recognised that KKMA invested huge resources, time and 
efforts on recruitment and selection, but that in effect, it relied mainly on passive and 
unreliable methods of recruitment. It was also perceived by the majority of the 
research participants as generally ineffective in selecting the very best candidates for 
cadetship. Most of them were dissatisfied with the system above all because they 
believed that it was vulnerable to external pressure. 
10.3.2 Indoctrination 
The investigation of KKMA's Class 1999 indoctrination programme yielded several 
important findings. The most compelling of them are the following: 
1. Overall, Class 1999 and their teachers were moderately satisfied with KKMA's 
indoctrination programme. 
2. According to the vast majority of participants in this research, KKMA tends to 
use overly harsh and outdated methods of military indoctrination. 
3. KKMA's indoctrination process focuses more on soldiering skills than on the 
all-important preparation of cadets for leadership. 
4. There is a pronounced overemphasis on conformity and obedience at the 
expense of creativity and personal initiative. 
5. KKMA was found to have a strong military culture and identity. It places a 
strong emphasis on traditional military values. 
First of all , it is worth noting 
that the vast majority of the survey participants (93.91 
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as well as commanders interviewed for this study recognised the crucial importance of 
the indoctrination programme in the preparation of cadets as soldiers and leaders. Over 
two thirds of them (81.6%) also described basic military training (BMT), where a 
heavy dose of indoctrination is inculcated, as undoubtedly the most shocking 
experience of a new cadet's life. They conceded, however, that it is an essential part of 
military preparation. Senior officers described it as the heart of military preparation, 
the foundation upon which everything else depends: discipline, loyalty, teamwork, and 
ultimately mission success. This is in line with professional military thinking and 
practices elsewhere (Lovell 1979: 96; Jordan 1971: 358; U'Ren 1971: 18; Downes 
1983: 3 10). Having said this, only 47.2% of the survey respondents were unequivocal 
in expressing satisfaction with KKMA's indoctrination programme. However, the 
whole sample mean for this item reached a moderate level (3.3 1). 
On the other hand, a large majority of the respondents consistently judged that KKMA 
was unduly harsh, particularly with regard to rule and regulation enforcement (65.9%), 
liberty infractions (65.1 %), discipline in general (70.8%), and in relation to unifonn 
appearance and grooming standards (52.4%). In fact, nearly two thirds of them 
(72.8%) considered that some of the indoctrination methods and practices used by 
KKMA were clearly outdated and counterproductive. 
This last finding was confirmed in the interviews with the commanders as one of. them 
recognised that he often felt uncomfortable with the level of harshness cadets were 
subjected to under KKMA's current indoctrination system. He also saw the disciplinary 
regime as too mistake-oriented, giving the impression that almost every aspect of cadet 
life was regulated. Reducing the level of harshness evident in KKMA's efforts to 
inculcate military culture in its aspiring officers would seem to be a reasonable thing to 
do. However, as Ellis and More (1974: 77) found in their in-depth study of American 
military academies, albeit over thirty years ago, any change in this direction usually 
meets with fierce resistance among officers and senior cadets. They would argue that it 
is dangerous to "go soft" on new recruits, that turning them into hardened men who 
could take the pain and successfully overcome the "stress factor" is part and parcel of 
military indoctrination and a necessary part of battlefield preparation. They might even 
oppose any attempt to eliminate traditional rites of passage, even excesses 
in this 
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regard, and turn a blind eye to them. Like others before them, they would argue that 
such a change would lead to poor standards of discipline and to the loss of an 
important military indoctrination tool. Reformers would have a hard job to initiate any 
significant departures from current indoctrination practices, as they are typically 
entrenched and rooted in tradition. 
The majority consensus as well as the admission by senior officers that KKMA's 
indoctrination was too harsh, authoritarian, and predominantly punishment-oriented 
call for reflection. As noted in the literature survey, the military expert Janowitz (197 1: 
xx iii) over thirty years ago rightly predicted that future military preparation 
programmes would gradually eliminate brutal induction procedures, excessive 
inspections, undue harassment, and subjecting recruits to degrading experiences. 
Inculcating military values and discipline through fear has only limited effectiveness. 
As pointed out by Ellis and More (1974: 75), Williams (1995: 25), and Moss (1996: 12), 
(you can only lead a man by fear for so long'. New ways of achieving indoctrination 
goals ought to be explored and experimented with, such as - the just-cited authors 
have suggested - identifying shared values and common goals, and generating 
motivation and team spirit through other means than authoritarianism without 
jeopardising authority. 
The finding that KKMA's indoctrination process focuses more on soldiering skills 
than on the all-important preparation of cadets for leadership may be viewed as a 
predictable consequence of the absence of an officially structured indoctrination 
strategy. Only upperclassmen, and not every one of them, get a chance to practise 
indoctrinating new recruits, which they often take as an opportunity to inflict on others 
the cruelties inflicted upon them rather than true indoctrination. There seems to be an 
assumption that making good soldiers of cadets is bound to make good leaders of 
them, or that there will be ample time for them to practise leadership in future. In 
contrast with Sandhurst's and West point's indoctrination progammesl Which stress 
leadership roles almost from day one, and where almost everything is taught through 
leadership (RMC 2001: 45, Yardley 1987: 197), KKMA is doing less than enough to 
systematically prepare its cadets for indoctrinating their own troops in future. 
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On the positive side, KKMA was found to have a strong military culture and identity. 
There was also much evidence that it placed a strong emphasis on traditional military 
values. KKMA's impressive modem buildings stand as awesome, proud monuments 
with gleaming symbols and logos. They project an unmistakable message of prestige, 
discipline, and high standards. More than half of all the survey respondents (mean, 
3.63) judged that KKMA was successful in inspiring in them respect and affection for 
the Academy, as well as in instilling pride in belonging to it and to its parent institution 
SANG. Well over 80% (mean, 4.08) of them agreed that the Academy successfully 
projected a strong identity, reputation, and commitment to excellence. The 
commanders interviewed for this study stressed their acute awareness that the 
Academy had a very high reputation to uphold, both in the eyes of the higher 
authorities and the public. 
Finally, traditionalists might rejoice in the finding that traditional military values are 
alive and well at KKMA. An impressive 87.8% (mean, 4.36) of the respondents 
believed that these were important or very important, with only a small difference in 
their perceptions of their importance from KKMA's point of view (92.5%) (mean, 
4.46). This is good news for the Academy at a time when - at least as reported in the 
Western world - there appears to be a widening gap between the standards of conduct 
inside and outside military academies, and the perceived deterioration of values such 
as courage, self-sacrifice, honour, duty, and so on. (Jones 1998: 18 1). 
It is now appropriate to attempt to answer the second research question of this study, 
which asks: 
RQ2 How effective is KKMA's indoctrination programme? 
The evidence obtained from the data on the indoctrination of Class 1999 points to a 
mixed verdict; that is, neither effective enough, nor wholly ineffective. The research 
participants' reactions were positive in relation to several important variables, such as 
control over all potential agents of socialisation, inculcating soldiering skills, military 
values, pride in the profession, and projecting a strong identity, reputation and 
commitment to excellence. On the other hand, they were in favour of some measures 
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for change, particularly with regard to outdated and excessively harsh indoctrination 
methods and the overemphasis on conformity and obedience. The most serious 
shortcoming was that the system better prepared cadets for soldiering than for 
indoctrinating their own troops in future as junior leaders. 
10-3.3 Vocational Programme 
Analysis of the data on the vocational programme for Class 1999 uncovered several 
notable findings. The most salient of them are: 
I- Class 1999's and their teachers' overall level of satisfaction with KKMA's 
vocational programme was moderate. 
2- KKMA provides high-quality basic military skills, namely drills and parades, 
infantry skills and shooting. 
3- KKMA offers adequate tactical knowledge and training, but it falls short of 
providing equally good technical knowledge and training. 
4- KKMA's leadership programme is weak and is not given the primacy it 
deserves. 
5- The provision of management and communication skills is disappointing. 
6- KKMA's MOOTW training is unduly limited to internal security, with no 
attention to potential involvement in international roles. 
The importance of the vocational programme in the preparation of junior officers is 
evident, which is why KKMA devotes virtually two thirds of its entire officer 
preparation programme to it. It includes, among other things, basic military skills, 
technical and tactical knowledge and skills, leadership training, mastery of 
management and communication skills, and grounding in the essentials of MOOTW. 
A total percentage of 95% (mean, 4.78) of the respondents judged vocational education 
as important or very important, while the commanders interviewed for this study 
described it as the vital ingredient for competent leadership and the Academy's major 
area of emphasis. The findings of this study reveal that Class 1999 were only 
moderately satisfied with KKMA's performance with regard to the provision of this 
component. In fact, less than half of all the respondents, including teaching staff 
members, were unquestionably supportive of it (42.9%) (mean, 3.27). For a 
fundamental component of officer preparation, this is somewhat disappointing. 
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There are various reasons for the lukewarm reaction to the vocational programme. 
Among some of the general criticisms levelled at it were that it did not provide a 
balance between theory and practice and that the learning environment was less than 
fully supportive of serious uninterrupted study. Apart from this, according to the 
participants in this research, it appears that KKMA offers a high standard in basic 
military skills, including infantry and shooting skills with live ammunition. The 
results, supported by documentary evidence, also indicated that the Academy paid 
disproportionate attention to military drill and parades, a common practice in other 
military academies, too (RMC 2001: 37, Yardley 1987: 109, Janjua 1994: 85), with 
arguably limited benefits other than ceremony and fanfare. Altogether, KKMA devotes 
almost half of its vocational programme volume to basic military skills (670 hours). 
In striking contrast, KK_N4A was found to set aside only 406 hours for military 
knowledge, combining technical and tactical military expertise. Still, this reflects 
significant attention to these subjects of study. Technical skills, it is worth 
remembering, have to do with the acquisition of the 'tools of the trade' so to speak, 
weapon systems, control systems, computers, etc. Tactical skills refer to troop 
movements, location and relocation, defence strategies, and so on. Both sets of skills 
are clearly complementary and must be mastered to a high degree of aptitude so that 
they can be applied in fighting and winning wars (ALDH 2001; 39-43). The 
respondents' overall assessment of these two crucial vocational components was that 
KKMA offered adequate tactical knowledge and training, but that it fell short of 
providing equally good technical expertise. Surely these two aspects of vocational 
education must receive equal attention if the aim is to produce all-round professionally 
competent junior officers. 
At the heart of the vocational programmes in preparation of junior officers is 
leadership training and instruction. The best military academies in the world accord 
leadership central importance in their programmes (RMC 2001: 45, Yardley 1987: 197). 
Indeed, as stressed by Palmer (1992: 6), the military academies' very reason being 
should be grounded in leadership. They are, after all, in the business of producing 
tomorrow's leaders (Atkine 2000: 19). 
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This aspect of the vocational component of KKMA's officer preparation was found to 
be particularly weak in more than one respect. It was no surprise, therefore, that more 
than-60% of respondents stated that the Academy failed to provide adequate leadership 
knowledge and skill. An even higher percentage, over 65%, considered that the 
leadership programme was not sufficiently rich in modem scientific theories and 
analysis of historical examples of leadership. In addition, well over half of them took 
the view that the practical side of leadership was predominantly based on authoritarian 
styles, rule by fear and unquestioning obedience. Worse still, over 70% of the research 
participants indicated that KKMA provided cadets with insufficient practical 
experimentation opportunities. Not only this, but they also criticised the leadership 
programme for failing to achieve a balance between theory and practice Turthen-nore, 
more than a quarter of the respondents, backed by a commander, were of the opinion 
that not all the officers cadets came in contact with provided exemplary role models . 
Finally, almost 66% of them believed that KKMA's vocational programme was not 
particularly conducive to the development of confident junior officers, equipped to 
lead men in times of both war and peace. It was least able to teach and train them to 
think creatively and act on their own initiative in accordance with the intent of their 
superiors, should the situation require it. 
The above findings can be seen as chilling reminders why leadership may be the 
greatest weakness of Arab training systems, as noted by Atkine (2000: 20). The road to 
improvement undoubtedly lies through the establishment of a well-thought-out 
leadership programme, both theoretical and practical. Ideally, this should be devised 
and overseen by a separate leadership department, well equipped with a library and 
various other resources for study and research. Thomas (2000: 14) suggests such a 
department could bring together the experiences and knowledge of many leadership 
experts in conferences, for example, or special addresses to cadets on leadership topics 
and experiences. Such a wealth of knowledge and experience would quickly 
demonstrate the futility of authoritarian methods of leadership, their inappropriateness 
and their counter productiveness in modem times. It would also undoubtedly show that 
effective modem leadership styles rely on subordinates' willing obedience and 
commitment, based on trust and shared goals, rather than on fear and forced 
compliance (Atkine 2000; 20-24). 
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The point was made in the literature review (Chapter Three, Sec. 3-4-1-4) that the 
preparation of professional military officers nowadays requires equipping them with 
the necessary principles of administration and management to enable them to run the 
affairs of the Military, whether in times of war or peace. The perception of the 
importance of this element of the vocational component is visible in the 80.3% support 
for it by the survey respondents in this study. Their assessment of KKMA's 
performance in this regard produced mixed reactions, with just over a quarter of them 
rating it as good or very good, while almost another quarter took the opposite view, 
seeing it as poor or very poor, and the rest - that is very nearly half of all respondents 
considering it neither good nor bad; hardly a positive endorsement. 
The commanders interviewed for this study also expressed split reactions, one 
maintaining that management courses at KKMA were sound considering the time 
limitations and the crammed syllabus A2-Cl, another while recognising the same 
constraints still lamented its failure to give cadets sufficient opportunity to practise 
managing time and resources A2-C3. It has to be admitted that in a hurried three-year 
preparation programme, there is only so much one can do; just one argument among 
many for extending the programme to four years. 
Another weakness in KKMA's programme equally attributed to time limitations, 
among other reasons given by the three commanders interviewed for this study, is the 
provision of communication skills. It is needless to stress how important good 
communication skills are for combat effectiveness and survival in the battlefield, as 
well as public relations (PR) (see Sect. 3.4.1.5). Suffice it to recall that the British 
Military Academy at Sandhurst for some years assigned it a separate department to 
ensure its success. Yet again, both survey respondents and interviewed commanders 
generally gave it the thumbs down. Thus, almost half of them judged it to be 
substandard and unsatisfactory, with no more than a third of them rating it as 
acceptable. The commanders admitted that more could be done to enhance the 
effectiveness of this component. The present researcher is in no 
doubt that 
improvements in this area are crucial not only for the individual aspiring officers, 
but 
also for the images of KKMA and SANG, as more and more military staff are 
expected to be able to cope with the media, public scrutiny, and the requirements of 
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participation in allied mission and international actions (Downey 1997: 177, Yardley 
1987: 114). 
Finally, since military objectives nowadays are no longer restricted to fighting 
conventional wars, as discussed in the literature survey (Chapter Three, Sec. 3.4 . 1.6), 
this study asked the participants whether KKMA's vocational programme adequately 
prepared cadets for the new mix of roles and demands of MOOTW (military 
operations other than war). Regrettably again, over half of all the respondents rated 
KKMA's provision in this regard as poor, and less than 20% of them as good or very 
good (overall mean 2.37 only). On the whole, the respondents felt that the Academy 
did not properly equip them with the knowledge, skill, and confidence they needed to 
perform in the new operating environments of the 21 s' century. To be fair, KKMA does 
provide some training in internal security, war against drugs and smuggling, terrorism 
etc., but its focus is admittedly limited to protection of the Kingdom, the state, and the 
public. A2-C3 conceded that there is a need to extend such training to cover 
competence in performance in foreign postings and international missions. Tomorrow's 
military officers might well be called upon to perform humanitarian relief operations, 
contain regional conflicts or carry out peace-keeping/making missions in places like 
Iraq, Afghanistan, or Africa. This is another argument in favour of extending the 
officer preparation programme to four years. 
It is now possible to answer the third research question of this study, which asks: 
RQ3 How effective is KKMA's vocational progamme? 
Bearing in mind all the evidence presented in Chapter seven, and the analysis and 
discussion of the major findings put forward above, the indications are that KKMA's 
vocational programme for Class 1999 was overall moderately effective, although it 
suffered from a number of shortfalls. It was rated highly effective in some respects, 
such as in providing high standards of military drills, parades, infantry skills, shooting, 
and tactical knowledge, while its provision of technical knowledge and skills and 
leadership training were considered less than satisfactory. The programme was also on 
the whole found to be fairly balanced, although more emphasis on practice was 
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needed. In terms of satisfaction with this component, reactions were moderately 
favourable. 
10.3.4 Liberal Education 
Analysis of the data on the liberal education component, which forms a substantial 
portion of the officer preparation programme, has produced many valuable results. The 
most prominent of them are summed up below: 
1. The importance of liberal education was perceived as low or very low by more 
than half of all cadets surveyed, in sharp contrast to the perceptions of their 
instructors and the Academy's official stance. 
2. The data on the survey respondents' overall level of satisfaction with KKMA's 
liberal education programme show that only a quarter of them were 
unreservedly satisfied with its provision. 
3. On whether KKMA lived up to the expectation of providing a strong, rich, 
interesting, and up-to-date broad-based liberal education programme, the 
research participants' views were roughly evenly split among those who agreed 
that it did, those who disagreed, and those who were unsure. 
4. On the extent to which KKMA's liberal education programme was effective in 
teaching reasoning skills and other useful intellectual habits, success was 
generally deemed modest. 
5. The respondents' perceptions of the effectiveness of KKMA's liberal education 
programme in instilling moral-ethical principles, wisdom and self-knowledge 
were broadly favourable. 
6. According to the research participants, the Academy's liberal education 
programme contains a balance of human and natural science subjects, but 
should ideally include an element of choice. 
7. The majority of research participants were opposed to greater liberalisation of 
KKMA's programmes. At the same time, they rejected the suggestion that the 
Academy should concentrate on military values rather than on intellectual and 
occupational pursuits. 
244 
KKMA's recognition of the importance of liberal education in the development of its 
junior officers is unambiguous and is well reflected in its allocation of 857 course 
hours to it, distributed over three years and representing one third of the entire officer 
preparation programme. Three of its main programme guides (KKMA Guide 1999: 38, 
General Programme Guide 2000: 1, and Academy Instruction Guide 2001: 12) clearly 
emphasise its importance and specify its aims as 'providing cadets with a broad-based 
liberal education, covering various branches of knowledge, including natural and 
social sciences, history, religion, and English language'. The programme guides also 
stipulate that its objectives are to enrich the cadets' knowledge of the society and world 
they live in, to broaden their minds and intellectual capacities, and to enable them to 
interact effectively both as future military leaders and subjects of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. Looking at the summarised contents and structure of KKMA's liberal 
education programme, it is possible to describe it as capable of meeting the desired 
objectives and even as an ambitious programme. It includes a wide variety of subjects 
from a broad range of branches of knowledge. 
However, the benefits of a strong, broad-based liberal education in the preparation of 
junior officers does not appear to be evident for graduating Class 1999 cadets. Quite 
the contrary, as more than half of all cadets surveyed rated its importance to them as 
low or very low (mean = 2.48), as opposed to their instructors, who rated it 
significantly higher (mean= 3.51, p= . 005 
(s)), and in contrast with the Academy's 
officially favourable stance. This result raises a number of questions why the value of 
liberal education does not seem to be ftilly appreciated by at least the majority of 
cadets. Objectively, however, this is no serious cause for concern since, as 
discussed in 
the literature survey, there are wide variations of views on the importance of 
liberal 
education in the preparation of junior officers among scholars and military academies 
all over the world (Effland and Reed 2001: 86). Moreover, 
it is not unlikely that their 
views will change later on as they mature and progress 
in their careers. Perhaps the 
teaching staffs judgements are evidence of this. 
What is clearly disturbing is the low overall 
level of satisfaction shown by the vast 
majority of respondents with the liberal education programme provision. 
Indeed. the 
figures show a consensus among both cadets and 
teaching staff ( p= . 139(NS)) that 
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KKMA's liberal education programme in its present form is only moderately 
satisfactory, with slightly over a quarter of them only satisfied or very satisfied 
(25.3%); the rest either expressed reservations or were thoroughly dissatisfied with it. 
The reasons for dissatisfaction are multiple. Often, as will be shown, they are due to 
the arguably over ambitious nature of the programme (an admission by A2-C2 and A2- 
C3), to some other weaknesses in its provision, but also to the length of the whole 
officer preparation programme and to the environmental conditions under which cadets 
are educated. 
Earlier, based on documentary evidence gathered for this research, it was argued that 
KKMA's liberal education programme could in theory be described as potentially 
broad-based and ambitious. In practice, there was no overwhelming consensus among 
the survey participants that the Academy met with such high expectations, despite its 
undoubtedly laudable efforts. The literature emphasises that a successful liberal 
education programme ought to offer a broad coverage of various branches of 
knowledge, a rich variety of interesting and valuable courses, a good understanding of 
current technology and its impacts, a solid foundation in computer literacy, and that its 
overall content must be equivalent to civilian university education (Keller 2001: 29, 
Albrecht 2001: 96). 
When KKMA's performance was assessed against such criteria, it was found that the 
participant's views were roughly evenly split among those who agreed that it did, those 
who disagreed, and those who were unsure. What is more, for three out of these five 
related issues, there was no significant difference between the reactions of cadets and 
the teaching staff who took part in the survey. There was only disagreement over 
whether KKMA offered a good understanding of current technology and 
its impact, 
and a solid foundation in computer literacy, with the teaching staff tending to agree 
more that this was the case than the cadets. No real enthusiasm was 
detected with 
regard to these aspects of KKMA's liberal education programme, 
least of all in relation 
to the provision of a solid foundation in computer literacy 
(mean= 2.46), with only 41 
teaching hours in total, which is a less than satisfactory performance. A noteworthy 
point in this respect is that only one in four survey participants 
believed that K-KMA's 
liberal education programme was as good as that offered in civilian universities. 
In a 
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world where the Military increasingly depend on technology and information, it is of 
some concern that the respondents to this survey felt that KKMA cadets were 1]1- 
prepared for the technological and informational explosions of the new century. Their 
counterparts in Western military academies are already beginning to train and 
experiment with computer simulations and virtual reality training and education 
resources (Michael 1995: 30). For all these reasons and others that follow, it is crucial 
to identify the reasons why perceptions of the liberal education programme are 
disappointingly mediocre. The views of cadets and teaching staff could be very 
informative. 
Bearing in mind such deficiencies, it was not surprising to observe similar reactions by 
the respondents in their assessment of the effectiveness of KKMA in teaching useful 
reasoning skills and intellectual habits. The eight specific areas selected for 
measurement were taken as predictable benefits that could be expected to result from a 
strong broad-based liberal education programme. Regrettably, the Academy's success 
with regard to its performance was judged to be modest. The highest whole sample 
mean only reached a moderate (3.33) in connection to the extent to which KKMA's 
liberal education programme taught cadets how to think for themselves and form their 
own measured judgements. The lowest whole sample mean was still a moderate 
(mean=3.06). It related to the extent to which KKMA's liberal education programme 
broadened cadets' minds and made them intellectually curious. Is it any wonder that 
only a quarter of them said they were satisfied with it and that more than half of them 
rated it as unimportant? 
KKMA would do well to discover why the participants in this study were of the view 
that its liberal education programme did not teach cadets well enough how to think and 
form independent judgements, how to follow a structured scientific procedure and 
arrive at sensible conclusions, how to think clearly and logically, how to organise their 
thoughts and how to distinguish between the important and the trivial. These are vital 
intellectual skills for all decision makers and leaders of men, particularly military 
leaders. Of particular concern is their belief that their preparation programme 
did not 
train them to reason critically without fear of expressing disagreement. 
This could be 
considered as a major deficiency since one of the principal purposes of 
liberal 
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education is to encourage creativity and innovation and to enhance cadets' ability to 
think critically, form independent judgements, and take suitable Initiatives with full 
knowledge of their consequences (Kirkpatrick 1998: 104, Sullivan 1998: 77). 
Other deficiencies were also noted, such as equipping cadets with only average 
communication skills, as the findings appear to show. How could junior officers 
destined to become future leaders be expected to meet the expectations of high- 
performance leadership in the 21st century and make wise and informed decisions with 
only an average knowledge of the appropriateness of objective evaluations, and with 
less than first-class insights into human nature and motivation? How effective, finally, 
is a liberal education programme that only partially succeeds in broadening cadets' 
minds and instilling intellectual curiosity and love of learning? Not effective enough to 
produce excellent leaders, present-day military educationalists suggest (Vitas 1999: 49, 
Converse 1998: 57, Boog 1998: 120). 
Moreover, contemporary military literature indicates that an effective liberal education 
programme not only educates the minds of future military leaders (Rothenberg 
1998: 153), but also stimulates value formation and strengthens desirable character 
traits, such as integrity, discipline, honour, duty, justice, etc. (Vitas 1999: 51-2). It 
should draw attention to the moral-ethical content or implications of issues, and 
encourage them to make them instinctively part of their judgements and decisions 
(Larson 1995: 34-7). It should, according to Adler (2002: 2), enhance our understanding 
of the moral and spiritual dimensions of our actions as well as instil wisdom and 
knowledge of ourselves and others. 
The results of this study show that the respondents' Perceptions of KKMA's liberal 
education programme performance in instilling such qualities and others related to 
them were largely favourable, with an overall percentage of 58.5%. However, when 
asked to assess the Academy's influence in specific areas such as enhancing their sense 
of responsibility towards society, tolerance and sensitivity to others, understanding 
people and the world they live in, percentages somewhat declined, although the whole 
sample mean scores remained relatively moderate. 
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Percentages and mean scores dropped to below 50%, and in one case down to 43.4 % 
(whether KKMA's liberal education helped develop 'wisdorn'). Incidentally, consensus 
among all the respondents was obtained in seven out of eight issues in this area. One 
likely explanation for this may be that the respondents were reluctant to attribute such 
effects exclusively to the Academy, although they would not deny that it upheld and 
possibly strengthened the values and qualities In question. This is not Implausible 
because moral values are strongly inculcated from a very early age in Saudi Arabia, 
both inside and outside the family and throughout schooling, and in all education and 
training institutions. Still, the figures may well be interpreted as disclosing areas of 
weaknesses in KKMA's liberal education programme, indicating a need to improve 
performance in developing integrity, honesty and good citizenship, in raising cadets' 
awareness of their own strengths and weaknesses, and in cultivating wisdom. 
Other interesting results were found concerning the issues of balance, relevance to 
military needs, choice, and skills transferability. Here, a clear majority of the research 
participants acknowledged that KKMA offered a broad coverage of the major branches 
of learning in its syllabus, but that there was room for improvement particularly in 
terms of the quality of delivery. In view of the short length of KKMA's officer 
preparation programme, the participants placed a high premium on relevance to 
military needs, with 63.7% of them rating it as important or very important (mean, 
377). Their insistence on relevance is consistent with the UK's strictly vocationally- 
based officer preparation programmes (RMAS 2002 Prospectus) and that of the Swiss 
military college (Kach 1999: 32), to name only two examples. 
One commander interviewed for this research (A2-C I) also stressed that every subject 
taught at KKMA should be relevant to the main mission of the Academy. In addition, 
the respondents also felt by a majority of almost 62% that an element of choice ought 
to be introduced (mean, 3.67). This way, according to Vistas (1999: 7) and Kirkpatrick 
(1998: 102), excessive workloads and 'intellectual torture' could be avoided. It would 
also reduce the risk of producing unifortned 'grey thinkers'. An exclusive 
focus on 
military-relevant subjects and activities may however miss out on the 
long term non- 
apparent benefits of a truly broad-based liberal education programme 
(Barker 2000: 10, 
Kenney 1996: 58). But, in a crammed three-year programme, relevance is inevitably 
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deemed important. If so, according to Effland and Reed (2001: 88), then it must be 
emphasised. A broad-based liberal programme is only realistically possible if a fourth 
year is introduced. 
The research participants generally were equally on the whole opposed to the greater 
liberalisation of KKMA's programmes. Thus, more than half of them felt that this 
could threaten its fundamental dedication to Spartan values. A similar percentage also 
believed that KKMA should not align itself too closely with civilian academic 
institutions and programmes, and favoured more focus on military sciences and 
technology. However, when they were asked for their opinion on whether KKMA 
should concentrate on military values rather than on intellectual and occupational 
pursuits, only 48.3% agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition. This is 
remarkably consistent with the earlier finding that the cadets' motivations for joining 
KKMA were healthily balanced between occupational and institutional factors 
(Chapter Five, Sec. 5.3.2). They appeared to share the view that a good liberal 
education programme should equip cadets with transferable skills which ensure 
professional flexibility and security for the future in case they moved into a civilian 
occupation at some stage in their careers. Liberal education was clearly not rejected as 
irrelevant to cadets' needs, but its excessive volume in a three-year compulsory 
programme was. 
It is now fitting to attempt to answer the fourth research question in this study, which 
asks: 
RQ4 How effective is KKMA's liberal education programme? 
Taking into account all the variables measuring KKMA's Class 1999 liberal education 
programme outcomes, it is possible to infer that on balance the programme was 
moderately effective despite its imperfections. The main chticisms 
levelled at it were 
that it paid insufficient attention to relevance to military needs, and that 
it was 
probably too ambitious in terms of volume and content within a tightly packed 
three- 
year officer preparation programme. 
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10-3.5 Physical Fitness 
Analysis of the data on the physical fitness programme brought to light several 
important findings. The most noteworthy of them can be summarised as follows: 
I- There are significant differences between the official importance given to the 
physical fitness programme, the perceptions of the importance it is given in 
practice, and the personal rating of its importance by the research participants. 
2- On the whole, Class 1999 and their instructors were moderately satisfied with 
K-KMA's physical fitness programme. 
3- Approximately four out of ten Class 1999 cadets rated their own level of 
physical fitness before graduation as good or very good; a similar proportion 
felt it to be reasonably good; and only about one fifth judged it to be poor or 
very poor. 
4- On programme structure and balance the respondents' views were split, with 
over a third of them rating it as well structured and balanced, a similar 
proportion as reasonably well structured and balanced, and just over a quarter 
as poorly or very poorly structured and balanced. 
Like other military academies in the world, KKMA regards physical fitness as an 
integral part of the education and training of junior officers. This is not merely for 
health reasons, as argued in the literature chapters, but also because of the widely held 
theory that there is a link between physical fitness and military preparedness (Pope 
1995: 441-8, Janowitz 1960: 130, USMA Prospectus 2001: 1, Sandhurst Diary 2001: 1, 
RMC Prospectus 2001: 50, RMAB Prospectus 2001: 2). Physical fitness is an essential 
element of soldier training. As soldiers and future leaders, military academy graduates 
are expected to function well under the most difficult and threatening situations. 
Physical fitness gives them the energy, power, and confidence they need to meet 
operational requirements and perform effectively under those conditions (Field Manual 
1992: iii). Few people would question its value for survival in the battlefield. Its 
importance is further increased by claims that it contributes positively to the 
development of character, sense of duty, team cohesion, team spirit, self-discipline, 
and morale, as well as the physical condition and appearance of aspiring officers 
(Chapter Three Sec. 3.6.2). 
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Examination of the documentary evidence relevant to KKMA's official physical fitness 
programme reveals that the Academy in theory spares no efforts in offering a well- 
structured, varied, and attractive physical fitness plan for cadets throughout their three- 
year officer preparation (Chapter Nine Sec. 9.2). It appears to meet the main 
requirements of 'Total Physical Fitness' (Chapter Three Sec. 3.6.3) although no explicit 
mention is made of the fourth component, i. e. the monitoring of body 
composition/weight control (Gindhat 1999: 12, Filed Manual 1992: 1-4), despite the 
fact the researcher knows well that this is done regularly at the Academy. Crucially, 
KKMA's physical fitness programme distinctly states its second aim to be "Training 
cadets on how to coach others in a variety of sports and in organising sports 
competitions" (KKMA General training Plan and Programme Schedule 2002). To its 
credit, the programme also includes regular physical fitness tests and first-rate health 
and safety checks and care as part of its commitment and goals (Chapter Nine Sec. 9.2- 
9.2.2). In theory, therefore, KKMA's physical fitness programme is capable of 
successfully contributing to the professional Preparation of cadets for officership. 
As just indicated, KKMA clearly endorses the importance of physical fitness for the 
health and military readiness of cadets in their future roles as soldiers and troop 
leaders. However, this research found that there were significant differences between 
the importance it is given officially by the Academy, the perceptions of the importance 
it is given in practice, and the personal ratings of its importance by the research 
participants. When the survey participants were asked for their views on how much 
importance is officially attached to the physical fitness programme by KKMA, less 
than half of them (43.5%) stated that the Academy considered it as important or very 
important. What is more, just over one fifth of them (20.7%) distressingly saw that the 
Academy gave little or no importance to its physical fitness programme. The whole 
sample mean was a moderate (3.35). 
In contrast to this, 94.5% of them regarded it personally as important or very important 
in officer preparation, resulting in a very high whole sample mean with no detected 
statistically significant difference between the views of cadets and their tutors 
(4.71)(P= 
. 300 
(NS)). The obvious implication is that physical fitness ought to have 
been given greater attention in practice by the Academy. It means that its perfon-nance 
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in this respect was below expectations, according to Class 1999, and their teachers. 
Both A2-C2 and A2-C3 conceded that more could have been done, stressing that an 
officer needs physical fitness as much as mental hardness and intellect; a reference to 
indoctrination, vocational and liberal education. 
Nevertheless, when the respondents were asked to assess their overall level of 
satisfaction with KKMA's physical fitness programme, 41.4% stated that they were 
satisfied or very satisfied with it, and over a third of them (34.4%) said they were 
somewhat satisfied. However, almost a quarter (24.4%) were dissatisfied or very 
dissatisfied with the programme provision (mean, 3.22). As an added measure of the 
Academy's performance in relation to its physical fitness programme, the cadets were 
asked to rate their own levels of physical fitness since they were just about to graduate 
at the time the survey was conducted for this research. Remarkably, a similar 
percentage of them (42%) rated it as good or very good. The next highest proportion of 
them (39%) felt that their level of physical fitness was reasonably good, and less than a 
quarter (19%) judged their fitness to be poor or very poor. The whole sample mean 
was moderate (3.28). As mentioned in the previous chapter, these results are by no 
means disastrous. One would expect, however, that every cadet who leaves KKMA 
should leave it in top physical condition. Sandhurst has this as a goal commitment for 
its graduating cadets (Sandhurst Diary 2001: 5). KKMA ought to follow suit. 
There are numerous reasons for the deficiencies and negative perceptions of KKMA's 
physical fitness Programme. These came to light when the respondents were asked 
how well structured and balanced the Academy's physical fitness programme was, as 
well as in answers to a range of other questions on specific areas of performance in this 
respect. On programme structure and balance, views were split, with over a third of the 
respondents (37.3%) rating it as well structured and balanced, a similar proportion 
(35.9%) rating it as reasonably well structured and balanced, and just over a quarter 
(26.9%) severely critical of it, judging it inadequately structured and balanced or not 
well structured and balanced at all. The overall mean was moderate (3.10), with no 
significant differences between the views of cadets and their tutors (p=. 
916(NS)). 
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In an assessment of a non-comprehensive list of eleven performance variables derived 
from features of successful physical fitness programmes promoted by knowledgeable 
writers (Harig 2001: 4, Gindhart 1999: 12, Wateny 1989: 15) and applied In military 
academies in the developed world (sections 3.6 & 9.3.3), the respondents admitted that 
KKMA provided professional physical fitness instructors and included a wide vanety 
of sports in its fitness programme. In all the remaining areas of performance except 
three (Chapter Nine Sec. 9.3.3), which will be returned to shortly, KKMA perfonned 
moderately well according to the survey respondents. They included encouraging 
cadets to develop a liking for sport and outdoor activities, providing a basic knowledge 
of a wide variety of sports, allocating time for physical training, and allowing choice in 
physical fitness activities. All were the object of consensus between cadets and 
teaching staff. 
The lowest whole sample mean scores (under 3.00) were however obtained in three 
key areas of importance: on whether KKMA integrates well other physical activities in 
its physical fitness programme (e. g. obstacle drills, endurance marches etc. (mean, 
2.98)), whether it ensured that cadets were never allowed to be physically unfit (mean, 
2.96), and whether it taught them to coach others so that they could train their own 
troops in future (mean, 2.67). This finding is at odds with the literature, which shows 
for example that at Sandhurst, the overall purpose of the physical fitness programme is 
"to ensure that every cadet leaves Sandhurst in top physical condition and will be able 
to supervise the fitness training of the soldiers who will be under their command" 
(Sandhurst Diary 2001: 2). The scores could be interpreted as indicating failure to meet 
at least two programme goals adequately: (1) developing cadets' physical fitness, and 
(2) training cadets on how to coach and organise physical fitness activities and 
organise sports competitions. It is clear that the weaknesses are in the implementation 
of the programme, rather than in its design, although greater emphasis on training 
future trainers might have engendered a better focus on these requirements. 
Finally, it is time to answer the fifth research question of this study which asks: 
RQ5 How effective is KKMA's physical fitness programme? 
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On the basis of all the evidence derived from the data on KKMA's Class 1999 physical 
fitness programme, it is possible to describe it as moderately effective despite suffering 
from a number of weaknesses and facing numerous obstacles. The main criticisms of 
the programme were that it allowed little choice for fitness activities; it was not well 
integrated with other physical activities, such as obstacle drills and endurance marches, 
and most importantly it did not sufficiently teach cadets how to coach others to enable 
them to train their own troops in future. 
10.3.6 Obstacles 
No officer preparation programme is immune from imperfections and KKMA is no 
exception. Because of their importance, this research has undertaken an extensive 
search for the most common blocks to effectiveness potentially affecting the five 
components of officership, namely recruitment and selection, indoctrination, 
vocational and liberal education, and physical fitness. Those that were found to have a 
direct influence on KKMA's programmes were assessed for their impacts and 
discussed in some detail in relevant sections of the data analysis findings. They all 
represent challenges and difficulties to be faced during the difficult task of selecting, 
training and educating recruits for officership. This section will only focus on the top 
ten impediments - two from each component - with the most serious effects on 
KKMA's officer preparation, as perceived by Class 1999 and their instructors. 
Wasta 
With regard to recruitment and selection and ahead of all the issues with the most 
negative impacts on the officer preparation programme, wasta (the Arabic word for 
nepotism) emerged as the most disturbing and the most intractable of all (Chapter Five 
Sec. 5.3.4). It is a pervasive and complex cultural phenomenon rooted in tribal 
tradition and is a fact of life in Saudi Arabia and in other Arab countries. As Al-Medlej 
(1997: 15 1) claims, most Saudis to some degree comply with it even though they may 
disapprove of it, because the costs of non-compliance may be too heavy. There are of 
course those who argue that its influence is in fact blown out of proportion, as one 
commander interviewed for this research maintained. 
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Nevertheless, it is impossible to dismiss the results of this study on this issue as the 
product of the respondent's imagination. And, regardless of the extent to which wdsta 
plays a role in KKMA's admission procedure, the perception of its existence and 
influence on selection decisions makes a mockery of the whole lengthy and costly 
recruitment and selection process. The implications of a selection system affected by 
wasta can be considered very serious. As Lescreve (2001: 94) argues, an unscientific 
selection process is no better than a random process. It is a defective system that could 
allow persons unfit for the profession to enter it. Cook and Klumper (2000: 27-10) 
make the same point, adding that the consequences of allowing such people into the 
officer profession can be very high, and not in terms of money alone. Thus, a selection 
system where wdsta plays a role, rather than being based on competence and merit, 
represents many threats to its credibility, fairness and efficiency, and to the image and 
professionalism of the Academy and its graduates. 
Unsystematic Selection Instruments 
The second major obstacle to effective recruitment and selection at KKMA was 
brought to light through documentary evidence. This was the Academy's reliance on 
unsystematic selection procedures and techniques (Chapter Five Sec. 5.2.2 and 5.2.3). 
Because of the huge number of applicants processed annually (10,000 candidates on 
average), paper and pen instruments of selection tend to predominate. This leaves no 
room for the use of more sophisticated and arguably more systematic selection tools, 
such as the socio-psychological tests discussed in the literature (Chapter 3). It is 
perhaps time to challenge the validity and reliability of the recruitment and selection 
methods currently in use at KKMA and to experiment with other instruments used 
particularly in military academies of the Western world, such as personality tests and 
computer-based tests. 
Absence of Indoctrination Guide 
The fact that no comprehensive guide or manual for the indoctrination of cadets exists 
at KKMA, to the best of the present researcher's knowledge, could be viewed as the 
reason for many shortcomings in the indoctrination programme (Chapter Six Sec. 
6.2). 
Responsibility for the design and implementation of the indoctrination strategy for all 
cadets rests with Battalion Headquarters. All attempts made by the researcher to get 
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hold of evidence of the existence of a specific, structured indoctrination programme 
were in vain. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the indoctrination 
programme was judged to be plagued by excessive harshness and inconsistencies since 
instructors and upperclassmen were left with virtually a free hand to indoctrinate as 
they saw fit, although the punishment system was regulated. 
Overemphasis on Conformity and Obedience 
The reactions of the research participants indicated that an unrelenting overemphasis 
on conformity and obedience in the indoctrination of cadets throughout their three 
years of officer preparation may be short-sighted and unproductive. It is an approach 
that is limited in its effectiveness and one that stifles creativity and progress towards 
more subtle, positive and enduring methods of indoctrination which are more in tune 
with the needs of the modem world. Perpetuating outmoded values and traditions 
without questioning their usefulness shows an inability to change and move with the 
times. This is a difficult obstacle to overcome in a process driven by traditions 
renowned for resistance to change. 
Authoritarian Leadership 
Leadership is almost synonymous with officer vocation (Pernsteiner 2001: 82, RMC 
2001: 45, Yardley 1987: 197). Excessive stress on soldiering skills and overemphasis of 
authoritarian methods of leadership based on fear and obedience were found to be 
major impediments to the development of effective vocational knowledge and skills at 
KKMA. If Atkine (2000) is to be believed when the argues that leadership may be the 
greatest weakness of Arab training systems, then outdated, purely authoritarian 
methods of leadership, based on fear and unquestioning obedience, and charactensed 
by distance and contempt for subordinates, must be replaced by more enlightened 
leadership which inspires respect and trust and stimulates obedience and enthusiasm. 
Few Opportunities for Leadership Practice 
"Too much theory and too little practice" is how A2-C3 described 
KKMA's vocational 
programme (Chapter Seven Sec. 7.3.4). The research participants 
lamented the lack of 
opportunities for cadets to hold command positions and experiment with 
different 
leadership approaches. This is not surprising in a system that overemphasises 
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soldiering skills and expects leadership simply to emerge. Not placing leadership at the 
heart of the vocational programme, and almost everything else cadets do and learn at 
the Academy is a serious obstacle to professional officership. 
Lack of Enthusiasm for Liberal Education 
KKMA's three-year officer preparation programme is crammed. Its attempt to Include 
a range of subjects many military academies in the world cover in four years has 
implications for almost every aspect of officer preparation. One casualty is liberal 
education, which is as a result perceived as a luxury at best and a distraction from 
vocational education at worst. The fact that more than half all the cadets surveyed rated 
its importance as low or very low may be evidence of this (Table 8.5). Their insistence 
on relevance to military needs and on the introduction of an element of choice can also 
be understood due to time limitations (Chapter Eight Sec. 8.3.5.2-3). Lack of 
enthusiasm for a truly broad-based liberal education programme, however justified it 
may be, is an obstacle to complete officer preparation. 
KKMA Environment's Incompatibility with Intellectual Pursuits 
Although the respondents' views on whether KKMA was in theory capable of offering 
genuine liberal education within its strictly regimented environment were split, a 
greater proportion of them felt that the Academy did not make adequate provision for 
time for thought, reading, research and analysis. No doubt this situation is exacerbated 
by the crammed three -year programme. 
Undervalued Physical Fitness 
Whether accurate or not, the perception that the physical fitness programme is not 
valued equally to other components of officer preparation constitutes a potential threat 
to its success. The participants in this research placed the lack of awareness of the 
benefits of physical fitness among cadets at the top of 15 obstacles facing KKMA's 
physical fitness programme. However, they did not take full responsibility for its 
shortcomings. They blamed them mostly on the lack of access to physical fitness 
facilities, the fact that fitness activities were not designed in a way that made them 
attractive and enjoyable, the lack of a sports infrastructure, the lack of a 
fitness- 
friendly environment, and on poor medical care. This can be backed 
by their earlier 
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perception that the Academy in practice attached less importance to physical fitness 
than they did (see Section 9.3.1). 
Time Pressure 
The analysis of evidence from the survey, interviews, and programme documents has 
time and time again prompted the researcher to question whether KKMA's officer 
preparation programme was too ambitious in its tendency to cover the maximum 
amount of subject matter in a three-year period. The impact of time pressure is felt in 
every aspect of cadet training and education. It is a hectic pace of life that leaves little 
room for reflection or relaxation. Under such conditions, quantity takes precedence 
over quality of instruction, theory over practice and rote learning over creative 
learning. 
Finally, the sixth research question of this study asks the question: 
RQ6 What obstacles - if any - impede the effective preparation of junior officers at 
KKMA? 
The summary and discussion of the major obstacles derived from the data on all the 
five components of officer preparation investigated for this study provide a detailed 
answer. 
10.4 Implications 
The research findings have enabled the researcher to answer six research questions. 
These appear to indicate that the Class 1999 officer preparation programme fell short 
of obtaining the outstanding results that might have been expected from an institution 
with a reputation for rigour and excellence. No doubt the very high expectations placed 
upon it had played a part in some of the severe criticisms levelled at it. 
The study presents both theoretical and practical implications for the evaluation of 
junior officer preparation programmes in Saudi Arabia and beyond, particularly in 
other Arab countries of the Middle East with similar military cultures. 
On the 
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theoretical aspect, the study raises awareness of the importance of examInIng all 
aspects of an officer preparation programme to get a full picture of its effectiveness, its 
strengths and weaknesses. This was done in this research using a unique Star Model 
symbolising both aspirations and officership. 
The study findings provide ample evidence that KKMA operates by and large in 
accordance with contemporary theories of how military officers should be 
professionally trained and educated. Its officer preparation programme pays substantial 
attention to the acquisition of military knowledge and expertise (vocational 
component) without neglecting to complement it with a broad-based liberal education, 
both being necessary to qualify its future members as professionals (Jenkins 1970: 53- 
107). The findings also confirm that KKMA possesses all the hallmarks of a 
professional organisation in terms of corporate identity, culture, socialisation process, 
ethics, service and mission. Its weaknesses are a separate issue. 
Since professionalism has also come to be associated with competence (Barber 
1963: 671, Goode 1957: 126), judgement on the level of professionalism of Class 1999 
must be linked with their assessment of their own preparation programme provision 
and its outcomes. The results obtained speak for themselves. They indicate that 
KKMA's performance needs to be improved considerably before its graduates can be 
described as highly professional and on a par with their counterparts in Western world 
military academies. 
Practical implications include the need to review every aspect of junior officer 
preparation at KKMA if it is to continue to enjoy high esteem for excellence and 
integrity, and if its graduates are to merit the status of professionals. In particular, 
KKMA ought to do everything it can to reduce dramatically or eliminate the effects of 
vmSta on its recruitment and selection system. This phenomenon causes a huge drain 
on the Academy's resources, undermines efforts, dents morale and perceptions of 
fairness, and represents a potential threat with far-reaching implications if as a result 
of it, unsuitable candidates are allowed to join the ranks of officers. 
Another practical implication that follows from the findings of this research is the 
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necessity for KKMA to tone down its level of harshness In Indoctrinating cadets, 
without compromising discipline. The findings also highlighted the need for KKMA to 
place leadership at the heart of everything cadets do and learn, giving more emphasis 
to developing leaders who are capable of thinking critically, creatively, and 
independently. As for the liberal education programme, it is essential either to reduce 
its volume and focus on quality and relevance of subjects taught within the existing 
three year programme, or/and introduce an element of choice (major/minor subjects), 
or perhaps better still extend the programme by introducing a fourth year. Updating its 
content in terms of information technology and advanced technology is crucial. 
Physical fitness could also be improved by removing the barriers to its effectiveness. 
introducing an element of choice, improving access to sports facilities and putting 
more emphasis on teaching cadets how to coach others would go a long way towards 
making it more effective. 
10.5 Limitations 
All research has its limitations and the present one is no exception. The choice of a 
specific research strategy inevitably imposes certain limitations (Gill & Johnson 1997: 
ix). Thus, the findings of this study must be considered bearing in mind the following 
limitations. First, this study focuses on one military academy officer preparation 
programme, KKMA's Class 1999 regular junior officer programme. Therefore, the 
findings and conclusions obtained strictly speaking only apply to the mentioned 
programme regardless of resemblances to KKMA's graduate fast-track programme 
(see Fig. 5.1). Other than this, there may or may not be similarities with other officer 
preparation programmes within and outside Saudi Arabia. Only further research can 
establish whether the findings of this research are consistent with the realities of other 
contexts. 
Moreover, since the research participants for this study were selected using stratified 
random sampling, bias in their responses could not be totally ruled out. It is possible 
that the respondents who took part in this study were better or worse than those who 
were not selected, in that they may have been more or less objective in their reactions. 
However, the researcher's presence during the completion of the research 
questionnaires preceded by an insistence on objectivity and truthful responses may 
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have reduced this threat to internal validity. To minimise it further, the respondents and 
interviewees were also reassured that their individual responses would be kept strictly 
confidential and anonymous, and that no names would be mentioned in the results. 
10.6 Contributions 
This research has made a number of contributions to what is a developing and 
expanding area of military research. First, it makes a valuable contribution to scarce 
cross-cultural studies of officer training and education (Converse 1998: 3). Secondly, it 
proposes a distinctive theoretical framework and a comprehensive questionnaire which 
can readily be used as diagnostic tools for the evaluation of other officer preparation 
programmes in other military institutions, and other national and cultural contexts. 
Thirdly, the findings of this research have identified numerous areas of strength which 
should be acknowledged and consolidated, while at the same time they also 
highlighted many areas of programme weaknesses which, if acted upon, could lead to 
the enhancement of KKMA's junior officer preparation programmes. Fourthly, this 
research provides an invaluable starting point for further and more focussed research 
by KKMA graduates, since it is the first attempt of its kind at the Academy and, as far 
as the researcher knows, throughout the Saudi armed forces. 
10.7 Future Research 
In bringing this work to an end, it is hoped that this research effort will stimulate more 
interest in the evaluation of officer preparation programmes and serve as a foundation 
for future research. Long before the study was completed, the researcher reallsed that 
each of the five components of officer preparation investigated was a major area of 
research in its own right. Each area could therefore be the subject of detailed study 
offering interesting and worthwhile opportunities for empirical investigation. 
Apart 
from this, there are still many other avenues for future research, such as the 
following: 
0A replication of this study in any other Arab or Third World country. 
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A comparative study evaluating and companng the effectiveness of the fast- 
track officer preparation programme with that of the regular programme at 
KKMA. 
A comparative study between KKMA's junior officer preparation programme 
and that of one of the other service branch academies in Saudi Arabia. A 
similar study could also be conducted by other researchers outside the 
Kingdom. 
A multiple case study investigating trends in the indoctrination processes of 
cadets across a number of service branches in Saudi Arabia. 
* An investigation specifically focussing on leadership training and education in 
one or more military academies in Saudi Arabia. 
263 
Conclusion 
This study, believed to be the first of its kind in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, aimed 
to an empirically based assessment of the effectiveness of KKMA's junior officer 
preparation programme. It has dealt with a topic of vital importance to SANG and 
sought to make a valuable contribution to military literature. To this effect, an 
extensive cross-national and cultural literature review was conducted. It brought 
together theoretical and practical insights from a multitude of military writers and 
experts and from the accumulated experiences of several military academies from 
around the world. Out of this wealth of knowledge, features of programme 
effectiveness and potential barriers to success were derived and used as a basis for 
evaluation. 
An innovative "star model" was then proposed to focus the research on its five 
constituting components: recruitment and selection, indoctrination, vocational 
preparation, liberal education, and physical fitness. Together with a carefully 
constructed, validated and pilot-tested questionnaire, they served as the main 
diagnostic tools for this research. In addition, to further enhance the validity and 
reliability of the conclusions drawn from the empirically gathered data, multiple data 
sources and triangulation integrating questionnaires, interviews, and documentary 
evidence were used. The investigation was also guided by Dowens' three evaluative 
questions: "How is it done? "; "How well is it done? "; and " how can it be improved? ". 
Based on the perceptions of the research participants, including one hundred 
graduating cadets, forty seven teaching staff members, and three high-ranking military 
officers, the findings indicated that KKMA's performance in accomplishing its 
mission to provide aspiring officers with the values, knowledge and skills deemed 
essential for their profession was nowhere near the apex of excellence yet. The results 
showed plainly that KKMA's recruitment and selection system on which the 
programme outcomes depend heavily was fundamentally defective due to cultural 
phenomenon of iv5sta. Its indoctrination programme, on the other hand, produced 
mixed reactions, while the remaining three components, the vocational programme, the 
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liberal education programme, and the physical fitness programme emerged as merely 
moderately effective with many areas of imperfection needing to be addressed. 
Critically, the Academy's emphasis on soldiering rather than on leadership training 
and education is indefensible. Experts stress that everything the military academy does 
should be geared towards leadership training. Altogether, if we adhere to the view that 
competence is vital element of professionalism, then KKMA's officer preparation 
programme for class 1999 provided a level of professionalism below that which is 
required for excellence and for meeting the challenges of the 2 I't century. 
This study has answered the research questions it set out to answer following a 
rigorous research methodology in gathering supporting evidence. It has increased our 
knowledge of the contributing factors to success and those that could impede it in 
training and educating military leaders of the future. It has provided a comprehensive 
picture of the reality of KKMA's junior officer preparation programme. The present 
researcher hopes that the Academy will see the value of an uninhibited self-assessment 
of its performance reflecting real concerns and issues that need to be addressed. Its 
findings are unlikely to be brushed aside as they are not contrary to expectations 
admitted by high-ranking officers at the outset of this investigation. 
In the researcher's view, however damning the findings of this study may appear to be, 
they ought to be seen as opportunities for remedial action and reform to correct 
deficiencies in areas of weakness, and for self-congratulation and consolidation in 
areas of strength, all for the good of KKMA, its graduates, and for the security of 
Kingdom as a whole. 
It is hoped that this study will serve as a stimulus for positive change, encourage the 
adoption of new training and education approaches and concepts, and bring about 
much needed programme content change, restructuring and updating. These measures 
are vital to drag the Academy into the 21" century so that it can adequately prepare 
future SANG leaders for the challenges of the complex operational environments 
ahead. SANG officer education and training of course continue 
beyond the academy 
experience, but historical evidence tells us that the seeds of enlightened, creatIN-e, and 
effective leadership are planted and nurtured from the beginning of an officer career, 
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that is at the academy. It is therefore imperative to get KKMA's junior officer 
programme content, structure, and delivery right. 
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Appendix 1: KKMA Questionnaire 
General Instructions: Please answer all the questions in this questionnaire by circling the appropriate response number, or by filling the blank space provided. Select the response that is most correct for you. It is important that your responses reflect reality 'as it is', rather than 'in a favourable light'. The information obtained through this questionnaire will remain confidential. Tick where indicated and circle a number from I to 5 (please note 5 is the highest). 
PART I 
Recruitment and Selection 
1. How did you first get to know about KKMA? (Tick one) 
(I - 1) through personal inquiry ------- 
(1 -2) through friends, relatives ------- 
(1 -3) through media advertising ------ 
(1 -4) following an open day tour at the Academy 
(1 -5) Other --------------------------------------------------- 
2. How important were the following considerations in your decision to join 
KKMA? 
(I = of no importance, 2= of little importance, 3= somewhat important, 
4. = important 5= very. important) 
Reasons for joining Acadgmy Influence Assessment 
(2- 1) wanted to serve my country 12345 
(2-2) the feeling of pride derived from being a military officer 12345 
(2-3) to continue a family tradition of service to the Military 12345 
(2-4) job opportunities more attractive than in civilian sector 12345 
(2-5) long-term job security and retirement benefits 12345 
(2-6) developing skills utilisable in the civilian world at 
sometime in the future 12345 
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3. What is your overall level of satisfaction about your decision to join KKMA? 
(I == very dissatisfied, 2. = dissatisfied, 3= somewhat satisfied, ,4=: satisfied, 5=ý erý satisfied) 
12345 
4. Each year, KKMA must decide on the suitability of thousands of applicants 
wishing to become military officers, of whom only a small number is chosen. 
Below are statements describing some aspects of KKMA's recruitment and 
selection. 
On aI to 5 scale, please indicate your views by circling one number for each item. 
(I = strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= somewhat agree, 4= agree, 5= strongly 
agree). 
Statement Extent of (dis)apreement 
(4-1) KKMA gives the greatest attention to its recruitment 
and selection methods 12345 
(4-2) KKMA uses reliable methods to reach and recruit 12345 
potentially the best officer candidates 12345 
(4-3) K-KMA has precise criteria which candidates must 12345 
meet before being accepted 12345 
(4-4) KKMA tests all candidates rigorously and chooses the 12345 
best among them 12345 
(4-5) Overall, KKMA's recruitment and selection processes are 
effective in identifying and admitting a majority of high- 12345 
quality officer candidates with the best prospects for success 12345 
(4-6) 1 am satisfied with KKMA's selection and recruitment 
process in general. 12345 
5 The selection and recruitment of cadets today faces a number of difficulties and 
obstacles. Below are some factors that could potentially adversely affect this 
process. Please circle a number for each item to indicate your assessment of 
the 
negative influence of each factor in KKMA . (I = very 
low, 2= low, 3= moderate 
amount, 4= high, 5= very high). 
-. dd 
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(5.1) Lack of independence of the committee's decisions 12345 
(5.2) Nepotism 12345 
(5.3) Poor and lengthy procedure I -) 345 
(5.4) Being late in announcing the accepted names 12345 
(5.5) Selecting only among high-scoring students 12345 
PART 11 
MILITARY INDOCTRINATION 
In this part of the questionnaire, you are requested to supply information about the 
cadet's experience of transformation from a civilian into a soldier at KKMA. 
1. On aI to 5 scale, how important do you regard the military indoctrination of the 
preparation of cadets for officershiP? 
(I = of no importance, 2= of little importance, 3= somewhat important, 
4. = important 5= very important) 12345 
2. Experts say that effective military indoctrination requires that everything and 
everyone a cadet comes in contact with (appearance of buildings, other officers, etc) 
during their formative period at the Academy should be considered as a potential 
influence on his Perception of military culture, values and ideals. 
2-1. How do you rate KKMA's level of awareness and control of these various sources 
of influence? 
(I = very low, 2= low, 3= moderate, 4= high, 5= very high). 
12345 
2-2. KKMA has a strong identity and a reputation and a commitment to excellence in 
terms of upholding military values and standards 
(I = strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= somewhat agree, 4= agree, 5= strongly agree). 
12345 
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3. The heaviest dose of indoctrination is inculcated during Basic 'Military 
Training (BMT), which starts from day one at the Academy. Please rate each 
statement below as to its accuracy in describing some aspect of BMT. Use the 
usual 5 to I scale (I = strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= somewhat agree, 4= agree, 
= strongly agree). 
Statement 
(3.1) BMT is probably the most shocking experience 
of a new cadet's life at KKMA 
Extent of (dis)agreement 
(3-2) BMT is an essential part of cadets' military preparation 
(3-3) BMT tends to be too harsh, brutal, and negative in some respects 
(3-4) Although KKMA's indoctrination programme has its flaws, they 
are outweighed by its positive outcomes 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
4. To what extent do you feel that KKMA is unduly harsh in the following areas 
of indoctrination on a5 to 1 scale 
(I = very relaxed, 2= relaxed, 3= somewhat harsh, 4= harsh, 5= very harsh). 
KKMA is harsh in: 
(4-1) enforcing rules and regulations 12345 
(4-2) relation to discipline in general 12345 
(4-3 ) relation to uniform appearance and grooming standards 12345 
(4-4) relation to liberty infractions 12345 
5. How important are traditional military values (absolute obedience, sacrifice, 
loyalty, military rituals, etc) to KKMA and to yourself? 
(I =of no importance, 2= of little importance, 3= somewhat important ,4= important, 
5- very 
important). 
(5-1) Importance of traditional military values to KKMA 
12345 
(5-2) Importance of traditional military values to me 
12345 
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6. The following statements measure some aspect of military indoctrination in KKNIA. 
Please circle the appropriate answer. 
(I = strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= somewhat agree, 4= agree, 5= strongly agree). 
(6-1) Some indoctrination methods used at KKMA may be outdated and 
counterproductive. 12345 
(6-2) If KKMA chose to reform its current indoctrination system to become less 
harsh, it would be moving in a positive direction. 12345 
(6-3) 1 am satisfied with the methods used to indoctrinate cadets 
at KKMA. 12345 
7. How well does K-KMA's indoctrination programme teach cadets each of the 
following abilities, skills, and attitudes? Please circle the number on the I to 5 
scale that best reflects your assessment of KKMA's performance for each item. 
(I := very poorly, 2 == poorly, 3 =: reasonably well, 4= well, 5= very well). 
Ability/skill/attitude Your assessment 
(7- 1) Soldiering skills 1 2 3 4 5 
(7- 2) Leadership skills 1 2 3 4 5 
(7 -3) Survival in combat 
1 2 3 4 5 
(7 -4) Group cohesion and loyalty 
1 2 3 4 5 
(7 -5) Effort co-ordination 
1 2 3 4 5 
(7 -6) Making rapid decisions under stress 
1 2 3 4 5 
(7 -7) Working against deadlines 
1 2 3 4 5 
(7-8) Physical hardness 1 2 3 4 5 
(7 -9) Mental hardness 
5 4 3 2 1 
(7- 10) Care and presentation of self and military equipment 
1 2 3 4 5 
(7 -11) Military courtesy and etiquette 
inside and outside the Academy 1 2 3 4 5 
(7 -12) Commitment to fundamental military values, 
such as duty, 
honour, and country 
1 2 3 4 5 
(7 -13) Pride in being a member of a professional 
institution 1 2 3 4 5 
(7- 14) Respect and affection for KKMA 
I " 3 4 5 
(7-15) Sense of pride in belonging to a unique profession 
1 2 3 4 5 
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8. The military indoctrination of KKMA cadets today faces a number of difficulties 
and obstacles. Below are ten factors that could potentially adversely affect this process. 
Please circle a number for each item to indicate your assessment of the negatiN, e 
influence of each factor on the adequate indoctrination of cadets (I = none, 2= some, 3 
=a reasonable amount, 4= quite a lot, 5= a great deal). 
Factor 
(8-1) Poor selection at the point of entry into KKMA 
(8-2) System is out of date 
(8-3) Excessively harsh punishments and abuses 
Extent of negative influence 
12345 
12345 
12345 
(8-4) Responsibility for indoctrination unduly left in the hands 
of senior cadets 12345 
(8-5) Uncertainty among cadets themselves about whether 
harsh indoctrination is necessary 12345 
(8-6) Difficulty of balancing indoctrination activities with 
academic priorities 12345 
(8-7) The feeling that there is too much to do and not enough 
time to do it 12345 
(8-8) The overemphasis on conformity and obedience at the 
expense of initiative and creativity 12345 
(8-9) The unwillingness of some staff to change certain values 
and traditions that may have outlived their usefulness 12345 
(8-10) Cheating incidents and breaches of Academy rules by 
Academy members 12345 
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PART III 
Vocational Preparation 
The questions in this part are about the education and training of cadets in the specific 
areas of military expertise and other functions of the modem military officer. 
1. On aI to 5 scale, how important do you regard this aspect of the preparation of 
cadets for officership? 
of no importance, 2= of little importance, 3= somewhat important, 4. = important 
5= very important) 1345 
2. The following statements measure some aspect of vocational programme in 
KKMA. Please circle the appropriate answer. 
(I = strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= somewhat agree, 4= agree, 5= strongly agree) 
Description 
(2-1) a high standard in infantry training 
(warfare training and exercises) 
(2 -2) a high standard in shooting skills 
(2 -3) a high standard in military drill and parades 
(2- 4) a high level of technical military expertise 
(2- 5) a high level of tactical military expertise 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
3. Please assess the following statements as to their accuracy with regard to 
leadership preparation. 
(I = strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= somewhat agree, 4= agree, 5= strongly agree) 
Description 
Extent of (dis)agreement 
Extent of (dis)aueement 
(3-1) KKMA's professional programme provides adequate knowledge 
and skills to produce capable military leaders 1234 -5 
(3-2) The leadership preparation draws on modem scientific 
theories and sound analysis of historical examples of leadership 12345 
(3-3) The leadership preparation offers cadets ample opportunities 
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to hold command positions in a variety of activities 12345 
(3-4) The leadership preparation provides adequate practical 
experimentation with different leadership approaches 12345 
(3-5) All officers cadets come in contact with provide good role models 
of leadership through their conduct and the standards they set 12345 
(3-6) The leadership preparation tends to overemphasise 
authoritarian methods of leadership based on fear and 
unquestioning obedience 12345 
(3-7) The leadership preparation produces leaders who are capable 
of thinking critically and creatively, and who can act independently 
in accordance with the intent of their superiors 12345 
(3-8) On graduation, cadets feel that they are confident and can 
organise and lead men in times of both war and peace. 12345 
4. In your view, how important is it for cadets to be equipped with at least basic 
principles of administration and management to perform future officer duties? 
(I = of no importance, 2= of little importance, 3= somewhat important, 4. = important 
very important) 12345 
5. How well are administration and management skills provided at KKMA? 
(1= very poorly, 2ý poorly, 3= reasonably well, 4= well, 5= very well). 12345 
6. How well are communication skills taught at KKMA? 12345 
(1= very poorly, 2= poorly, 3= reasonably well, 4= well, 5= very well). 
7. The 21 st century Military is often expected to conduct military operations other than 
war (MOOTW). How well do you feel that KKMA's professional programme 
adequately equips aspiring officers to cope with the new mix of roles and 
commitments, such as pursuing terrorists and drug warlords, carrying out peace- 
keeping missions, etc. 
very poorly, 2= Poorly, 3= reasonably well, 4= well, 5= very well). 
12345 
8. Overall, to what extent does KKMA offer adequately balanced theoretical and 
practical expertise in all aspects of the professional component of officer preparation 
(military skills, knowledge, leadership)? 
(I=not balanced at all, 2= poorly balanced, 3= reasonably well 
balanced, 4 =vvell balanced, 5 
= very well balanced). 
134 
-5 
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9. To what extent is the learning environment at KKMA conducive to the development 
of desirable high levels of professional military expertise in its future leaders? 
(I =not helpful at all, 2=a little helpful, 3= reasonably helpful, 4= helpful. 5= verý' helpful). 
12345 
10. On the usual I to 5 scale, please rate your overall satisfaction with KKMA's 
professional aspect of officer preparation (military skills, military knowledge, 
leadership). 
very dissatisfied, 2. = dissatisfied, 3= somewhat satisfied, ,4= satisfied, 5= very satisfied) 
12345 
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PART IV Liberal Education 
This part concerns general, non-military-specific education, which is designed to 
develop the whole person. 
1. On aI to 5 scale, how important do you regard this aspect of the preparation of 
cadets for officership? 
of no importance, 2= of little importance, 3= somewhat important, 4. = important 
5= very important) 12345 
2. Please rate all the following statements as to their accuracy in describing the 
general education programme offered to cadets at KKMA. 
(I = strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= somewhat agree, 4= agree, 5= strongly agree) 
Liberal education in this Academy offers: 
Description 
(2- 1) a broad coverage of the ma or branches of learning i 
(2- 2) a rich variety of interesting and valuable courses 
(2- 3) a solid foundation in computer literacy (IT) 
(2- 4) a broad understanding of current technology and its 
various impacts 
(2-5) an overall general education programme content that is 
equivalent to that of civilian undergraduate instruction 
Extent of (dis)agreement 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
3. General education aims to teach cadets reasoning skills and good intellectual 
habits. How well does the general education offered at KKMA teach cadets: 
Statement Extent of (dis)agreement 
(3-1) how to think clearly and logically, how to organise their 
thoughts, and how to distinguish the important from the 
trivial in complex situations 12345 
(3-2) how to follow a structured, scientific procedure and arrive 
at sensible conclusions using traceable evidence 
12345 
(3-3) how to think for themselves and form their own 
measured judgements 
12345 
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(3-4) how to reason critically and creatively, unafraid of 
expressing disagreement 
(3-5) the appropriateness of objective and subjective evaluation 
(3-6) to broaden their minds and be intellectually curious 
(3-7) insights into human nature and motivation 
(3-8) good communication skills 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
4. General education can cultivate desirable attitudes, values, and character 
traits. To what extent do you agree that KKMA's general education programme 
is used as a vehicle to: 
Statement Extent of (dis)agreement 
(4-1) emphasise the moral-ethical aspects and implications of 
behaviour 
(4-2) instil respect for the views and rights of others, 
tolerance and sensitivity 
(4-3) improve understanding of people and the world they live in 
(4-4) raise awareness of one's own strengths and weaknesses 
(4-5) develop wisdom 
(4-6) develop integrity, honesty, and good citizenship 
(4-7) prepare and motivate cadets for future learning 
(4-8) enhance their sense of responsibility to society 
2345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
5. To what extent do you agree that the general education programme offered at 
KKMA provides a balance of courses from the humanities and the social sciences on 
the one hand, and other natural and theoretical scientific disciplines on the other 
hand? 
=not balanced at all, 2= poorly balanced, 3= reasonably well 
balanced, 4= well balanced, 5 
= very well balanced). 
345 
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Many general education courses appear to have no self-evident immediate 
usefulness because their benefits may be indirect or have only a long-ten-n value. To 
what extent do you feel that it is important that military relevance be emphasised in all 
subjects taught? 
of no importance, 2= of little importance, 3= somewhat important, 4. = important 5= very 
important) 12345 
7. To what extent do you feel that there is a need to introduce an element of choice in 
the curriculum to allow cadets the opportunity to major in liberal arts, social science 
subjects, or in other sciences and technology subjects if they wish to? 
(I = of no importance, 2= of little importance, 3= somewhat Important, 4. = Important 5= very 
important) 12345 
8. Transferable skills are those that are usually valuable both in military and civilian 
occupations (as well as across subjects). 
(8-1) How important are transferable skills to you? 
(I = of no importance, 2= of little importance, 3= somewhat important, 4. = important 5= very 
important) 12345 
(8-2) How well they are taught at KKMA? 
very poorly, 2= poorly, 3= reasonably well, 4= well, 5= very well) 12345 
9. Below are now some statements regarding certain aspects of the general 
education programme at KKMA. Please indicate the degree to which you agree 
or disagree with each statement by circling the appropriate number 
(I = strongly disagree, 2 == disagree, 3 == somewhat agree, 4= agree, 5= 
strongly agree). 
Statement Extent of (dis)ajzreement 
(9-1) The large volume of the general education programme 
in KKMA is in danger of weakening cadets' fundamental 
dedication to the unique purpose of the military mission 12345 
(9-2) KKMA should concentrate more on martial values than 
on intellectual and occupational pursuits 
12345 
(9-3) KKMA should not align itself too closely with the academic 
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concerns of civilian education institutions and focus more 
on military sciences and technology 12345 
(9-4) Excessive liberalisation of the curriculum has had a negative 
effect on military standards and values 12345 
(9-5) KKMA ought to focus on producing immediately employable 
specialists, rather than generalists 12345 
10. Truly liberal education depends upon an environment that is conducive to its 
development. 
(I = strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= somewhat agree, 4= agree, 5= strongly agree) 
(10-1) To what extent do you agree that the military Academy environment does 
provide first-class, unrestrained instruction in this regard? 
12345 
(10-2) Good quality liberal education necessitates time for thought, reading, research 
and analysis. To what extent do you agree that KKMA makes adequate 
provision for these considerations in its curriculum? 
12345 
11. On a scale from I to 5, with I being the lowest and 5 the highest, please rate your 
overall satisfaction with KKMA's general education aspect of officer preparation: 
(I = very dissatisfied, 2. = dissatisfied, 3= somewhat satisfied, ,4= satisfied, 5= very satisfied) 
12345 
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PART V PHYSICAL FITNESS 
This part of the questionnaire asks you about KMMA's physical fitness programme 
and its effectiveness. Please answer all the questions. 
In your view, important is physical fitness officially considered by KKMA? 
(I = of no importance, 2= of little importance, 3= somewhat important, 4. = Important 5=ý cry 
important) 12345 
2. In your personal view how important is physical fitness in the preparation of cadets 
for officership? 
(I = of no importance, 2= of little importance, 3= somewhat Important, 4. = Important, 5- 
very important) 12345 
3. To what extent is KKMA's physical fitness programme well structured and 
balanced? 
(I=not balanced at all, 2 =: poorly balanced, 3= reasonably well balanced, 4= well balanced, 5 
= very well balanced). 12345 
4. Please indicate your level of (dis)agreement with each of the following 
statements describing KKMA's physical fitness programme. 
(I= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= somewhat agree, 4= agree, 5= 
strongly agree). 
KKMA: 
Extent of (dis)agreement 
(4- 1) includes a wide variety of sports in its fitness programme 
(4-2) integrates well other physical activities in its physical fitness 
programme (e. g. obstacle course, endurance marches etc) 
(4-3) encourages a liking for sports and outdoor activities 
(4-4) gives enough time for physical training 
(4-5) provides professional instructors 
(4-6) allows for choice in physical fitness activities 
(4-7) provides a basic knowledge of a wide variety of sports 
(4-8) teaches cadets how to coach others so that they will be able 
to train their own troops in the future 
1234 
12345 
12345 
1234 -5 
12345 
12345 
2345 
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(4-9) improves the cadet's skills 12345 
(4- 10) makes sure that all cadets participate in at least one 
competitive sport 12345 
(4-11) ensures that cadets are never allowed to be physically unfit 12345 
5. KKMA's physical fitness programme faces a number of barriers which can 
cause it to be less effective or fail. Please assess the following factors in terms of 
negative impact by circling the number that reflects your assessment of each item. 
(I = none, 2= some, 3=a reasonable amount, 4= quite a lot, 5= a great deal). 
Factor Negative impact strength 
(5-1) Lack or insufficient awareness of the many benefits of 
physical fitness among cadets 12 3 4 5 
(5-2) Lack of adequate access to physical fitness facilities 12 3 4 5 
(5-3) Lack of sports infrastructure 12 3 4 5 
(5-4) Lack of variety in the physical fitness programme 12 3 4 5 
(5-5) Lack of a fitness-friendly environment 12 3 4 5 
(5-6) Our culture is indifferent to physical fitness 12 3 4 5 
(5-7) Unsuitable diet 12 3 4 5 
(5-8) Poor medical care 12345 
(5-9) Our hot climate is unsuitable for vigorous fitness exercises 12345 
(5- 10) The perception that fitness sessions are a burden to be endured 12345 
(5-11) Fitness activities are not designed in a way that makes them 
attractive and enjoyable 12345 
(5-12) Sports instructors are not good role models of fitness 
themselves 12345 
(5-13) The Academy is not seriously committed to physical 
education and training 12345 
(5-14) The use of additional exercises as a form of punishment 12345 
(5-15) Cadets not willing to put in necessary effort 12345 
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6 Overall how satisfied are you with KKMA's physical fitness programme? 
very dissatisfied, 2. = dissatisfied, 3= somewhat satisfied, ,4= satisfied, 
5= very satisfied) 
12345 
How would rate your overall physical fitness level? 
(I = very poor, 2. = poor, 3= reasonably good, ,4= good, 5= very good) 
12345 
299 
Appendix 2: Interview Questions 
SELECTION 
9 What is the overall objective of the recruitment and selection processes? 
(Selecting only the best, and only those with the best prospects for success) 
How effective would you say are your recruitment methods? (Give reasons) 
How effective are your selection methods? (Give reasons) 
Are you satisfied with the standard of recruits that come to KKMA? 
Is there a problem of attrition at KKMA? How serious is it? 
What needs to be done to improve the recruitment and selection methods at 
KKMA? 
e How important are the recruitment and selection processes in relation to the 
overall officer preparation programme? 
e How many cadets are achieving success in your programme? How many are 
failing? 
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INDOCTRINATION 
" How important is military indoctrination in relation to the overall officer 
preparation programme? 
" How effective would you say your indoctrination programme is? 
" How satisfied are you with the indoctrination programme at KKMA? 
" How satisfied are you with the indoctrination methods used at KKMA? 
e To what extent do you feel that some indoctrination methods used at KKMA 
may be outdated and counterproductive? 
To what extent do you believe that if KKMA chose to reform its current 
indoctrination system to become less harsh, it would be moving in a positive 
direction? Please give reasons for your answer. 
301 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
9 How important is professional preparation in relation to the overall officer 
preparation programme? 
" How satisfied are you with the professional preparation programme at KKMA? 
" To what extent are the stated goals of this programme being achieved? 
" To what extent would you say that the programme produces confident and 
capable junior leaders who can organise and lead men both in times of war and 
peace? (Please give reasons for your answer. ) 
e The 21st century military is often expected to conduct military operations other 
than war (MOOYW). To what extent do you feel that KKMA's professional 
programme adequately equips aspiring officers to cope with the new mix of 
roles and commitments, such as pursuing terrorists, drug war lords? 
302 
LIBERAL EDUCATION 
9 How important is liberal education in relation to the overall officer preparation 
programme? 
How satisfied are you with the liberal education programme at KKMA? 
To what extent are the stated goals of this programme being achieved? 
To what extent would you say that the programme contributes to producing 
well-rounded junior officers and citizens (officers and scholars)? 
e Many military Academies in the world have incorporated an element of choice 
in their officer preparation programmes (electives). That is, they have a core 
curriculum (compulsory subjects) and the option to major either in the sciences 
or arts subjects. Would it be a good idea for KKMA to adopt a similar system? 
* What changes need to be made to improve the existing professional preparation 
progamme? 
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PHYSICAL FITNESS PROGRAMME 
9 How important is the physical fitness programme in the preparation of cadets 
for officership? 
How satisfied are you with the physical fitness programme at KKMA? 
* To what extent would you say that the stated goals of the physical fitness 
programme are being met? (Explain gap, if there is one. ) 
What needs to be done to improve KKMA's physical fitness programme. 
